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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how the United States reacted to changes in its external environment in the Asia 
Pacific after the Cold War; in particular, this paper examines the creation of the security trilaterals in 
what had been a traditionally bilateral alliance system and seeks to explain this through Washington’s 
complex relationship with the other great power in the region, China. American policy toward China 
has been marked by its policy complexity, in the sense that the US has seen China both as an important 
trade partner and a potential peer competitor. 
 
While many scholars have covered both alliance theory and US approaches toward China, this thesis 
seeks to explore both together, seeking to put American strategy in the region writ-large within an 
overarching neoclassical realist (NCR) framework. As a result, this thesis prioritizes power and the 
structure of the international system, while also maintaining that external variables alone are 
insufficient to explain the complex behavior exhibited by the United States at this time. It therefore 
draws from domestic variables introduced Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and examines them through 
the NCR conceptions of ‘threat assessment’.  
 
This thesis identifies four intervening variables as crucial to understanding the evolution of US policy 
in the region from 1993 to 2015. These include policy-coalitions of foreign policy elites (FPEs), their 
perception of the structure of the international system, the domestic political conditions in which they 
labored, economic inter-dependency to China, and threat-assessment debates. Applying those five to 
the independent variable of China’s rise, this thesis argues that American foreign policy elites formed 
into two broad policy coalitions, who could not agree on whether to balance or to accommodate 
China’s rise.  
 
The quasi-nature of the trilateral, the failed attempt at a quadrilateral, and the off-and-on again nature 
of US-Japan-Australia alliance dynamics indicate that foreign policy elites inside all three states 
continue to debate China’s threat-assessment status. Therefore, this thesis finds that at heart, hedging 
is the product of domestic variables, the inability of policy coalitions to triumph over their opposites.  
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHY TRILATERALS? 
Of all the changes to power and diplomacy in the Asia Pacific over the past fifteen years, perhaps one 
of the most intriguing and under-researched has been the gradual proliferation of a new type of 
security cooperation, the trilateral. As an area of research, the trilateral has fallen between the cracks 
of rising power debates centered around China’s rise1, hegemonic stability discussions2, debates on 
the future of the American “hub and spokes system”3, and Southeast Asian community-building and 
regional order studies4. Despite the relative paucity in research, the trilateral model has replicated 
itself throughout the region5, popping up between allies and even between peer competitors, fulfilling 
a range of functions; from political and economic, as with the China-ROK-Japan Trilateral Summit; to 
strategic and political, as with the Australia-India-Japan trilateral. Some are extra-regional in focus, as 
with the US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue; some are primarily regional in focus, as with the US-Japan-
Australia Security Dialogue; and some are primarily sub-regional in focus, as with the US-Japan-ROK 
model.  
 
As the past four examples show, the United States has been a particularly prominent builder of 
trilateral relationships, developing three trilaterals around its Asia-Pacific alliance partners.  Often, it 
has sought to link up allies with which it already has strong bilateral ties, but who lack their own 
bilateral, such as Australia and Japan. Often, as a result, the difference between bilateral and trilateral 
                                                          
1 See for example: G J Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West” in Foreign Affairs Vol.87, No.1 (Jan – Feb 
2008), pp.23-37; Nicholas D. Kristof “The Rise of China” in Foreign Affairs (Nov-Dec 1993); Aaron L. Friedberg A Contest for 
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York, W.W. Norton and Co. 2011); Henry Kissinger On 
China (New York; Penguin Group, 2011); Edward N. Luttwak The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy (Cambridge, MA, Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2012); Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge of China’s Grand Strategy and International 
Security (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2005). 
2 See for example: T.J. Chistensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and US Policy toward East 
Asia” in International Security, Vol.31, No.1 (Summer 2006) pp.81-126; Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic 
Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging” in International Affairs, Vol.82, Issue 1, (January 2006) pp.77-94; William C. 
Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World” in International Security, Vol.24, No.1 (Summer 1999) pp.5-41; Jorn Dosch, 
“Managing Security in ASEAN-China Relations: Liberal Peace of Hegemonic Stability” in Asian Perspective, Vol.31, No.1 (2007), 
pp.209-236; Christopher Layne “This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana” in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.56, Issue1 (March 2012) pp.203-213. 
3 See for example: Kent E. Calder, “Security Security through Prosperity: the San Francisco System in Comparative Perspective” 
in The Pacific Review, Vol.17, Issue 1, (2004), pp.135-157; Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: the US-Korea-Japan 
Security Triangle (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1990); Victor Cha, “American Alliances and Asia’s Regional 
Architecture Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations 
of Asia (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, Oct, 2014); Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security 
Dilemma in East Asia Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the International 
Relations of Asia (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, Oct, 2014); William T. Tow and Amitav Acharya, Obstinate or Obsolete? 
The US Alliance Structure in the Asia-Pacific, (Canberra, Dept. of International Relations, Australian National University, 2007), 
4 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies” in International 
Security, Vol.32, No.3 (Winter 2007/8) pp.113-157; Peter Katzenstein and Christopher Hemmer, “Why is there No NATO in 
Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism.” In International Organization Vol.56, No.3 (2002), 
pp.591-594 Amitav Acharya, “Culture, Security, Multilateralism: the ‘ASEAN’ Way and Regional Order” in Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol.19, Issue 1 (1998), pp.55-84; David Martin Jones, “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving 
East Asian Regional Order” in International Security, Vol.32, No.1, (Summer 2007), pp.148-184. 
5 Michael J. Green, “Strategic Asian Triangles” in Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot (eds.,) The Oxford 
Handbook of the International Relations of Asia (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, Oct, 2014) pp.1-13. 
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cooperation has been muddied, so much, that Desmond Ball, a prominent Australian scholar, has said: 
“it is often difficult and sometimes even impossible to distinguish purely bilateral activities from the 
myriad of multilateral activities in which Australia and Japan are engaged, and particularly from 
collaborative activities undertaken as part of the respective alliance arrangements with the United 
States.”6 This muddying of waters does not just cover what the trilaterals do, but also what the 
trilaterals are, since they lack one of the primary features of alliances, a formal or informal defence 
commitment between two allies. Noting this, William Tow – a prominent Australian scholar of 
trilateralism – describes them as a “unique theoretical challenge”7 for the international relations 
scholar, demanding either a redefinition of alliances or a redefinition of security cooperation. This lack 
of clarity has led to many scholars resorting to description as a form of definition. Michael Wesley calls 
the trilaterals, “expansive bilateralism”8, entailing “cooperative security behavior between three 
states or strategic polities”9. Certainly, it cannot be confused with “triangularity”10, a concept related 
to trilateral balancing (such as US-China-Japan triangularity). Despite this confusion, two 
commonalities reveal themselves in US-Japanese trilateralism: first, thus far, they all take place in the 
Asia Pacific. Second, they prioritize security over other forms of diplomatic activity.  
 
1.1. The Riddle 
In the early days of this project, I asked three different scholars to define the trilaterals. Perhaps, 
unsurprisingly, given the above discussion, I received three different answers. To one, it was clear that 
they were merely alliances-by-another-name. Another disagreed with this strongly, insisting they 
were about a US-Japanese attempt to further regional integration. A third argued they were part of 
an American containment strategy of China. This inability of three academics to agree on the nature 
of the trilaterals crystalized into the primary riddle of the trilaterals. It was clear that this definitional 
uncertainty would play a large part of my initial theoretical work. Were they alliances, as the first 
scholar insisted? Given their emphasis on security cooperation, they certainly seemed alliance-like, 
after all, they had no economic function, and nearly all their working groups and public statements 
focused on soft and hard security issues. On the other hand, they lacked the crucial element required 
by alliances: a stated or unstated defence obligation existing between one or more parties. However, 
if trilaterals are not alliances, what are they? And why would the United States be content with non-
                                                          
6 Desmond Ball, “Whither the Japan-Australia Security Relationship?” APSNet Policy Forum, September 21, 2006, Available at: 
http://nautilus.org/apsnet/0632a-ball-html/ (Accessed October 19, 2016). 
7 William T. Tow, “Contingent Trilateralism: Applications for the Trilateral Security Dialogue” William T Tow, Mark J. Thomson 
(eds) Asia Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle (New York, Routledge for Australia Strategic 
Policy Initiative, 2007) pp.27. 
8 Michael Wesley, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’s Institutional Politics” Ibid pp.39. 
9 William T. Tow, “Contingent Trilateralism: Applications for the Trilateral Security Dialogue” Ibid pp.27. 
10 Camilla T. N. Soerensen, “Strategic ‘Triangularity’ in Northeast Asia: The Sino-Japanese Relationship and US Policy,” Asian 
Perspective, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2006), pp.99-128. 
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obligatory defence relationships, when it had such a bold tradition of alliance formation? Was this a 
form of underbalancing11 by the US or its trilateral partners? Or was it a form of soft deterrence to 
rising powers like China? Were these inconsistencies caused by internal considerations like the US 
dependency on Chinese trade?12 If China continued to behave assertively, they seemed to suggest, 
would the trilaterals become increasingly alliance-like in their mutual obligations? One prominent 
Australian official13 asserted that the trilateral was all about policy coordination – presumably at the 
grand strategy level – and  therefore driven by a combination of external challenges and intra-group 
dialogues to deal with those challenges. While this would seem to have a large pinch of truth, 
particularly over the rise of China, it begs the question of why the trilateral continued to evolve so 
many hard power functions after the immediate dialogue was established. 
 
It struck me that there was historical evidence for trilatralism in Europe. After all, wasn’t the Triple 
Entente a sort of trilateral? It is a truism of schoolyard history that World War 1 was caused by 
alliances, but contrary to popular opinion, the Triple Entente was never a full alliance. As late as August 
1914, Lord Grey sought to reassure an anxious House of Commons that “the Triple Entente was not 
an Alliance” but rather, it only a “diplomatic group”14. Despite close military ties to France, Grey told 
the Commons that “nothing which passed between [our] military or naval experts should bind either 
government or restrict in any way, their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would 
give that support when the time arose.”15 Some historians, like Byron Dexter, have argued that in fact 
this lack of defence commitments resulted in grave consequences. For by not committing Great Britain 
more openly to France, and over-emphasizing the false distinction between the political and military 
spheres, he misled his own cabinet about the degree of obligation between the British and French 
militaries16, and in the process undermined what might have become a credible deterrent to German 
military adventurism. Why didn’t Britain formally ally with France and Russia? And what were the 
consequences of that informality? 
 
                                                          
11 Underbalance in a “timely and inefficient manner”, as put forward by Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political 
Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: University of Princeton Press, 2006), p.10. 
12 Michael N. Barnett, Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973,” 
International Organization, Vol. 45, No.3 (Summer 1991), pp.369-395.   
13 Miller, Amb. Bruce (Australia’s Ambassador to Japan; aide to Ashton Calvert, Secretary of DFAT 1998-2004) Personal 
interview, Tokyo, 23 February 2015. 
14 Statement by Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, HC Deb 03 August, 1914, Vol. 65, cc1809-32, 
available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-grey (accessed 
November 11, 2016). 
15 Statement by Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, HC Deb 03 August, 1914, Vol. 65, cc1809-32, 
available at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1914/aug/03/statement-by-sir-edward-grey (accessed 
November 11, 2016). 
16 Byron Dexter, “Lord Grey and the Problem of an Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.30, No.1 (January 1, 1951), p.301. 
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One hundred years after the outbreak of the First World War, we are now seeing a proliferation of a 
similar type of non-committal defence cooperation to that which existed between Great Britain and 
the Franco-Russian alliance in 1914. This trilateral model seems to be spreading right across the Asia 
Pacific. The United States and Japan – two of the region’s largest economic and military powers – have 
by themselves paired up in no fewer than three such trilaterals: the US-Japan-ROK trilateral, the US-
Japan-Australia trilateral, and the US-Japan-India trilateral. Despite the fact that American leaders 
have continually reassured China that they do not have the will or the ability to encircle or contain 
China, Beijing has followed the changes and updates to the US alliance system with barely-disguised 
concern. Chinese scholars have called the US-Japan-Australia trilateral an “Asian version of NATO”17, 
saying it represents “an important effort to balance China’s rise and military buildup in the region”18. 
Although one might dismiss this as a reflection of China’s worst-fear security apprehensions19, it is 
clear that the US-Japan-Australia trilateral is becoming ever-more able at cooperating during a 
conventional conflict20.This in turn has seemingly been driven by what some have called “ a symbiotic 
means to enhance the overall power of the United States and its allies and partners…and thereby 
maintain the existing power balance in the region.”21 Rightly or wrongly, the media in all three 
countries has often framed the trilateral in this geopolitical, China-balancing model. Even some 
policymakers have done so. In 2014, one Japanese diplomat called the burgeoning bilateral 
relationship between Tokyo and Canberra a “quasi-alliance”22 in remarks to the Australian media23, 
highlighting this hard power trend. Many more used such terms in interviews conducted for this 
                                                          
17 Feng, Zhu, “TSD – Euphemism for Multiple Alliance?” in William Tow, et al, (eds.), The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: 
Facilitating Community-Building or Revisiting Containment? (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 
p.43. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Rick Wallace, “Japan Military Drill with US, Australia likely to upset China”, in The Australian, November 25, 2014; Rob Taylor, 
“Leaders of US, Australia, japan to Meet, with Eye on China: Washington Seeks Help from Allies for Increased Cooperation in 
Asia” in The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2014; Rory Medcalf and Dr. C Raja Mohan, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: 
Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions”, on the Lowy Institute website at 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-to-Indo-Pacific-rivalry,  accessed on 5th of January, 2015; Robert 
Ayson, “Words fail Australia, and anger China, at the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” in The Lowy Interpreter, 11 October 2013, 
J. Berkshire Miller, “China Looms Over Abe-Obama-Abbott Trilateral at G-20 Summit”, in The Asahi Shimbun, November 21, 
2014; Wang Hui, “Trilateral Alliance only Shores up Tensions” in China Daily USA, November 26, 2014. 
20 For a discussion of the TSD’s evolving character, see: James L. Schoff, “The Evolution of US-Japan-Australia Security 
Cooperation”, Yuki Tatsumi (ed.) US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington DC, Simson 
Center, 2015), pp.37-50; For a broader discussion of the evolution of institutions, see Iain Wilson, “Darwinian Reasoning and 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics: Elimination, Imitation and the Selection of Behaviors,” International Relations, Vol.27. 
No.4 (2013), pp.417-438; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, “Evolutionary Tendencies in Realist and Liberal IR Theory”, in William 
Thompson (ed.) Evolutionary Interpretations of World Politics (London: Routledge, 2001), pp.62-109; Ian Lustick, “Taking 
Evolution Seriously: Historical Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory” Polity, Vol.43, No.2, (2011), pp.4-8; Bradley Thayer, 
“Bringing Darwin Back in” International Security, Vol.25, No.2 (2000), pp.125-151. 
21 Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security, Vol.40, 
No.4 (Spring 2016), p.49. 
22 Victor Cha called the US-Japan-ROK trilateral a “quasi-alliance” in his Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan 
Security Triangle, (Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 1999); while Ralph Cossa called the it a “virtual alliance” in his 
edited volume US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a ‘Virtual Alliance’, (Washington DC, The CSIS Press, 1999). 
23 John Garnaut, “Australia-Japan military ties are a ‘quasi-alliance’, say officials” in the Sydney Morning Herald, October 26, 
2014. 
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research project. In all this, it has been clear that internal debates continue on the nature of the 
trilaterals. This may explain why American, Australian, and Japanese foreign policy elites went to the 
trouble of creating a security forum but were unable to or unwilling to create a full alliance with an 
obligation for mutual defence.24 This might also explain why the United States has particularly found 
the trilateral format so useful in dealing with uncertain allies and a rising peer competitor. 
 
This internal tension between Washington and its allies has been apparent from the very first 
beginnings of the trilateral. In a press conference following the 2001 AUSMIN talks held between 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, a journalist raised the 
possibility of a US-Japan-Australia trilateral taking shape. Foreign Minister Downer’s conditional and 
carefully constructed response at the time is instructive: “So as not allow a hare to rush away here, 
we obviously – I think it must be obvious – wouldn't want new architecture in East Asia which would 
be an attempt to kind of replicate NATO or something like that. We are talking here just about an 
informal dialogue.”25 Was it obvious to Downer’s audience? And why did he not want a “hare to rush 
away”? And do his comments still stand, despite the fact that the trilateral has expanded over time 
and the “informal dialogue” he proposed now boasts three separate government-to-government 
tracks of engagement, with multiple thematic working groups, covering a broad range of activities, 
including humanitarian assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime security, counter-terrorism, and 
capacity-building? Furthermore, the three have taken serious steps to institutionalize intelligence-
sharing, and defence industrial cooperation. So, why did Downer take such pains to insist that the 
trilateral would only be an “informal dialogue”? Was his message primarily for Washington’s benefit, 
or Beijing’s, or both?  
 
As Graeme Dobell, a Journalist Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has written26, 
Downer’s message was aimed at warning both the United States and Japan that such a grouping did 
not limit Australia’s freedom of action, while also seeking to reassure China. Both this incident, and 
Dobell’s analysis suggest at least one theoretical answer to our deeper question on the nature of the 
trilaterals. By this reading, there are two “security dilemmas”27 lurking in the background of security 
                                                          
24 Hugh White, “Trilateralism and Australia: Australia and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with America and Japan”, William T 
Tow, Mark J. Thomson (eds) Asia Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle (New York, Routledge 
for Australia Strategic Policy Initiative, 2007). 
25 State.Gov Website, Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Admiral 
Dennis C. Blair, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, Minister of Defense Peter Reith, and Admiral Chris Barrie, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/4350.htm (accessed June 16, 2016). 
26 Graeme Dobell, “The Downer Legacy: Northeast Asia,” The Lowy Interpreter, The Lowy Institute for International Policy 
Website: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2009/09/14/Downer-seminar-Northeast-Asia.aspx (accessed June 7th, 2016). 
27 See, for example: John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", World Politics Vol. 2, No. 2 (1950), pp. 
171–201; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World Politics vol. 30, no. 2 (1978): 186–214 (Published 
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ties of these three states: the first security dilemma is purely internal, an intra-alliance security 
dilemma, in which “member states within an alliance are subject to feelings of insecurity toward one 
another”28, swinging between the dangers of “abandonment” and “entrapment”; the second security 
dilemma has an external aspect, in that all three states are aware that whatever actions they take to 
bolster their security, there is a fourth state reacting to this by bolstering its own security. This state 
is, of course, China. These two security dilemmas would combine with economic inter-dependency 
with both the United States and China29, serve to push and pull and pulling policymakers between 
balancing style behaviors and reassurance. As Dobell notes, Downer’s attempt at reassurance – and 
the many more since by US officials – have not prevented Chinese government officials and scholars 
from seeing the trilateral as a containing bloc or alliance. Nor has it hindered trilateral members from 
developing ever-greater alliance-like features. In a sense, the trilateral is the next-best thing for 
policymakers, who are unable or unwilling for domestic reasons to commit to full alliance status. 
 
The primary research question to this thesis was to try and answer the following: why did American 
policymakers choose a format for US-Japan-Australia security cooperation which had an unclear sense 
of defence obligation over the more conventional one of an alliance? Secondary questions include, 
what exactly are trilaterals? Why is the United States utilizing them so much in the Asia Pacific? Are 
they a new type of institution, or part of a greater US strategy? If the former, do they deserve their 
own category? If the latter, what are the implications for the balance of power in the region? Should 
the trilaterals be classified as organizations, dialogues, processes, alignments or quasi-alliances; and 
if the latter, are quasi-alliances different from alliances and other classic forms of defence cooperation 
in international relations literature? What is the relationship between the US-Japan-Australia trilateral 
and China? What are the implications for security studies and international relations? How should we 
think about the relationship between Australia and Japan, who, despite the immense strides in 
security cooperation, have such an ill-defined relationship that their leaders cannot agree on what to 
call it? And above all else, why now? What is particular to the current environment in the Asia Pacific 
to provoke these new institutions or dialogues? Are they related to Japan’s unique pacifist 
constitution?  
 
As a result of what I have called the definitional problem of trilaterals, scholars and practitioners have 
resorted to a broad range of terms to describe the trilaterals, including “informal dialogue”, “quasi-
                                                          
by Cambridge University Press); Glaser, C.L. "The Security Dilemma Revisited", World Politics vol. 50, no. 1 (October 1997): 
171–201. 
28 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 180-201. 
29 Michael N. Barnett, Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: the Case of Egypt, 1962-1973,” 
International Organization, Vol. 45, No.3 (Summer 1991), pp.369-395. 
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alliance”, “minilateral”30, “dialogue process”31, “security triangle”, “federated network”32, and 
“security community”.33 Indeed, Thomas Wilkins, has created an excellent taxonomic table of different 
forms of “alignment” in order to bring the trilaterals in line with international relations theory34. While 
such taxonomy has been useful to explaining what, they have not really explained why or why now. 
This thesis – while acknowledging the importance of the definitional debate to the international 
relations scholar – chooses to approach trilaterals in a different route. Indeed, rather than discussing 
the strengths and weaknesses of the various definitions, it chooses to focus on this interesting fact 
that scholars cannot agree on them, and makes this the starting point for our discussion. This lack of 
agreement in itself is fascinating in itself and says much about the trilaterals. 
 
This thesis focuses primarily on the US-Japan-Australia variant of the trilateral and investigates its 
origin-story. In eschewing the definitional approach, and using an origins approach, one finds that the 
American foreign policy elite (FPE) groups35 that manage US security and foreign policy in Asia have 
been divided about trilateralism from the very start. One actually finds that these divisions are also 
mirrored in the other two states’ FPEs, in Tokyo and Canberra. Roughly speaking, these FPEs are 
divided between those who view the trilaterals as a means of inter-connecting the traditionally 
bilateral San Francisco system, in order to deter and dissuade China from adventurism36; and those 
who fear a self-fulfilling security dilemma with China,37 and who have sought to bind Beijing through 
institutional and economic engagement. These two groups agree that China is a challenge, but they 
disagree on the solution, with one group acting in a tradionally defensive manner and the other 
practicing the adage “Hug your friends close, and your enemies even closer”. This split hinders clear 
policymaking. As Steven Lobell has argued, “when a shift in a component of power of a foreign state 
                                                          
30 Yuki Tatsumi (ed.) US-Japan-Australia Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington DC, Stimson Center, 2015), p.15. 
31 Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its 
Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006). 
32 Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security, Vol.40, 
No.4 (Spring 2016). 
33 Sorpong Peo, “Security Community-Building in the Asia Pacific,” in William Tow, ed., Security Politics in the Asia Pacific: A 
Regional-Global Nexus? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 154-58. 
34 Thomas S. Wilkins, “’Alignment’, not ‘Alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security cooperation: Toward a 
Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment,” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, (2012), pp.53-76. 
35 “Foreign policy elites” (FPEs) are defined in this thesis as members of the group, from government ministries – like the 
foreign, defence, intelligence, trade, and aid agencies – to members of the legislature or executive who partake in the external 
relations of a state. Complicating matters, there is a secondary layer of FPEs who have “privileged access” to this first layer, 
think tank researchers, academics, journalists, and members of funding foundations, who help shape the policy debates. The 
second layer of American FPEs are particularly influential because many are composed of former government officials, or 
government officials-in-waiting, and for this reason, US Government officials are more responsive to their influence. 
36 See for example, Michael A. McDevitt, James A. Kelly, “Chapter Ten: In Search of Stability: Designing for a Better Peace in 
East Asia,” in Ralph A. Cossa (ed.) US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance”, (Washington DC, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1999), p.152; and Blair, Dennis C. and John Hanley Jnr., “From Wheels to Webs: 
Reconstructing Asia Pacific Security Arrangements”, The Washington Quarterly, No 24:1 (2001). 
37 Robert D. Blackwill, Ashley Tellis, “Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China”, A Council of Foreign Relations Special Report, 
No. 72, (March 2015), p.18. 
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disables a foreign policy coalition, (then) the FPE is constrained in its threat identification and 
inefficient counterbalancing can occur.”38 Lobell uses the inability of British policymakers to agree on 
the threat posed by Germany in the early 1930s. The lack of agreement within American domestic 
foreign policy explored in this thesis relates to China, and matches both Lobell’s inability to carry out 
“threat identification” and the resulting “inefficient counterbalancing”. This “China Debate” has long 
been a facet of American foreign policy making. It divides the main political parties39, it permeates the 
bureaucracy40, and it even divides the domestic FPEs of America’s Asian allies.  
 
Recognizing this debate and the factions that define it, one policy-academic Dr Michael Green coined 
the terms “Mahanians” versus “Continentalists”41 to describe them. For Green, the Mahanians have 
sought to bolster America’s ties with its allies and promoted trilateralism as a means of doing that, 
while Continentalists have prioritised diplomatic and economic engagement with China. When 
Mahanians held key posts in Washington DC – as in 2001 – the trilateral evolved quickly. When 
Continentalists held those positions in Washington  – as in 2008 – the trilateral evolved less quickly or 
halted completely. Thus, trilateralism is the result of both domestic and external variables and might 
be seen as a form of alignment.  This domestic stalemate produces the policy behavior commonly 
known as “hedging” among IR theorists. Typically, hedging is described as a policy basket, or a 
strategy, containing elements of engagement and elements of internal and external balancing, a 
combination that is meant to minimize a state’s risk.  However, if trilateralism is the result of domestic 
policy battles, then we are left with the startling possibility that hedging is not a strategy at all, but an 
inefficient outcome, produced by contradictory policy impulses. At the risk of sounding flippant, 
United States policy toward China and the Asia Pacific – including the alignment behaviour of 
trilateralism - encapsulates “hedging” because American FPEs cannot agree on a threat assessment of 
China. It is not that US FPEs will never agree on a threat assessment on China – simply that they have 
not done so yet. 
                                                          
38 Steven Lobell, “Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: A Neoclassical Model,” in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M.  
Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp.42-75. 
39 See, for example, the “Red Team/Blue Team debate in Washington that characterized the late 1990s, early 2000s: Action 
on Hill Reflects Informal Group’s Clout” debates: Robert G. Kaiser, Steven Mufson, “’Blue Team’ Draws a Hard Line on Beijing”, 
Washington Post, February 22, 2000; Jay Branegan, “The Hard-Liners”, Time, April 02, 2001; Michael J. Waller, “Blue Team 
Takes on Red China,” Insight on the News, June 04, 2001. 
40 Edward N. Luttwak, The Rise of China VS. the Logic of Strategy, (Cambridge, MA, the Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2012), pp.213-247. 
41 The author would like to acknowledge his debt to Michael J. Green for providing this analytical framework, as well as the 
actual terms. Others, like David A. Beitelman critique “simplified ‘panda hugger’ versus ‘China hawk’ characterizations”. 
“America’s Pacific Pivot,” International Journal, Vol.67, No.4, (December 2012), p.1074. These two terms are somewhat crude, 
pejorative, and differ in tone from Mahanians versus Continentalists. The latter terms come with policy packages, and implicit 
assumptions about alliances, values, and the nature of power in the region. Having said that, they serve a similar purpose, in 
that like-minded policymakers can organize around those networks. 
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1.2. The Argument  
The main argument of this thesis is to assert that US grand strategy in the Pacific was shaped and 
constrained by domestic variables, namely the inconclusive threat-assessment debates between 
American foreign policy elites (FPEs) which accompanied – and occasionally triumphed over – the 
usual systemic external variables. Using the research programme offered by neoclassical realism, this 
paper puts forward the hypothesis that the confusing structural stimuli of the “double security 
dilemma”, has produced in the US inconclusive threat-assessment debates about China between two 
groups of American policymakers, the Mahanians and the Continentalists. In turn, these debates have 
created the oddly alliance-like-but-not-really-alliance US-Japan trilaterals – including the US-Japan-
Australia variant. This – rather than strategic intent – is how we might better understand what scholars 
call hedging42, a behavior that is associated with Washington’s China policy. The argument of this 
thesis progresses in three-stages, which goes as follows: 
 
Trilaterals: 
This thesis notes that the definition of trilaterals is not settled; they are viewed by various academics 
and practitioners in widely differing ways, because while they engage in alliance-like security 
cooperation, and they even contain alliances, they are not themselves new alliances, say, between 
Australia and Japan. This is not to say they can never be alliances, but that they do not fit the 
requirements for alliance status at present. In making this argument, I avoid trying to definitely define 
the trilaterals. As raised in the last section, I think that this definitional problem is itself fascinating 
and a useful starting point for our inquiry. By avoiding the definitional game, we can instead focus on 
what drives the states in question to act this way, and we immediately discover that they are driven 
by conflicting structural drivers – the double security dilemma – sends conflicting messages to 
domestic elites on the nature of risk in the Asia Pacific. This, in turn leads to inconclusive threat-
assessments (specifically, of China), which in turns leads to policy incoherence and inefficient 
balancing. On the one hand, domestic elites struggle to define the relationships of their states to each 
other, while third-party states undervalue the trilateral either as a “talk shop” or conversely overvalue 
the groupings as a “shadow alliance”43. In attempting to understand trilateralism, it is tempting to take 
a structural approach, viewing the trilaterals through the lens of great power shifts. It is equally 
tempting to use a foreign policy analysis to explain why the US has chosen to engage in this particular 
trilateral with Japan and Australia. However, if one looks at the interaction between domestic and 
                                                          
 
43 Purendra Jain and John Bruni, “Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance?”, International 
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external variables, particularly in relation to American domestic debates on the strategic meaning of 
China’s rise in the power system, then the reasons behind policy confusion in the US becomes easier 
to explain. Using the double security dilemma, combined with the domestic debates sheds light on 
why American FPEs have not pushed Australia or Japan harder to formalize the relationship and 
presents an additional insight into Lobell’s argument on why great powers underbalance against 
potential challengers. 
 
Foreign Policy Elites (FPEs) 
While admitting that there are many definitions of what constitutes a “state”, neoclassical realists 
such as Taliaferro, Lobell, and Ripsman (2010) define it as “a generic term for a variety of autonomous 
polities with different geographic scopes, internal attributes and relative material capabilities that 
coexist and interact in an anarchic environment.”44 They accept the explicit distinction between the 
state and society made by Otto Hintze45, and the relative autonomy this affords the former. A number 
of NCR scholars call these foreign policymakers the “foreign policy executive”. This is defined as the 
President, key members of the cabinet, and advisors, diplomats, and military officials who are charged 
with making and conducting foreign and defence policy46. This thesis accepts this term, but seeks to 
broaden it to the wider term “foreign policy elites” (FPEs), which includes the community that 
influences policymaking decisions. It takes the foreign policy executive as defined by Taliaferro, Lobell, 
and Ripsman, and instead labels this, “Level 1” of the FPE: those who directly carry out foreign and 
defence policy decisions or implement those decisions. It then adds to this, a “Level 2” of the FPE, 
which includes those who have privileged access to policymakers, or those who seek to directly or 
indirectly influence the shape of foreign and defence policy. This split is particularly suited to the 
pluralistic American model of policymaking in the Asia Pacific, where journalists, academics, and think 
tank analysts regularly meet in track 1.5 settings47, and where a high number transition in and out of 
government or elected office throughout their careers. 
 
In examining domestic debates that characterize US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, this research 
uses a framework proposed by Michael Green, and divides American FPEs into two broad groups, the 
                                                          
44 Steven Lobell, “Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy,” in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin  
M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy, (Cambridge, United Kingdom, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.27. 
45 See, for example: Otto Hintze, “Military Organization and the Organization of the State,” in Felix Gilbert, (Ed.,) Historical 
Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp.180-215. 
46 Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics, (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2016), p.61. 
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“Mahanians” and “Continentalists”. In an interview48 with the author carried out for this thesis, Green 
defined the term Mahanian in the following way: it included politicians or leaders who were “US-first, 
Japan-first, maritime, Mahanian, democratic value…Anglo-Sphere”. Later, in describing the short-lived 
Quadrilateral of 2007-2008, Green said: “it was a very Mahanian maritime concept with a democracy-
and-values overlay, which Mahan had.” In addition to describing this coalition and its features, Green 
asserted that a number of politicians had opinions or policies that were typical of Mahanianism, 
including “John Howard, Tony Abbott, Julie Bishop, Andrew Shearer…[Richard] Armitage, me, Kelly, 
Kurt Campbell on the Democratic side, the “Popeye club” as Funabashi calls us, and then in Japan it 
includes [Ryouzou] Kato, [Shinzo] Abe, and [NobKaneharas; To summarise Green’s description of 
these policy-Mahanians, they tended to emphasize close ties between allies on the one hand, and 
realist arguments about the possibility of a clash with China. Their name is derived from Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, the 19th century American naval thinker who emphasized US naval power, a common thread 
since Australia, Japan, and the United States are all dependent on naval power in the Asia Pacific – 
unlike China, a land power. For Mahanians, the intra-alliance security dilemma plays a large part in 
their calculations, so that they tend to prioritize alliance cohesion, the risk of abandonment, and 
reassurance. 
 
In the same interview49, Dr. Green also put forward the concept of the policy maker group, he termed 
the ‘continentalists’. Green stated, “In Australia, that was many people in DFAT, it was Hugh White 
among scholars, it was Michael L’estrange, who replaced Ashton. In the US, it was kind of Zoellick, 
Tom Donillon,”. They were policymakers in Washington who saw China as the focus of US efforts in 
the region. Green continued, “their big game was China. And then in Japan, it’s a dwindling breed. But 
Takeuchi is a little bit in that camp, and that’s a traditional MOFA position: keep close to the US but 
avoid entrapment in any US-China confrontation. A trilateral that was implicitly about China would’ve 
been inimical to that school, but not to the Kishi, Abe, group.”50 To summarize Green’s concept of 
‘Continentalists’, they are American foreign policy elites – working on Asia – who have tended to 
emphasize “getting China right” over strong alliance relationships. They also argue that China has in 
fact behaved responsibly in the existing institutions of global governance. They continued to hold that 
liberal capitalism will help the United States manage China’s rise, through the development of a 
progressive-minded Chinese middle class or through the “socialization” of China into global norms and 
practices. Rather than stressing the intra-alliance security dilemma, they instead tend to prioritize the 
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conventional security dilemma between China and the US. And finally, some like Robert Zoellick, had 
a background in trade and saw US foreign policy through the prism of the US trade relationship with 
China. 
 
In this way, Mahanians and Continentalists should be seen as a difference in degree rather than one 
of absolutes. One might support engagement with China and be supportive of America’s alliances. 
That is not the issue. However, when it comes to which is more of a priority, this thesis argues that 
here there are discernible differences between one set of FPEs and another. 
 
: :  
 
 
Hedging 
When American foreign policy elites – such as Mahanians and Continentalists – are unable to agree 
on the threat-assessment of a rising power like China, they are unable to implement clear policy 
directions. As we know from Schweller, states are only able to balance against a potential threat when 
there is “a strong consensus among elites that an external threat exists and must be checked by either 
arms or allies or both”51, but happens where is no strong consensus? In some cases, FPEs are pushed 
and pulled in various directions, which causes them to carry out a mixture of balancing and 
engagement strategies, depending on the constitution of the cabinet and how strong different FPEs 
are relative to each other in a given administration. They may happen by accident – as with the Bush 
Administration – or it may occur as a matter of deliberate policy choice – as with the Obama 
Administration. This policy incoherence constitutes a new theory of hedging, which builds on the two-
pronged definition provided by Evan Medeiros. As a NSC staffer in the Obama Administration, 
Medeiros envisioned balancing and engagement strategies to be different sides of the same coin. 
However, at times, hedging has occurred because of on-going China-debates between the Mahanians 
and the Continentalists. The TSD itself is a microcosm of this larger trend toward hedging, taking place 
within the networks of FPEs in the United States and its allies.  
 
1.3. Literature Review  
We will now review some of the academic literature on trilateralism. As stated before, there is 
comparatively little academic work on trilaterals. The first trilateral in the Asia Pacific was the US-
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Japan-South Korean trilateral, which was created in 1994, by Carl Ford, a former US defence official52 
in order to foster Japan-Korean bilateral dialogue, and thereby improve coordination between two of 
Washington’s most important regional allies. As a consequence, much of the early theoretical 
literature on trilaterals focuses on this particular variant of trilateralism, which has consequences for 
the theoretical work already carried out. For example, the idea that trilaterals are incremental bodies 
evolving toward greater institutionalization stems from Korean and Japanese domestic sensitivities to 
developing a formal relationship too quickly. Much early literature focuses on the prosaic function of 
coordinating policy over North Korea. Joel S. Wit wrote, “Trilateral cooperation had been the 
cornerstone of American strategy for dealing with North Korea… [and] securing support from Seoul 
and Tokyo would be the first act in the unfolding drama of building a multilateral coalition supporting 
sanctions.”53 But even in these early works, there is some awareness that trilateralism has regional 
effects, important to the wider balance of power. As regional security began to worsen in the late 
1990s, some American FPEs began to promote trilateralism as a US regional strategy aiming at closer 
alliance coordination and regional integration. Entrenched in these later debates, was a rarely 
acknowledged and contradictory debate about China, a debate which would ultimately bleed into 
every subsequent trilateral format. The integration of alliances through the trilaterals was thought to 
be a good thing, because it would deter Chinese adventurism, but formalizing such linkages was 
probably counter-productive and might create a security dilemma with Beijing. Academic discussions 
at the time borrowed heavily from alliance literature, particularly alliance formation, as well as from 
the less-clearly delineated area of institution-building and multilateral security architecture-
formation. While, much of this research track was put in place for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral, it re-
occurs with the TSD and sets the tone for much subsequent trilateral literature.  
 
In some ways, think tanks have played an oversize role in the creation or facilitation of trilateralism in 
the Asia Pacific. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)54, the National Bureau of 
                                                          
52 According to former Principle Deputy Secretary for East Asia (1991-1993), Carl Ford, these meetings were always 
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is an Adjunct Fellow at CSIS, which might be construed as influencing this finding.  
 
 
25 
Asian Research (NBR)55, and the Stimson Center56 have tended to dominate publications on trilaterals 
in the United States. This is partly because of the afore-mentioned definitional debate, and partly, 
because, as a phenomenon, they are relatively recent57. By contrast, Australian and Japanese 
universities field a healthy number of scholars who write about trilaterals regularly. Framed primarily 
by the initial definitional riddle, scholars tend to push research into two different directions: the first 
approach examines the US-Japan-Australia trilateral through alliance literature58, while the second 
examines the trilateral through multilateral security communities or regional integration. A sub-genre 
of the alliance-trilateral literature looks at Japan-Australia bilateralism, again, through the lens of 
alliance literature, as the “northern and southern anchors” of the US alliance system59 or through the 
lens of the normalization of Japan’s security and foreign policy60. Finally, a second off-shoot of the 
alliance-based literature frames trilaterals from a Chinese perspective, highlighting the concern that 
they might turn into a NATO-like structure61. This literature tends to see Japan and Australia as “the 
two claws of the US containment strategy”62. 
 
Perhaps, the first serious work by a scholar to provide a theoretical framework for trilateralism was 
by Victor Cha, whose Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (1999), 
examined trilaterals through alliance theory. In Alignment, Cha sought to add the “quasi-alliance” to 
the lexicon of classical alliance theory63, defining it as “one in which two states remain unallied but 
                                                          
55 William Tow, Michael Auslin, Rory Medcalf, Akihiko Tanaka, Zhu Feng, and Simon Sheldon, Assessing the Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue, NBR Special Report, (Washington DC, National Bureau of Asia Research, 2008). 
56 Yuki Tatsumi (ed.) US-Japan-Australia Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington DC, Stimson Center, 2015) 
57 There is, of course, scholarly work on the track 1.5 Trilateral Commission, but as this is and remains a non-government body, 
it is counted by this study as an all-together different type of institution. 
58 See for example, Thomas S. Wilkins, “Toward a ‘Trilateral Alliance?’ Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in 
American-Japanese-Australian Relations,” Asian Security, Vol. 3, No. 3, (2007), pp.251-278; Victor Cha, “Complex Patches: US 
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61 Xiao Zan, “’Mini NATO; in Asia-Pacific Region Plan by the US and Australia,” Beijing Review, 13 September, 2001, p.10; 
Purendra Jain and John Bruni, “Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance?”, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2004), pp.265-285. 
62 Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its 
Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006), pp.521-535. 
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H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997). 
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share a third party as a common ally.”64 Drawing from Snyder’s alliance security dilemma65 of 
“abandonment” and “entrapment”, Cha asserted that the willingness of Japan and Korea to develop 
closer security ties (alliance formation) was driven by a matrix of US engagement / disengagement 
and regional security / insecurity factors. The weaker US commitment seemed, the more both allies 
feared abandonment. This insecurity promoted closer Japan-ROK defence ties, however, the more 
secure they felt, then the more historical issues and domestic politics came to the fore, inhibiting ties. 
Although Cha’s work might be described as neoclassical realist, his analysis avoids analysis of different 
domestic groups within Japan, the United States, or Korea – one never gets a sense of how different 
FPEs in Seoul, for example, might differ in their approach toward Japan. Instead, domestic FPEs are 
differentiated from the state simply to demonstrate how nationalism and the historical issue influence 
foreign policy-making. 
 
Also published in 1999, Ralph Cossa’s edited volume US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a 
“Virtual Alliance” emphasizes the policy implications of the trilateral. As the President of Pacific Forum 
CSIS, the think tank in Hawaii that first hosted Ford’s track 1.5 US-ROK-Japan trilateral, Cossa’s volume 
is an early insight into trilateralism, involving many practitioners among the volume’s contributors. 
The book considers the trilateral through the lens of alliance formation, but introduces collective 
balancing and multilateral institution-building, linking these to wider concerns about regional stability. 
The pivotal chapter – for the purpose of this research – is “In Search of Stability: Designing for a Better 
Piece in East Asia,” by Michael A. McDevitt and James A. Kelly. Since both men have been intimately 
involved in the formation of US alliance policy66, this chapter holds some key insights into the thinking 
behind the creation of the trilaterals. Their main argument is that “the best hope for a security 
framework for Northeast Asia lies in three overlapping triangular relationships, all of which include 
the United States and Japan” 67. One of these triangles, “the US-Japan-China triangle”68 recognizes 
China as “the greatest independent variable in international politics”. Uncertainty – this line of 
reasoning holds – is connected to China’s rise, which in turn leads to regional “worries about Chinese 
assertiveness”69. This causes states to “hedge”. As McDevitt and Kelly say, “Strategists attempt to 
                                                          
64 Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle, (Stanford, Ca., Stanford University Press, 
1999), Chapter 2. 
65 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 180-201. 
66 Two years after this article was published, in April 2001, James A Kelly went on to become the Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in President G.W. Bush’s Administration. 
67 Michael A. McDevitt, James A. Kelly, “Chapter Ten: In Search of Stability: Designing for a Better Peace in East Asia,” in Ralph 
A. Cossa (ed.) US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance”, (Washington DC, Center for Strategic and 
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Three-Party Harmony be Sustained?” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume VI, Issue 2, (Summer/Fall 1999). 
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shape outcomes and hedge against an uncertain future. The reinvigoration of the US-Japan 
relationship is a key element in such a hedging strategy. The long-term objective is to be prepared to 
restrain China, should it opt to misuse the economic and military strength it is rapidly accumulating. 
That is the best way to ensure the continued stability of East Asia.”70 This first use of “hedging” in 
connection to the trilaterals is significant, and although neither McDevitt nor Kelly define hedging, or 
state how it might be done, its connection to trilaterals dates from this period.  
 
As the US-Japan-Australia trilateral developed from 2001 onwards, scholars and policymakers also fell 
into the above-described binary, and in their efforts to explain the new “bilateral – multilateral 
security nexus” inherent in trilaterals, set about borrowing alliance and alignment concepts from 
classical and neoclassical realism, or borrowing institutional, organizational, and security community 
concepts from liberalism and neoliberalism. A third group even attempted to marry neorealism and 
neoliberalism, highlighting the conceptual fuzziness of the entire intellectual approach. Interestingly, 
nearly all literature on the TSD, treats it as an evolving or changing institution. It has not been born 
complete, as it were. In summary, much of the primary academic work begins with a definitional 
debate, and then attempts to understand which direction the trilaterals are “evolving”, with those 
who favor alignment literature seeing the trilaterals as evolving steadily more alliance-like features, 
and those who favor security regional integration, seeing them as building blocks to region-wide 
architecture. Scholars like Jun-hyun Paik and practitioners like Jim Schoff raise the prospects that 
trilaterals might “progressively develop” or “evolve”71 into something else. They are not static, but 
rather adapt and change according to internal and external environmental factors.  
 
Let us first deal with the literature which treats trilaterals as agents of regional integration. Within this 
perspective, scholars write about “enriched bilateralism” as a means of “order-building”72 and 
“security community-building”73. Scholars like William Tow, Kei Koga, Brendan Taylor, and Sorpong 
                                                          
70 Ibid. 
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Peou74 suggest that the TSD is a form of “order-building”. Taylor argues that there is a synergy in 
bilateral and multilateral approaches toward security, because they reinforce bilateral cooperation, 
allow small groups of states to coordinate common policy postures, while acting as a constraint on 
larger powers75. Jun Hyun-paik calls trilaterals, “a recent trend in US-Japan security community-
building”, which involve a “low-key expansion of the dyadic core to include a wider spectrum of 
strategic partnerships based on commonly held democratic values.”76 Perhaps the most prominent 
example of the security community literature is the Washington Quarterly article: “Wheels to Webs: 
Reconstructing Asia-Pacific Security Arrangements,”77 published by the former PACOM commander-
in-chief Admiral Dennis Blair. The piece evokes Karl Deutsch to argue that military exercises, 
consultations, and meetings at the regional and multilateral level can lead to regional, multilateral 
approaches to common security challenges.  
 
Let us now examine the literature which frames the US-Japan-Australia trilateral in alliance-terms. 
Purnendra Jain78, Aurelia George Mulgan79, Takashi Terada80, Tomohiko Satake81, and Nina Silove82 
have all written monographs that follow the tradition of Cha and Wilkins. Purnendra Jain and John 
Bruni note that there is “genuine concern by the Japanese, Australian, and United States governments 
not to be seen to be developing any formalized and open alliance.”83 Another scholar, Thomas Wilkins, 
argues that the US-Japan-Australia trilateral is also a “virtual alliance”, and that traditional notions of 
what alliances are must be reconsidered84. Rather than dealing with overt threat calculations, Wilkins 
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75 Brendan Taylor, “Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus,” in William T. Tow, Brendan Taylor, (eds.,) 
Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and Asia Pacific Security: Contending Cooperation, (London: Routledge, 2013). 
76 Jun-hyun Paik, “Chapter 8: Creating a Multilateral Cooperative Security System in East Asia,” Ralph Cossa (ed.) US-Korea-
Japan Relations: Building Toward a ‘Virtual Alliance’, (Washington DC, The CSIS Press, 1999); p.128.  
77 Blair, Dennis C. and John Hanley Jnr., “From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asia Pacific Security Arrangements”, The 
Washington Quarterly, No 24:1 (2001). 
78 Purnendra Jain and John Bruni, “Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance?”, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2004), pp.265-285; Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United 
States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, 
Issue 4, (2006), pp.521-535. 
79 Aurelia George Mulgan, “Breaking the Mould: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 30, Number 1, April 2008, pp.52-72. 
80 T. Inoguchi, et al (eds.) The US-Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism, Takashi Terada, “Evolution of the Australia-
Japan Security Partnership: Toward a Softer Triangle Alliance with the United States?” (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 
pp.217-232 
81 Tomohiko Satake, “The Origins of Trilateralism? The US-Japan-Australia Security Relations in the 1990s,” International 
Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 11, (2015), pp.1-28. 
82 Nina Silove, “The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia,” International Security, Vol.40, 
No.4 (Spring 2016). 
83 Purendra Jain and John Bruni, “American Acolytes,” in Brad Williams, Andrew Newman, (Eds.,) Japan, Australia, and Asia 
Pacific Security, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2006).96. 
84 See for example, Thomas S. Wilkins, “Towards a ‘Trilateral Alliance?’ Understanding the Role of Expediency and Values in 
American-Japanese-Australian Relations,” Asian Security, Vol. 3, Issue 3, (2007), pp.251-278; Thomas S. Wilkins, “’Alignment’, 
not ‘Alliance’ – the Shifting Paradigm of International Security cooperation: Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment,” in 
Review of International Studies, Vol. 38, (2012), pp.53-76; Thomas S. Wilkins, “Japan’s Alliance Diversification: A Comparative 
 
 
29 
states that “undeclared goals”, shared interests and values constitute the trilateral in an ever-evolving 
minilateral consortium85.  Of them, Satake’s monograph makes the clearest argument for the origins 
of the trilateral, pointing to increased regional insecurity in the late 1990s, and concerns in both Tokyo 
and Canberra with US staying power in the region. These fears led to both countries to push for a 
“redefinition of the US-Japan and US-Australia alliances…”, which caused both alliances to undergo “a 
systemic change in nature and role from a traditional bilateral defense arrangement to one that 
focused on addressing regional and global security problems.”86 While much of his analysis is excellent 
and backed by empirical research, his argument does not really explain why the three chose the 
trilateral model in particular over other alternatives. His argument centers on alliance dynamics, and 
he pays only a slight attention to changes at the domestic level, arguing that while the “reaffirmed US-
Japan alliance had an ‘implicit purpose’ of maintaining a stable balance of power in the region”87, the 
alliance was more dedicated to regional crisis management and peacekeeping. In contrast, Silove uses 
a balancing rationale for the trilaterals – internal and external – and expands it, dramatically, dating 
the trilaterals to a Bush-era set of DOD initiatives to build “a federated set of capabilities and 
interoperability”, which would dissuade China from challenging the status quo. Based on US strategy 
“outputs” rather than “outcomes”88, her account is highly persuasive, but she is unable to explain – 
using power transition theory – why the United States did not simply contain or balance China’s rise. 
She gives a good description of US strategy, but fails to explain why this was chosen over traditional 
balancing approaches. Furthermore, since she treats US allies as objects of US strategy (rather than 
actors themselves) she misses the fact that the trilateral was originally an Australian initiative89.  
 
Of this grouping of authors, only Jain and Wilkins attempt analysis at the domestic level. Wilkin’s cites 
Risse-Kappen and Snyder, asserting “the more closely the executive’s preferences and actions comply 
with those of society, the more autonomy they will have in alliance negotiations.”90 This statement 
points broadly in the right direction, but does not explain the particular role that domestic politics had 
on trilateral-formation. Jain, by contrast, does attempt to formulate a bureaucratic politics approach 
toward trilateral-formation, asserting that the trilateral evolved “at a time when conservative 
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neoliberal elements were at the helm in all three countries, carrying national policies on a similar 
ideological path under three individual leaders highly supportive of each other.”91 He also accepts that 
throughout the evolution of the trilateral strategic dialogue, “China as the rising power has been a 
serious sticking point”, indicating that inconclusive threat assessment plays a role. Thus, Jain’s analysis 
comes very close to the framework in this thesis. However, there are slight but important differences. 
He uses the terms “similar ideological” factors and “leadership” as a shorthand way of identifying how 
these coalitions of FPEs align themselves, but does not really attempt to systematically frame their 
alignment behavior. When Jain wonders what will happen to the trilateral if “governments of a 
different political/ideological stripe could be elected to power”92, he is assuming that executives and 
administrations define policy directions. Fieldwork for this thesis, however, suggests that two 
different policy coalitions can exist inside one administration, and that what sets them apart from 
each other – in regards to the trilaterals – is the strength of their threat assessment and attitude 
toward China, not their party affiliation or ideology. Some US-Japan-Australia monographs93 put their 
emphasis on Japan since many count the Japan-Australia alliance-like relationship as a significant 
departure in Japanese security policy-making, which has historically preferred exclusively bilateral ties 
with the United States.  
 
Finally, there is a sub-branch of this type of alliance literature which views the trilaterals from a 
Chinese perspective and asks if they are merely a tool for containment. Zhu Feng states, “The TSD is 
in effect an important effort to counterbalance China’s rise…without the specter of a rising China, 
Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra would not have begun intensifying defence cooperation.”94 that the 
trilaterals might turn into a NATO-like structure95. This usually arises from Chinese fears of 
containment, and the perception that Japan and Australia are “the two claws of the US containment 
strategy”96. In a sense, these scholars are both correct and incorrect in their thinking. They are correct 
in assuming that the trilaterals are China-oriented, but are unable to account for the domestic split in 
a convincing manner. Despite this, many Chinese scholars fail to acknowledge that other factors might 
                                                          
91 Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its 
Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006), pp.528. 
92 Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its 
Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006), pp.521-535. 
93 See for example, Aurelia Mulgan, “Breaking the Mold: Japan’s Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest 
Minilateralism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 30, Number 1, (April, 
2008), pp.52-72. 
94 Zhu Feng, “Euphemism for Multiple Alliance? In William T. Tow, et al, Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, NBR Special 
Report, (Washington DC, National Bureau of Asia Research, 2008), p.43. 
95 Xiao Zan, “’Mini NATO; in Asia-Pacific Region Plan by the US and Australia,” Beijing Review, 13 September, 2001, p.10; 
Purendra Jain and John Bruni, “Japan, Australia, and the United States: Little NATO or Shadow Alliance?”, International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (2004), pp.265-285. 
96 Purendra Jain, “Japan-Australia Security Ties and the United States: The Evolution of the Trilateral Dialogue Process and its 
Challenges,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, Issue 4, (2006), pp.521-535. 
 
 
31 
have played a role in driving the trilaterals into being. There are other regional security issues – such 
as disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and anti-piracy – which have motivated trilateral cooperation. 
Furthermore, while China is important to Mahanian policy-makers, Chinese scholars fail to see the 
role that China itself in strengthening the hand of Mahanians by behaving more assertively and 
building up their military. By contrast, China’s behavior has weakened the hand of Continentalists, 
whose attempts to promote China’s rise as a “responsible stakeholder” have been undermined by 
Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Finally, it should not be forgotten that there were other factors 
– besides the China factor – which played a role in developing the trilaterals, which had to do more 
with US alliance management, and intra-alliance politics, than to do with geostrategic planning. Other 
factors included Japan’s attempts to find a security role in the Asia Pacific, and dealing with Australian 
and Japanese abandonment fears, spawned by the perception that American foreign policy was 
overly-focused on the Middle East. 
1.4. Selection of Case Study 
In approaching US trilateralism, it was clear that selection of a good case study was crucial to any 
viable research project. This was partly because of the large number of samples (there are half a dozen 
trilaterals in existence, each with their own characteristics, membership, and purpose) and partly 
because security-oriented trilaterals are a rather recent phenomenon,97 making archival research 
difficult if not impossible. As a result, it was clear that open-source materials, government documents, 
and interviews with policymakers would have to form the backbone of this study. Then, there was the 
question of how many case studies should be attempted. Given this project’s dependence on 
interviews, focusing on three trilaterals would have required the monumental task of visiting five 
different countries, and interviewing hundreds of individuals, an unfeasible expenditure of resources 
and time. While this study would focus on US motives and reasons for trilateralism, I decided early on, 
that policymakers from the other partners should also be interviewed. Therefore, I decided to explore 
one trilateral in depth and attempted to uncover those drivers and organizing principles that might 
also be applied to other trilaterals and to international relations theory in general. Some drivers were 
already evident prior to the formal fieldwork stage. For example, a brief examination of the various 
trilaterals revealed that – apart from the decidedly-economic China-Japan-ROK trilateral – nearly all 
of them are engaged in strategic cooperation. They were, as one Australian defence publication 
stated, “concerned with the art and science of employing national power in a synchronized fashion to 
achieve the national end state and national objectives.”98 It was clear that this commonality was 
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pivotal to understanding how they came to be. Trilaterals assemble the diplomatic and defense 
personnel from three different countries to discuss the issues of the day and to attempt to develop 
common policy positions around them.  
In examining the various trilaterals in which the United States was involved, it became clear that they 
all had varying degrees of institutionalization, and that there was some expectation – implied or stated 
– that they were evolving toward greater institutionalization and norm-setting. They were not, in 
other words, static institutions, but rather evolving processes, seeking greater formality and greater 
inter-operability. Of those trilaterals listed above, this thesis will focus on the US-Japan-Australia 
Trilateral because it was found to be the most institutionalized. Indeed, such is the high level of 
institutionalization of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, that I came to realize there are actually three 
government-to-government trilateral tracks dealing with US-Australia-Japan relations. There is the 
original diplomatic trilateral forum; (i) the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), which deals with 
geopolitical issues, and is primarily the preserve of the three foreign ministries; there is also the (ii) 
Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), which deals with closer military-to-military defence 
ties aims for ever-greater interoperability99; and finally, there is the (iii) Trilateral Missile Defense 
Forum (TMDF100), which examines cooperation over a potential ballistic missile shield from a technical 
standpoint, driven primarily by a small section of the defence ministries. Technically, the TMDF is a 
part of the DOD tranche of dialogue – cooperation, but has always insisted on independence from the 
SDCF101. 
1.5. The US-Japan-Australia Trilateral  
This thesis will examine overall track 1 trilateral cooperation between the US, Japan, and Australia. At 
times, this may seem confusing since there are three different “dialogues”. This confusion is 
accentuated by internal changes and inter-agency competition. According to Erum Jilani, a senior 
advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), there is competition between different 
agencies to “own” certain issues, such as maritime security, which means that knowing which dialogue 
or agency deals with what issues can be quite murky102. This section will merely present an outline of 
the type of activities carried out by the trilateral and cannot hope to give a 100 per cent accurate and 
                                                          
99 James L. Schoff, “The Evolution of US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation”, Yuki Tatsumi (ed) US-Japan-Australia Security 
Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington DC, Stimson Center, 2015), p.43. 
100 This third trilateral, the TMDF, is the least transparent and is seldom discussed in the literature. Furthermore, repeated 
efforts to interview personnel from the US iteration of the TMDF, met in failure. This was most likely due to both the technical 
sensitivity as well as political sensitivity of the subject matter in potential ‘host’ countries such as Australia and Japan, as well 
as the implications for US grand strategy. 
101 Jim Schoff, (Senior Advisor for East Asia Policy, Department of Defense, 2010-2012) interview with author, Washington DC, 
May 22, 2015. 
102 Jiliani, Erum (Asia Pacific Advisor, OSD 2012-2016) interview with author, telephone. December 14, 2016. 
 
 
33 
up-to-date picture of the organization. Nevertheless, the organizational maps have been sourced from 
the US Department of Defense. 
 
The TSD first met in July 2002, on the sidelines of an AUSMIN meeting and a Security Consultative 
Committee meeting at the Deputy Secretary, Vice-Minister, and DFAT Secretary level. It has also 
sought the greatest convergence of norms and standards, in approaches toward regional security. As 
the above diagram reveals, it has a number of working groups, and seems to mimic a national security 
council structure. Similar to national security councils, the TSD has the ability to drive the agenda, and 
to socialize its members into what the priority issues are at any given time.  
 
 
 
The military variant, the SDCF first met in 2006 as a separate process to the Department of State 
(DOS)-led TSD. Although the SDCF is led by the Department of Defense (DOD), the DOS and other 
agencies do sit in on meetings. The SDCF promotes military integration – of capabilities, methods, and 
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tactics –between the three. It has a maritime component, a strategic component (led by PACOM), and 
a missile defence component. The most public feature of its cooperation has been the trilateral 
ministers’ meetings, usually held on the sidelines of regional events and the promotion of regular 
military exercises between the three, helping to “socialize” the three militaries on common objectives, 
and even common opponents.  
 
It is difficult to tell how much regular military exercises constitute alliance-like behavior in the modern 
age, since they have become a regular feature for the US military in the Asia Pacific, and are instigated 
for all sorts of reasons: trust-building, defence sales, and regional integration all play a non-alliance 
role in fostering the many regional military exercises. However, one important point stands out 
regarding the SDCF exercises: all three of the main trilateral exercises prioritize conventional war-
fighting, and do not attempt strategic ambiguity in areas of soft security. According to one senior US 
defence official, a theme running through all three has been to build a common communications 
infrastructure, common rules of engagement, as well as unit-level operational familiarity.103 The 
ground troops exercise, known as Southern Jackaroo, which began in May 2013, is described by the 
Australian Department of Defence as reflecting, “the shared commitments of Australia, Japan and the 
US to strengthening defence and security cooperation, and working closely together to promote 
regional stability, peace and prosperity.”104 The 2015 iteration of this exercise saw 2,000 Australian 
troops train with 150 US and Japanese service members in the Northern Territory of Australia. Then 
there is Exercise Pacific Bond, which was promoted by the Australian Department of Defence. The 
exercise involves training in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), with one Australian participant, Jonathan 
Earley, the Commanding Officer of HMAS Ballarat, commenting, “These exercises are about keeping 
[that] interoperability in good order, and building on it, so that we stand ready to form a coalition 
when the need arises.”105 The Australian DOD has stated that the trilateral air exercise, Cope North 
Guam, seeks to “develop multilateral interoperability and coalition procedures in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, air power missions, to include air superiority, close support interdiction, 
electronic warfare, tactical airlift, aerial refueling and airborne command and control.[italics 
added]”106 Graeme Dobell has argued that this “defence cooperation is a function of capability”.107 
                                                          
103 Anonymous, (Joint Staff, DOD) interview with author, Washington DC. 
104 Australian Department of Defence, “Australia, Japan and US participate in inaugural exercise Southern Jackaroo” May 29 
2013, available at Australian Department of Defence Website: http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/05/29/australia-japan-and-
us-participate-in-inaugural-exercise-southern-jackaroo/ (accessed November 3, 2016). 
105 Sarah West, “Bolstering Bonds in the Pacific,” Australian Navy Website, available at: 
http://www.navy.gov.au/news/bolstering-bonds-pacific (accessed on November 8, 2016). 
106 Exercise: Cope North Guam, Ministry of Defense Website, available at: 
http://www.defence.gov.au/Exercises/CopeNorthGuam/ (accessed on November 3, 2016). 
107 Graeme Dobell, “The New Relationship of Japan and Australia,” The Strategist, July 14, available at: 
www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-the-relationship-of-japan-and-australia/ (accessed November 8, 2016). 
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It is clear that these exercises are evolving, and becoming increasingly complex and large as time 
progresses. The largest of these trilateral exercises has been the US-Australia combined forces 
Talisman Sabre, which involves air, land, and sea components and has featured more than 33,000 
personnel. In July 2015, Japanese and New Zealand forces were included in the amphibious training 
exercise108. Japan and Australia are also regular partners in large-scale American exercises, such as the 
US-Japan-India Malabar exercise, the annual air exercise Red Flag in Alaska, and the biennial RIMPAC 
maritime warfare exercise (the world’s largest), often hosting up to 22 participant nations. As with 
previous areas of trilateral defence cooperation, the security dilemma with China provoked by 
trilateralism, has  seen efforts to reassure China and to dispel the idea that these exercises are about 
“containing” or “encircling” China or balancing against Russia109. In the case of RIMPAC, Russian forces 
were invited to take part in 2012110, while Chinese forces were invited to take part in 2014 and 2016111. 
Nevertheless, perceptions within the region112 as well as in China113 continue to see ever-closer 
trilateralism as provocative and unsustainable. In March April 2016, in the wake of tensions in the 
South China Sea, Chinese television released footage114 of a supposed US-Japan-Australia trilateral air 
and naval exercise in the South China Sea.  
 
1.6. Research Methodology  
As stated above, the relatively recent nature of the trilaterals makes archival research difficult for this 
study. Therefore, this thesis adopts a mixed method approach to understanding the trilaterals, using 
a combination of primary open-source document sources, key informant interviews, and supporting 
                                                          
108 Seth Robson, “Three Nations Holding Exercise in Australia Ahead of Talisman Saber,” Stars and Stripes, June 3, 2015 
109 See, for example: Seth Robson, “Plenty of Reasons for Marines to Train in Australia – Just don’t Mention China,” Stars and 
Stripes, July 15, 2013. 
110 “RIMPAC 2012: Participating Vessels by Country,” Naval Technology Website, available at: http://www.naval-
technology.com/features/featurerimpac-2012-vessels-aircraft-countries/ (accessed November 3, 2016). 
111 “RIMPAC Participating Forces,” Commander of the Pacific Fleet website, available at: 
http://www.cpf.navy.mil/rimpac/participants/#cn (accessed on November 3, 2016). 
112 Sam Bateman, “Brinkmanship in the South China Sea helps nobody,” East Asia Forum, June 07, 2016; Peter Drysdale, “The 
new Geo-politics in Asia…and farewell” East Asia Forum, January 25, 2016; Rick Wallace, “Japan Military Drill with US, Australia 
likely to upset China”, in The Australian, November 25, 2014; Rob Taylor, “Leaders of US, Australia, japan to Meet, with Eye 
on China: Washington Seeks Help from Allies for Increased Cooperation in Asia” in The Wall Street Journal, November 13, 
2014; Rory Medcalf and Dr. C Raja Mohan, “Responding to Indo-Pacific Rivalry: Australia, India and Middle Power Coalitions”, 
on the Lowy Institute website at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/responding-to-Indo-Pacific-rivalry,  accessed on 
5th of January, 2015; Robert Ayson, “Words fail Australia, and anger China, at the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue,” in The Lowy 
Interpreter, 11 October 2013, J. Berkshire Miller, “China Looms Over Abe-Obama-Abbott Trilateral at G-20 Summit”, in The 
Asahi Shimbun, November 21, 2014; Wang Hui, “Trilateral Alliance only Shores up Tensions” in China Daily USA, November 
26, 2014. 
113 See, for example: Feng, Zhu, “TSD – Euphemism for Multiple Alliance?” in William Tow, ed., The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: 
Facilitating Community-Building or Revisiting Containment? (Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2008), 
p.43; Pang Zhongpen, “Japan’s Plot to Contain China with US, Australia not viable,” The China Daily, July 23, 2015, available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-07/23/content_21389724.htm (accessed November 8, 2016). 
114 “US, Japan, Australia hold joint exercises in South China Sea”, CCTV News Youtube Page, April 25, 2016, available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GP4qnyBrT6I (accessed November 3, 2016). 
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secondary texts. This thesis uses theoretically informed, historical process-tracing to chart the 
development of the trilateral between 2001 and 2010, with some focus on the role of Australian and 
Japanese diplomats intimately involved in the creation of the trilateral. Research examines three 
different sources of qualitative data.  
 
Primary data: First, this thesis utilizes interviews with foreign policy elites (FPEs) in all three member 
countries; this includes key policy-makers, political leaders, academics, and think tank analysts close 
to the topic. As the trilateral was established by three senior foreign policy bureaucrats, Richard 
Armitage, Ryozo Kato, and Ashton Calvert, efforts were made to interview all three or –  in the case 
of Calvert, who is deceased – their closest aides. As the Trilateral was created in late 2001, that period 
receives close attention, though this paper recognizes that the previous decade of US foreign policy 
in the region is important for context and background. Process-tracing around the trilateral continues 
from 2001, right through to 2015, in order to show how it has evolved under the influence of various 
policy coalitions. These interviews allow access to the motivations and thought processes not 
represented in documents and analyze the forces at work behind ‘policy-as-presented’. Part of the 
thesis, for example, examines China’s role as a motivation for Washington’s hedging strategy involving 
the TSD. Naturally, due to political sensitivities, Japanese, American, and Australian official documents 
and TSD official documents rarely name China as a motivating force. Instead, they utilize diplomatic 
and vague language to discuss “regional security”. In interviews, however – particularly with retired 
government officials – officials have been more candid about the China factor. At times, some of these 
officials have still been in office. In those cases, the interviews were carried out anonymously. When 
interview subjects were uncomfortable with being listed, they asked to be listed as anonymous. I have 
balanced their need for privacy with the needs for academic rigour by listing every person interviewed 
for this project in the index. I have also left out dates and affiliation since this would naturally help to 
identify those who wished to remain unrecognized. 
 
Interviews were developed along a number of different tracks. Some were developed through 
contacts made by the author as a think tank analyst at RUSI, others were by introduction or the 
recommendation of other interviewees. Due to the author’s background in Japanese security studies, 
by far the most interviews took place in Tokyo115, with nearly thirty-four respondents taking place in 
either office or informal settings. Though many in this group were Japanese, some senior American 
and Australian figures based at the Embassies in Tokyo were also included. This was followed by 
                                                          
115 From November 2014 to March 2015, I was affiliated with HItotsubashi University near Tokyo. The faculty include many 
foreign diplomats and foreign policy experts, and author was also able to engage in think tank events and conferences in order 
to develop further contacts.  
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eighteen interviews in Canberra and twenty-two interviews in Washington116 where the author was 
an adjunct fellow at the think tank CSIS. A further fifteen interviews were carried out in London, either 
in person or by telephone with subjects in the United States, Japan, and Australia. All interviews were 
developed organically, without the use of a question list. Instead, the author attempted to tailor each 
conversation to their ability to contribute raw data to the project. When interviewees were not 
particularly close to trilateral work, but were former senior officials working in this or that 
administration, for example, I asked questions about alliance dynamics, the dynamics of foreign 
policymaking, domestic issues, and regional security issues. Some policymakers were reluctant to 
speak on the record; others were concerned about imparting restricted information. In all cases, the 
author reassured interviewees of their anonymity and only requested information that they were 
comfortable imparting. The language used during the substantive parts of the interview were in 
English117.  
 
Secondary Data: Secondary data included newspaper articles, reports, government statements, 
strategy papers, books, and other open-source materials dealing with the trilaterals, the US-Japan 
Alliance, the US-Australia alliance, and US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific. This included the 
publications of think tanks and universities that have a history of working on the trilateral, such as the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the National Bureau for Asian Research (NBR), 
the Wilson Center, the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), the National Institute for Defense 
Studies (NIDS), the Lowy Institute, the Australian National University (ANU), and the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Secondary data also included newspaper articles from The Australian, 
The Japan Times, The Diplomat, The New Sydney Herald, and others. In addition, blogs like ANU’s East 
Asia Forum and Lowy Institute’s The Interpreter provided further material. 
 
1.7. Contribution to Existing Research 
This thesis makes the following contribution to existing research: 
a) It makes a comprehensive overview of the origins of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, through 
the collection of extensive interviews and official documents. 
                                                          
116 From April to July 2015, I was a resident Adjunct Fellow at the US think tank the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS). It should be noted that Michael J. Green, the Japan Chair at CSIS and an influential figure in US-Japan Alliance 
matters, plays a pivotal role in the origins of the trilateral – both in practice and in theoretical underpinnings. Green was the 
author’s immediate supervisor during this time. 
117 This is because while I am comfortable in conversational Japanese, greetings, etc, I am not fully fluent in Japanese and 
would have missed much during the substantive sections. Fortunately, most Japanese experts working on the alliance with 
the United States and special relationship with Australia, are by necessity, fluent in English. Furthermore, MOFA and other 
Japanese government agencies provide many of the press statements, speeches, and documents in English on its website. 
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b) It conducts research into the American policymaking process and makes a key revelation 
about that process when foreign policy elites are divided. 
c) It makes a connection between divided policy elites, the trilaterals, and hedging. 
d) It creates a new definition for hedging, proposing that it is a behavior, as well as a strategy. 
e) It contributes more widely to our understanding of alliance-formation, threat assessments, 
and how foreign policy elites make policy when confronted with a security dilemma.  
This study should be of interest to those interested in US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, alliance, 
alignment, and institutional theory, and neoclassical scholarship relating to policymaking. In terms of 
IR theory, it will be of interest to those interested in rising powers, alliance formation, foreign policy 
analysis, and balance of power strategies. 
 
1.8. Why does this research problem matter? 
There are three broad reasons that this research question is important. The first relates to how states 
are reacting to the changing power balance between the United States and China and the strategies 
they are adopting. The second relates to insights on how the US conducts foreign policy in the Asia 
Pacific, and the third contributes insights on what happens when domestic foreign policy elites 
disagree on the threat status of another state, and the impact that has on the making of clear policy.  
 
This research also matters because the three states in the TSD also represent a significant aggregate 
of economic and military power in the region and will play an important part in the future peace and 
stability of the region. According to the CIA Fact book, all three states rank within the top 15 global 
economies (by GDP): The United States is either at 1st or 2nd, Japan and Australia rank at 3rd and 12th. 
Similarly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks all three states as being 
in the top 15 global military spenders: the US ranking at 1st, while Japan and Australia rank at 6th and 
13th118 respectively. As well as their efforts to increase interoperability, the three are meaningfully 
engaged in the “revolution in military affairs”.119 Clearly, these states make up some of Waltz’s 
‘principle parts’ in the Asia Pacific. The US-Japan Alliance – contained within the trilateral – is by far 
the largest security alliance in the Asia Pacific, and jointly comprises the most powerful aggregate of 
naval military power in the region, though whether this lead will last much longer is open to question. 
There are various functions, it would seem, carried out within the TSD, but amongst those explicitly 
mentioned are a number of implicit ones: balancing China’s rise is one, but providing public goods to 
                                                          
118 The 15 Countries with the highest military expenditure 2011, SIPRI website: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15/the-15-countries-with-the-highest-military-
expenditure-in-2011-table/view (accessed on 4th January, 2013). 
119 Brendon Taylor and Desmond Ball, “Historical Overview” William T Tow, Mark J. Thomson (eds.,) Asia Pacific Security: US, 
Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle (New York, Routledge for Australia Strategic Policy Initiative, 2007) pp.14 
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the region would seem to be another. There is a long history of joint-operations in the field between 
the US and Australia, perhaps second only to that between the US and UK. Though small by regional 
standards, Australian forces are highly trained and well equipped, and have a high level of inter-
operability with US forces. There is also a long history of joint intelligence cooperation between the 
US and Australia, and it is clear that the Five Eyes120 component plays a role in the TSD, and Japan’s 
pro-trilateral Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, is said to favor closer relations between Japan’s intelligence 
community and those of the intelligence group121. The intelligence General Security of Military 
Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Australia in 2012, Japan’s domestic intelligence legislation in 
2014, and the 2016 Trilateral Intelligence Sharing Agreement (TISA) go some ways toward bringing 
Tokyo closer to Five Eyes regulatory standards and intelligence-sharing procedures in addition to 
institutionalizing Japanese intelligence cooperation with two of the Five Eyes. 
 
Second, this research matters because it sees the revival of Japan as a regional and global player, after 
nearly 60 years of near-dormancy. While it is true that Japanese government debt is more than double 
its gross domestic product (GDP), it is still the 3rd largest economy in the world, with a globally traded 
currency. Furthermore, its debt – while considerable – is held domestically, making it far less 
vulnerable than other states similarly situated. While Japan has traditionally avoided taking part in 
military conflicts in line with Article 9 of its Constitution, it has begun to play an auxiliary role to various 
US and UN operations and possesses a surprisingly large amount of hard power, ranking among the 
top 10 global defence spenders. Despite its commitment to only spending one per cent of its Gross 
National Product (GNP) on defence, Japan’s military budget in 2013 was still the third largest in the 
region, and 7th largest in the world122. Its navy is the 4th largest in the world, and many would argue 
that in qualitative indicators such as equipment, training, and professionalism, it may well rank even 
higher. This latent power has long been recognized by US policy makers, who have sought Japan’s help 
with US strategy in Asia, perhaps to play a similar role to the UK in Europe. Bureaucrats and American 
politicians regularly refer to the US-Japan Alliance as the “linchpin” or “cornerstone”123 of regional 
security. In other words, American policymakers see Japan as a “swing state” in the global balance 
with China.  
 
                                                          
120 The Five Eye’s network is a loose way of discussing the various security and intelligence-sharing arrangements between the 
US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, which have existed since the end of the Second World War. 
121 Kotani, Ken (Senior Fellow, NIDS, 2014-2016) interview with author, Tokyo, January 8, 2015. 
122 The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The 15 Countries with the Highest Military Expenditure in 2013” 
http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=476 accessed on November 26th, 2014. 
123 In her 2009 Senate confirmation hearing as nominee for Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated that the alliance was “a 
cornerstone of American policy in Asia, essential to maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.”  
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The hypothesis made in this thesis – that the creation of the trilateral was the result of domestic 
variables inside Washington, with American elites reacting to changes in the structure of power in the 
international system – is important for those who would seek to understand the role of foreign policy 
in international relations. To those who seek to understand American security and foreign policy in 
particular, the debate on why Washington chose to join the trilateral, illuminates the place of 
inconclusive debates among FPEs. On the one hand, there is a cadre of alliance managers, who work 
closely on the US-Japan alliance, who see the alliance as the cornerstone of US policy in the region, 
and a tool for greater regional security integration. Within this element are two story arcs: the first 
involves the impact of the nature of the American alliance with the Japan, and the second involves the 
debate by American elites about Japan’s regional and global role. Then, on the other hand, there is 
another cadre of FPEs who think that getting Asia right, means getting China right. They are mobilized 
by the traditional state-on-state security dilemma. They believe, that formal institutionalization of the 
trilateral would lead to counter-moves by China to build a coalition of like-minded allies, sparking a 
pre-1914 scenario. To many of these FPEs, the “big game” is China – and this has led to a number of 
different policy prescriptions over the past three decades: one policy trend has been to promote trade 
and high level political engagement with Beijing so as to foster domestic political reform and 
liberalization from within; a second later policy trend has been to accept China’s domestic regime, and 
seek inter-dependence, so as to ameliorate structural tensions, and thus avoid a “Thucydidean 
Trap”124, as described by Graham Allison.  
 
While the United States’ decision to cooperate within the trilateral framework is the focus of this 
paper, this paper also hopes to shed light on the wider theoretical question of why states align 
themselves, while eschewing collective defence commitments. Although it has been argued that the 
trilateral represents a “unique approach to alliance politics in Asia”125, it shares similarities with the 
pre-1914 Triple Entente, since both contain alliances within them, but are not themselves, alliances. 
As Thomas Wilkins points out, the relationship between Australia and Japan – a significant new leg of 
the trilateral – does not qualify as an alliance, but rather is a “strategic partnership” or “security 
alignment”126, which mirrors the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, which was an agreement, rather than 
a full treaty.  
 
                                                          
124 Graham Allison, “The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?”, The Atlantic, September 24, 2015. 
125 William Tow, “Assessing the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue” in East Asia Forum, 12 February 2009. 
126 Thomas S. Wilkins, “From Strategic Partnership to Strategic Alliance? Australia-Japan Security Ties and the Asia Pacific”, 
Asia Policy, Number 20, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle Washington, 2015, p. 81-111.  
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Thirdly and finally, this research question provides an interesting study of domestic and external 
variables in explaining state behavior during a time of great change in the structural balance of power. 
The story within this Sino-American rivalry is also the story of how domestic elites react to and 
disagree over threat assessments, and the resulting normative and policy choices. Australia’s decision 
to align with Japan, its decision to develop with Tokyo and Washington a new type of alliance-like 
organization, but its unwillingness to formalize that in a treaty says much about how states hedge in 
the face of uncertain threats. Given the fact that the TSD is still at best a half-formed alliance – or 
some might even argue – an alliance-in-waiting, what does this say about the threat perceptions of 
American elites and the nature of its hedging strategy? There are all sorts of interesting side-questions 
on the types of hedging strategies adopted by states in a rising power situation which are of interest 
to alliance theorists, particularly how FPEs inside states perceive threats127 and how those perceptions 
shape foreign policy outcomes.  
 
1.9. Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. This chapter has sought to introduce the thesis by outlining 
the puzzle, the approach, methodology, and structure. Chapter two consists of a discussion of 
trilateralism, against the main theoretical schools of international relations, moving through alliance 
literature, neoliberal literature, constructivism and finally, foreign policy analysis and the role of 
foreign policy elites (FPEs). It then puts forward a neoclassical realism as possible framework, which 
has better explanatory power than the other three theoretical bodies of literature. Chapter three puts 
forward the argument, using the NCR framework, examining the relationship between the structure 
of the international system – and its components – and the perceptions. It also looks at how 
perceptions shape policymaking, and a discussion of how the policy preferences of foreign policy elites 
(FPEs) are influenced by beliefs, career, and outlook. In examining structure, this chapter analyzes the 
American alliance system in the Asia Pacific, since it shapes how American FPEs view American 
interests for the region, as well as identifying friends and enemies.  
 
Chapter four explores more in depth the intervening variable of foreign policy elites (FPEs). Since 
much of this thesis relies on the testimony of FPEs, and relies on a particular model of FPEs, I make an 
effort to define them more carefully. My definition is not wildly original, but extends a little the usual 
grouping, commonly referred to as the foreign policy executive. I argue why the foreign policy elite 
framework is an improvement on this term, more telling in the creation of foreign policy, and 
                                                          
127 The best discussion of Walt’s threat balance from a non-material, ideational point of view, can be found in Michael N. 
Barnett’s essay “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East”, in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: 
Columbia, 1996).  
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particularly relevant to the American political appointee system. Chapters five, six, and seven present 
a three-decade review of the trilateral, looking at Asia Pacific policy through three different 
presidents.  
 
Chapter five examines alliance policy and regional security during the two terms of the Clinton 
Presidency (1994-2000). Essentially, this chapter is to provide the context for the creation of the 
trilaterals – since there is much empirical evidence that the origins of the trilateral rest in the 1990s, 
rather than the 2000s. This section also looks at the different forces pulling at FPEs in Washington at 
the time, from the idea of a “peace dividend” to discussions with allies, worried about major US troop 
withdrawals from the region. Concurrent with these debates, runs a neoliberal arc, in which regional 
states began examining ways to develop new multilateral types of political and security architecture. 
The US and its allies, were also motivated to join, develop, and foster this enthusiasm for 
multilateralism, with discussions of security community prevailing among the White House. Chapter 
six gives an account for the founding of the trilateral during the Bush administration (2001-2008) and 
provides some crucial empirical support for the using an NCR approach rather than neorealism or 
other approaches. It covers both terms and examines the Quadrilateral Initiative briefly. The last 
empirical chapter, chapter seven covers the expansion and evolution of the trilateral into its present 
“quasi-alliance” state.  
 
Finally, the Conclusion of this thesis puts forward arguments for and against the new definition of 
hedging, before then reviewing the neorealist / neoclassical realist search for equilibrium between 
explanatory power and parsimony. It then sets out future research directions for trilateralism, 
including a future project comparing the 1914 Triple Entente and the 2001 Trilateral Strategic 
Dialogue. Their inability to shape the behavior of challengers of the status quo are perhaps a testimony 
to their inefficiency, but that does mean they have not served a purpose.  
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2. CHAPTER 2: MAKING THE CASE 
This chapter examines the trilaterals through the three mainstream theoretical approaches of 
international relations, and argues that while the accounts of the trilaterals provided by neorealism, 
neoliberalism, and constructivism are useful, none provides a fully satisfactory explanation. Instead, 
this thesis finds that a neoclassical realists (NCR) approach is best128  because it bridges constructivism 
and foreign policy analysis, providing more explanatory power, by using both internal and external 
factors. Even when the relative autonomy of American FPEs on Asia is considered, one must add the 
filter of perception to inputs, and the filters of domestic constraints, institutions, and bureaucratic 
politics to the foreign policy outputs. 
 
2.1. Theories of International Relations 
The field of international relations has produced a number of approaches to attempt to explain and 
understand the complexities of global politics. Often, there has been little integration or cooperation 
between these approaches, due to incommensurability and theoretical pluralism, a problem raised by 
Colin Wight129. What is challenging about any analysis of the trilaterals is that these quasi-alliances 
appear to sit at the cross-roads of so many different theoretical approaches, as well as systemic levels 
of analysis. In trying to explain foreign policy outcomes using different levels of analysis, it is difficult 
to know which level of analysis should be prioritized. Some theorists like Kenneth Waltz have stressed 
structural or external factors like capabilities within the international system while others – like 
Graham Allison, Peter Trubowitz, and Robert Jervis – have focused on internal constraints or domestic 
geographic, economic, and bureaucratic constraints on foreign decision-makers.  
 
At the structural level of analysis, there are a number of competing models. For example, many 
theorists have approached trilaterals through either realist alliance / alignment literature, while others 
have approached trilaterals through what Ole Holsti calls Global Society/Complex-Interdependence 
models130. While both approaches have their uses, prioritizing one over the other can sometimes 
                                                          
128 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp.144-172 
129 Colin Wight, “Incommensurability and Cross Paradigm Communication in International Relations Theory: What’s the 
Frequency Kenneth?” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 25, (1996), pp.291-319. 
130 Ole R. Holsti, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy,” G. John Ikenberry, Peter L. Trubowitz, (eds.,) American 
Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 7th Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.17. 
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produce a surfeit of explanatory power, or produce too little, rarely providing a balance between the 
two. Then there are innenpolitik approaches, like constructivism, an approach  associated with 
Alexander Wendt131, which emphasizes cultural and normative variables and their impact on shaping 
how policymakers perceive and interact with the world. While constructivism says little about 
alliances or trilaterals, one can note that norms, values, and culture all play a deep role in shaping 
threat assessments and perceptions of foreign policymakers. Thus, in alignment and alliance-
formation, social construction does seem to play a role, though to what extent is debated within the 
academic community. Stephen Walt asserts that “the belief that ideology determines foreign policy 
will often be a self-fulfilling prophecy”, since states that behave as though ideology is important will 
cause other states to behave in ways that seems to confirm this belief. After all, all three states are 
liberal democracies and have consistently emphasized shared values and norms in their statements. 
This self-fulfilling prophecy that domestic regime type is important seems debatable however, as 
empirical research carried out for this thesis reveal that Australian policymakers had a much lower 
threat perception of China, though Australia is in no way less democratic. It would appear that its 
economic relationship with China rather than ideology is a factor.  Thus the complexity involved in 
constructivist analysis makes predicting the alignment of states problematic, though not impossible. 
However, by taking an approach which considers structural capabilities, while still affording a 
generous place for domestic and socially constructed variables, this thesis puts forward 
I) A credible explanation for the trilateral, grounded in both theoretical and empirical 
research. 
II) A new NCR theory of hedging, which can be said to frame US foreign and security 
policy in the Asia Pacific since the end of the Cold War. 
 
2.2. The Structure of the International System  
Neoclassical realists begin with the assumption that the international system is the starting point of 
all foreign policy outputs. In his 1998 article, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, 
Gideon Rose states,  “the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost 
by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities.”132 
Naturally, this presupposition requires that we attempt to answer the question of what constitutes a 
system, what defines its system-ness, who are its main actors, and what are the underlying dynamics 
of that system. Then, there are a number of different theoretical approaches that one can take toward 
the analysis of the system’s structure. Such approaches can take place at the global or the regional 
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sub-system level; or they might attribute qualities to the system by its power balances, its polarity or 
hegemony; it might view the system in terms of its institutional or organizational nature. In terms of 
the modern day system, many scholars and practitioners tend to mean the state-oriented system, 
which is traced historically –rightly or wrongly – to the Treaty of Westphalia.  
 
As the next chapter will seek to demonstrate, different structures of power within the international 
system itself can play a role in shaping the perceptions choices of foreign policy elites both at the 
regional and sub-regional levels. 
 
2.3. Realism and Neorealism  
As the oldest approach towards international relations, realism is not a single unified approach, but 
rather a collection of different approaches that share some common assumptions. Classical realism 
presents a rich and complex framework of interdependence between the individual, the state, and 
the international system. What it provides in explanatory power, it lacks in parsimony. Lacking a 
rigorous theoretical framework, it was supplemented in 1979 with Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of 
International Relations (1979) by the more elegant neorealism – a variant of realism – which 
prioritized structure and was able to provide clearer predictions of state behavior. As with classical 
realism, neorealism also included a focus on geographically-based unitary actors, such as states, 
empires, kingdoms, and nations, and the argument that such actors are driven by the self-help nature 
of the system to seek security, through a rational analysis of national interests in how to gain the 
maximum security in their environment. At times, realists suggest this is a normative exercise, at other 
times, they suggest they can find an objective truth in the system writ-large133.  
 
While many prominent realist theorists in the post-War era have included Americans,134 mainstream 
theorists and practitioners within the United States tradition tend to view American foreign policy 
through the lens of liberalism or neoliberalism135. However, even here, there is a blend as the liberal-
oriented American foreign policy elites (FPEs) have overlaid the neoliberal economic system with a 
robust and long-lasting alliance network, which constitutes defence alliances or commitments with 
more than 54 countries, a share of 75 per cent of the global economy, with more than 2 billion people 
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under its sway136. Clearly any analysis of US foreign policy or of the trilateral that ignores alliances and 
alliance theory will not do justice to how the United States acts on the international stage.  
 
2.4. Alliances  
Alliances have long been associated with the balance of power concept in the realist school; in Politics 
Among Nations, Morgenthau says they are a “necessary function of the balance of power operating 
in a multiple state system”137. Alliances are both a source of security and insecurity, since they can 
adjust the balance of power between a particular bloc of states versus another bloc. Given the obvious 
nature of its similarities, the trilateral would seem to be alliance-like since it involves a high degree of 
security cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and expanding interoperability. Indeed, a number of 
theorists working on the trilateral – like Victor Cha and Thomas Wilkins – have sought to explain the 
trilaterals through the framework of alignment and intra-alliance dynamics. Both are useful in 
understanding how the trilaterals came about. Furthermore, the first term of the Bush administration 
– the period in which our case study originates – saw a foreign policy team that openly prioritized 
alliances, with the National Security Advisor, Torkel Patterson, briefing Michael Green, Director of 
Asia, to “strengthen alliances” in the region.138 
 
In Theory of International Politics, Kenneth Waltz attempts to explain why states align themselves in 
one direction or another by putting forward the argument that the distribution of material capabilities 
is the most important variable in deciding state behavior under anarchy139. Balance of power theory 
predicts that states respond in two ways to this distribution: (1) states will balance against threatening 
powers; or (2) that states bandwagon with threatening powers. Balancing takes the form of external 
balancing140 such as alliance-building; “soft” balancing”141, or “internal balancing” such as the internal 
build-up of economic, and industrial foundations of military strength”142. It is also affected by 
geographical proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intention. Bandwagoning is when a state 
chooses to move closer to a great power in the anticipation of avoiding harm or winning rewards for 
doing so and can take limited political or military support. When thinking about these two types of 
movements between states, the term alignment is used.  
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The fact that this thesis does not consider the US-Japan-Australia trilateral a full alliance is of 
fundamental importance and it is worth taking some time to explain why – despite the views of some 
– it does not constitute a full alliance. This thesis agrees with Thomas Wilkins’ argument that 
alignments constitute “mutual expectations”143, but these are vague and there are few penalties if 
they are not met. Alignment is a broader concept than alliance since it does not focus solely upon the 
military dimensions of international politics. Furthermore, there are degrees of alignment , which can 
take place “in political economic, military and cultural spheres present[ing] a multifaceted sculpture 
of national and supranational postures.”144 Part of the confusion between the two terms stems from 
the fact that alliances and alignment are very closely linked: Snyder says that, “Formal alliances are 
simply one of the behavioral means to create or strengthen alignments…and thus are a subset of 
alignments…”145. However, if we are rigorous with our definitions, we see that alliances have minimum 
requisites to be considered alliances. For example, Stephen Walt, argues that at a minimum, an 
alliance “…assumes some level of commitment and an exchange of benefits for both parties; severing 
the relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost something, even if it were 
compensated in other ways.” 146. This emphasis on a stated or unstated obligation – formal or informal 
– is also common to definitions of quite a number of alliance scholars, including Snyder147, Diebel148, 
Osgood149, and Evans and Newnham150. Why States decide to align or ally is of fundamental concern 
to the international relations scholar and to the statesman, and there are a number of reasons – 
external and internal – why they might not develop a full-fledged alliance.  
 
While it is true that the US-Japan-Australia trilateral contains one full treaty alliance – the US-Japan 
Alliance – and one quasi-alliance, the US-Australia defence pact,151 the trilateral itself cannot be 
considered a full alliance because of a lack of a de jure or de facto defence commitment in the third 
dyad, Japan-Australia. One might argue that there is a moral imperative or even an argument of 
enlightened self-interest for Japan to defend Australia if it were attacked or for Australia to defend 
Japan if it were attacked, but both of these arguments are entirely different from a formal and 
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understood treaty obligation. While some might argue that this is immaterial, the fact is that 
practitioners do not think so because of the fears brought about by the security dilemma. Australian 
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s speech in 2001,152 for example,  emphasized the fact that 
Australia’s leaders did not want a new alliance, while Japan is said to have turned Australia’s offer of 
a formal treaty down in 2007. Lord Grey and Lloyd George both repeatedly reassured Britain’s 
Parliament that they were not obliged to join Russia or France in a war against Germany in the fateful 
summer of 1914, before Germany invaded Belgium and the Lowlands153. Decision makers can thus be 
extremely careful in laying out their positions, and carefully – and at times, jealously – guard their 
states from entrapment.  
 
States also avoid becoming fully-entangled in alliances when there are strong domestic variables at 
play. As Barnett and Levy discuss in “Sources of Alignments and Alliances”, Egyptian alliance behaviour 
included domestic political and economic drivers, and that the insecurity of the regime or concerns 
about its economy could play an important role in driving the regime to form an alliance. They assert, 
“domestic political and economic constraints may limit a state's ability to mobilize internal resources 
for external security without adversely affecting the domestic political interests of the elite in power 
and thus may provide powerful incentives for leaders to prefer external alignments to internal 
mobilization as a strategy to provide for their security in the face of external threats.”154 Furthermore, 
those regimes that may suffer from internal strife may choose to develop a partnership with a larger 
ally that provides both resource gains for the security services and some legitimacy for the state 
(though of course, this can play both ways for a nationalist population). While many of the conditions 
that shaped the alignment behaviour of third-world states like Egypt are missing in the context of the 
US155, the trilateral could be said to have a domestic component for the United States, in that foreign 
policy elites who favour a Contintentalist “China-first” approach may have strong business ties to US-
China trade. Some like Robert Zoellick, will have actually had experience as trade diplomats in the US 
Government. As this thesis seeks to demonstrate in the next chapter, Continentalists have often been 
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a restraining force on those in the US government who would seek to push the trilateral to full-alliance 
status.  
 
In terms of external variables, alliances are not only motivated by insecurity and security dilemmas. 
There are other security considerations that drive alliance-formation. Patricia Weitsman156 points out 
that alliances take shape even when there is “no clear and present danger”, while Celeste Wallander157 
points out that other alliances like NATO behave like security institutions, or as means of harnessing 
the power of large states, or restraining the power of previously-aggressive member states. Both 
Osgood158 and Pressman159 discuss at length, the restraining imperative for alliance-formation. Ajin 
Choi and William Tow, point out that in exchange for cooperation on Washington’s non-proliferation 
policy and war on terrorism, “Australia and Japan view their TSD involvement as a means to further 
solidify US guarantees to their own security via continued and reliable access to US intelligence and 
technology.”160 As we will see, these factors certainly play their part in the creation of the alliances, 
but interviews and empirical evidence suggest while the three states have different motivations for 
taking part in trilateral cooperation, insecurity has played a strong common factor for all three. 
 
2.5. Two Types of Security Dilemma 
This thesis argues that structural power balances alone cannot direct a foreign leader to the best 
course of action. This is because sometimes the system suggests conflicting paths to greater security. 
This is evident in the double security dilemma that exists in realist theory. The first security dilemma 
is the structural variant that asserts that even when states do little more than attempt to seek to 
buttress their security, their actions will alarm and threaten other states, who – mobilized by their 
own insecurity – will react in turn by doing the same. This is because weapons can be used for both 
offense as well as defence, and the uncertainty of any given state’s intentions. As Robert Jervis says, 
the theory puts forward the idea that “the means by which a state tries to increase its security 
decreases the security of others.”161 At a diplomatic or strategic level, this means that one state allying 
with another causes a third to feel heightened insecurity and seek its own security partners. At the 
tactical level, it might mean that one state’s tactics for gaining a preponderance of forces or for gaining 
tactical advantage, will cause other states to react by developing counter-tactics. However, this is not 
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the only security dilemma at work. This thesis also considers a second type of security dilemma, that 
which takes place between allies, and involves the insecurity caused by the 
“entrapment/abandonment” trap. In this internal security dilemma, explored by Glenn Snyder162, FPEs 
are torn between their desire for security and their concern that their state will become entrapped in 
an alliance with another state, fighting in conflicts that are only peripheral to their interests. This 
chapter will now examine the two types here in order to understand the part they play in the creation 
of the trilaterals and in the wider hedging behavior which characterizes American policymaking. 
 
2.6. The Security Dilemma with China 
What does the first type of security dilemma look like in the context of the Asia Pacific? A major feature 
of the American alliance system in the region is its exclusion of China, one of the region’s great powers 
and a historic leader of the system. Zhu Feng, Hugh White, and Lyle Goldstein have all written on how 
the trilateral with Australia might possibly trigger – or has already triggered a security dilemma 
between the trilateral partners and China in the region. While China has been integrated into global 
institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank (WB), 
as well as regional institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), it remains external to the regional network of security alliances in its home-
region. Chinese scholar Zhu Feng notes that as the US fortifies its regional alliances, Beijing feels 
increasingly isolated and surrounded163. The fact that China’s historic foe, Japan, is Washington’s 
partner of choice, heightens this dilemma. “Since 1995” Lyle Goldstein writes, “the capabilities and 
preparedness of the US-Japan Alliance have been ratcheted up to such an extent that the alliance 
itself is triggering a security dilemma that reflects Beijing’s acute security anxieties.”164  
 
In his edited volume, US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Towards a Virtual Alliance (1999), Ralph 
Cossa shows how this same security dilemma was present in the minds of American FPEs in the 1990s, 
when the US-Japan-ROK trilateral was developing on the Korea Peninsula. The body, he claimed,  
served an alliance-like function of bringing “the three sides closer in a way that serves all three nations’ 
national security interests and the broader goal of regional stability.”165 However, he argued that a 
formal security alliance would not really serve the interests of its members, since it would 
“unnecessarily alarm neighbouring countries, like China or Russia, who would be inclined, regardless 
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of the actual motives, to see such an effort at containment or encirclement.”166 In other words, the 
trilateral is security cooperation frozen by its member states at a stage where it affords the benefits 
of collective security without the risks of entrapment and entanglement. 
 
Another example of the security dilemma at work in this thesis involves the Quadrilateral between 
the US, Australia, Japan, and India, a Japanese initiative which initially had strong support from the US 
National Security Council, the Office of the Vice –President, as well as the Australian Prime Minister’s 
Office (PMO)167. One year after the Quadrilateral was created, after a number of meetings and after 
the four had hosted the Malabar 07 military exercise, Australia unilaterally withdrew from the 
grouping. This took place for two reasons: (1) China had issued demarches to all four states; and (2) 
Australia held a national election, and a new Continentalist Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, took office. In 
this case, structural reasons cannot explain on their own, why Australia would have attempted to join 
an initiative and then, just as quickly, quit it. Furthermore, it is clear that structure alone would not 
suggest to Australian leaders the correct choice. Whichever way they turn, they are foregoing some 
measure of security. Given its economic ties to China and fears of entrapment in an anti-China bloc, 
there are few reasons for Canberra to reach out to this grouping, since its security needs are already 
covered by the US-Australia defence pact. However, a neoclassical realist approach – using the 
intervening variable of domestic policy coalitions – allows for these types of miscalculations and 
provides a richer level of analysis. 
 
Despite the fact that Australia dropped out of the Quadrilateral Initiative, it has continued trilateral 
activities with Washington and Tokyo. Over the same space of time, Beijing has begun to pursue the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – a sub-regional security grouping of states – which has 
sometimes been explained as a reaction to overall feeling of encirclement by US allies. From the US 
perspective, the growth of Chinese military capabilities, the development of its naval power, and its 
anti-access, area denial (A2AD) strategies, have led American FPEs to question both Chinese regional 
intentions and to question the ability of American forces to protect US allies and interests. The focus 
of the US military on A2AD, its own tactical responses – such as Air Sea Battle, and the US-Japan-
Australia military exercises on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) can all be taken as indications of the 
security dilemma at work. In many ways, the guiding concept of the age, particularly of China’s rise 
and the system of American alliances, could be said to be shaped around the security dilemma. 
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2.7. The Intra-Alliance Security Dilemma  
Within alliances too, Snyder notes that a type of “anarchy” prevails, with members worrying that they 
will either be abandoned by their allies when danger is at its greatest, or pulled in, entrapped by their 
ally in unnecessary wars168. Commitment, interest, and entanglement are all elements fraught with 
danger for the statesman, considering the national interests of his own nation. Victor Cha writes on 
how this type of internal security dilemma defines what he calls the US-ROK-Japan “quasi-alliance” 169, 
which moves according to the same logic as a formal alliance. As Cha explains: “Japan and Korea are 
not party to a mutual defense treaty, but that does not preclude the existence of alignment patterns 
between the two states. As a result of their geographic proximity, prominence in the region, common 
security threats, and the triangular alliance arrangements with the United States, the two nations 
exhibit alignment patterns and de facto security ties that play an important part in their overall 
relationship.”170  
 
While there are differences between the US-ROK-Japan and US-Japan-Australia trilateral, this thesis 
holds that both are mobilized by this intra-alliance “balance of anxiety”. Cha’s argument broadly 
follows the same lines, but also seeks to harmonize a realist security dilemma drawn from the Western 
experience with the normative domestic factors that shape Japan-Korea relations. Thus, “history, 
perceptions, and commitments”171 play a role in distancing Seoul and Tokyo, despite their common 
security interests. However, when threatened with abandonment, both overcome these domestically-
driven elements, to forge closer security cooperation. Despite acknowledging this internal security 
dilemma, Cha misses the possibility that a second security dilemma is at play (that with China). 
Furthermore, while he acknowledges domestic variables – like history – he does not acknowledge that 
the FPEs might be arrayed against each other into different factions. Rather, his domestic constituents 
are proxies for the Korean or Japanese state, with values and culture added.  
 
The strongest argument for the intra-alliance security dilemma driving the creation of the US-Japan-
Australia trilateral is made by Tomohiko Satake, a Japanese scholar and defence official, who argues 
that trilateralism has its origins in Japanese and Australian abandonment fears in the late 1990s. These 
fears were provoked by Washington’s intention to drastically reduce its military presence in the region 
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as outlined in the DOD East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI). According to Satake, “many Japanese policy 
analysts felt a ‘strong sense of crisis’ at the reduction in US forces, as they thought that this could lead 
to a new ‘isolationist’ US foreign policy posture”.172 He continues, “…Australian policymakers were 
apprehensive that Washington’s phased plan for military reduction would confirm their fears of a 
long-term decline in US strategic presence in the Western Pacific.”173 Satake argues that these fears 
led directly to the resurgence of the two alliances – as carried out in the 1996 Sydney Statement 
(renewing the US-Australia alliance) and in the 1997 Joint Declaration (renewing the US-Japan 
alliance). He also argues that the renewal of both alliances facilitated the trilateral. As with Cha, Satake 
makes an excellent argument on how intra-alliance security dilemmas affect state alignment, but does 
not show how the FPEs of Japan and Australia, propelled by abandonment fears, sought greater 
alliance cohesion with the United States, thus provoking a further security dilemma with China. 
Clearly, neorealism alone cannot always suggest to FPEs the correct policy options that will maximize 
their own security.  
 
2.8. Neoliberalism and Order-building 
At the other end of the spectrum to neorealism’s structural approach, stands neoliberalism, which 
puts forward the notion that interests are much more diffused than is commonly held by realist 
accounts. Complex interdependence – a concept coined by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye174 – 
recognizes that economic relationships forge new dynamics between states and ameliorate military 
competition and insecurity. Because of this preference for inter-dependence, neo-liberalism has 
favoured institution-building, norms, and the establishing of peaceful ways of dealing with the 
tensions of the anarchical system. As Tow and Acharya have sought to demonstrate, the new-
networked alignments – like the US-Japan-Australia trilateral – have been increasingly focused on 
“order-building”175 in their orientation. They identify the fact that the Asia Pacific still lacks strong 
regional multilateral security organizations as a major vulnerability for the fast-growing region. As 
North Korea’s nuclear issue continued to rise during the 1990s, this event did foster the initial 
attempts at institution-building. As described above, the US-Japan-Korea trilateral was developed at 
this time with the twin aims of coordinating policy over North Korea, and ensuring regional stability. 
Entities like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the track 1.5 Council for Security Cooperation in the 
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Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Six Party Talks, and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative 
(NAPCI), have all followed as deliberate attempts to foster dialogue and communication between 
great powers in the region and sub-regional groups like ASEAN. However, the failure of these groups 
to deal with great power rivalry or with the larger problems of North Korea and Taiwan contrasts with 
the expansion and strengthening of the American Cold War-era alliance network176 since 2001.  
 
Brendan Taylor identifies four ways to understand the nexus between this American bilateral system 
and the regional multilateral system177. The first merely sees the bilateral system and multilateral 
systems as completely and mutually separate. The second sees the two elements as able to cooperate, 
but prioritizes the bilateral security element, seeing multilateralism as a complementary addition. The 
third way sees the bilateral system as a “stepping stone” to a wider goal of multilateral security 
architecture, in which the two are integrated or synthesized into something new. Finally, the fourth 
approach sees bilateralism and multilateralism as complementary forces or “convergent security”, 
that will continue to work alongside each other. As the later chapter will show, different American 
foreign policy elites have taken different approaches toward the region. The early Clinton 
administration did in fact take the third approach, with President Clinton announcing a Pacific 
Community policy in a speech in 1993 in Seoul178. While this ultimately failed to gain traction, the idea 
of the “security community” became prevalent among American policymakers, particularly in the 
military in Pacific Command. Admiral Blair, the Commander-in-chief at PACOM and a supporter of the 
“security community” concept, argued that “this idea of security communities would enable 
cooperation to happen even between countries that were not ideologically aligned with us, to do good 
things without bringing in the things like democracies versus autocratic governments, or China versus 
the rest.”179  
 
Despite the slight empirical evidence suggesting that FPEs treated the trilaterals as part of a wider 
neoliberal security project, alternative explanations favor the view that the growth of insecurity has 
led to a “hardening” of alliance trilateralism, with more hard power elements coming into play over 
eight years. Clinton’s Pacific Community language quickly fell from use in US policy documents during 
the Bush administration, as did similar schemes put forward by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
and Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. While neoliberalism is therefore useful to 
                                                          
176 With the US trilaterals, the alliance with the Philippines, and deepening of bilateral ties with South Korea and Japan, as 
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177 Brendan Taylor, “Conceptualizing the bilateral-multilateral security nexus,” in William T. Tow, Brendan Taylor, (eds.,) 
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178 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, The American Presidency Project: 
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understanding the context of trilateralism, the areas where the United States, Japan, and Australia 
have chosen to move forward on regional cooperation are clearly reacting to geopolitical changes in 
the region. Southeast Asian states – on the front line of China’s attempts to consolidate its hold over 
the South China Sea – have shown remarkably little cohesion over the issue. Often, they suffer from 
lack of resources, and are unable to even form a common operational picture (COP) of the maritime 
space. Consequently, trilateral capacity building assistance (CBA) has sought to strengthen these areas 
through the framework of maritime domain awareness (MDA) , providing funding through 
programmes like the Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy and the Maritime Security Initiative 
(MSI)180.   
 
2.9. Constructivism and the English School 
Then there are constructivist and English School analyses of the trilaterals. Here, constructivist 
scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Evelyn Goh argue that the relatively static view of identity 
within realism is in fact “an ongoing boundary-drawing process”181, in which normative and ideational 
factors actually construct the political institutions and processes in which foreign policy elites operate. 
Bull, of the English School, states that the boundaries of international society are dictated by great 
powers that seek to turn their unequal power into authority through the provision of public goods182. 
Goh argues that the bilateral-multilateral nexus between trilateralism and regional multilateralism is 
really about “divergent visions of regional order”183 between the US security network, the Chinese 
quest for a new regional “security concept”, and the ASEAN-led quest for a normative-Asian 
institution. According to Goh’s account, the US-Japan-Australia trilateral is the product of two 
commitments that occur between Washington and its allies; the first sees allies “tying down” the US 
to the predictable management of regional security issues; the second sees Washington recommit to 
playing the “benign alliance leader” that would act to “preclude the rise of a hostile hegemon through 
selective crisis intervention and through deployment of superior military power in the region.”184 
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The normative and ideational elements of the trilateral are explored more in depth by scholars like 
Thomas Wilkins185, Zhu Feng186, and Hauke Klevinhaus187. Wilkins asserts that threat assessment – a 
binding factor for aligning states – at essence a social activity, and that regime type can help or hinder 
alliance cohesion. He notes the liberal values of three democracies plays a strong part to shaping how 
the three trilateral partners188 view their own interests189, which Zhu Feng notes, excludes China.  
Klevinhaus also examines the constructed side of order-building, draws from Immanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett’s “security community” concept to frame the language and coding used by the 
trilateral in mission statements, press releases, and policy outputs. Referring back to Admiral Dennis 
Blair’s conceptualization of a regional security community, Klevinhaus notes that the trilateral’s 
community of shared democratic values lends legitimacy to the American use of power and to Japan’s 
search for a regional security role. After talks with American, Japanese, and Australian officials at the 
July 2001 ARF meeting, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Armitage told reporters, “I’ve noted 
Australia has a very close – primarily political and economic – relationship with Japan. The United 
States has a very close economic, and political, military and security relationship with Japan. It seems 
to me we are all liberal democracies, we are all concerned with the fate of Asia and it seems to me a 
perfectly reasonable proposition that we ought to get together and talk.”190 Armitage’s reference to 
common security interests and common political values seems a defining feature of Mahanian 
accounts. 
 
Indeed, it would be difficult to understand American foreign policy decisions without reference to 
norms. Nor can trilateral cooperation be understood without these social and normative factors. 
However, constructivism’s focus on identity and normative factors is often at the expense of greater 
trends in power balance. For example, constructivists might explain why the three aligned as they did, 
but not why they chose to do so at this point in time. This can only be understood if China’s material 
rise is taken into account, an event with both societal and material elements. Furthermore, 
constructivism often seems to emphasize normative elements over power, forgetting that states that 
misjudge their power relative to other states can be swiftly punished. History, as the adage goes, is 
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littered with the remains of states which misperceived actual power balances. However, “correcting” 
reveals itself in technological advances, for example, which might accord adversaries particularly 
offensive advantages. It is really only through a combination of power balances and ideational 
elements that we find FPEs inside states “perceiving” other states as threats. And this nexus between 
the structure of power and perception of foreign policymakers is critical to our understanding how 
threats are defined, and what mobilizes states to align themselves in one direction or another. 
 
2.10. Neoclassical Realism as a “Middle Way” 
As can be seen, all the different mainstream schools of international relations offer helpful insights 
into American foreign policy and the origin of the trilaterals, but none, by itself, provides a satisfactory 
explanation of why the trilaterals developed as they did, when they did. Neorealism’s structural 
impulses are useful, but can also be quite contradictory, propelling states from one security dilemma 
to another. Only by accessing their domestic debates can we can see how FPEs navigate these 
different options. Neoliberalism, on the other hand, offers us some indications of why states might 
seek collective security, or seek to build a security community, but this is not really a clear argument 
of why trilaterals developed as they did – over a different form of multilateralism. Arguably not. 
Neoliberalism really seems to have been used by practitioners as a fig leaf for alignment, ironically, 
with the intention to avoid a security dilemma with China. Few scholars looking at trilaterals now view 
them as “order-building”. Finally, constructivism does offer some valuable insights into how and why 
states align, but does not accord actual power balances a prominent place in that analysis.  
 
It is only by adopting a mode of analysis which examines both structural and domestic variables that 
we can explain these inconsistencies and anomalies; we can see that systemic stimuli alone do not 
really suggest clear policy lines to FPEs, because (a) it is difficult for FPEs to agree on the threat 
assessment of states like China; and because of (b) the conflicting pressures of the double security 
dilemma. We can also see why the Korea trilateral is languishing under the burden of history, while 
the Australian variant has gone through higher and higher levels of institutionalization. We can thus 
see why similar states behave differently under the same environmental stimuli; we see why states 
don’t always decide on clear strategies for dealing with external threats; why states sometimes pursue 
strategies harmful to their rationally-calculated interests. After all, “there is no immediate or perfect 
transmission belt linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior.”191 This thesis agrees with 
Nicholas Kitchen’s proposition that a state’s grand strategy can only come after an assessment of 
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power in the international system followed by a competition of ideas at the domestic level192. 
Certainly, the balance of material capabilities in the system is important, but the imperfect perception 
of those capabilities, and inability to agree over the threat status of third-party states, and competing 
policy solutions are equally important in shaping the foreign policy outcomes of states. 
   
Neoclassical realists attempt to bridge the gap between innenpolitik and Waltz’s systemic theory in 
what some have called the “second state debate”193. Scholars like Steven Lobell have pointed out194 
that it is only by looking at the threat assessment stage that we see how states can come to react to 
similar stimuli in different ways. Indeed, the threat assessment stage is an integral part of the 
trilaterals, because if those debates are inconclusive, FPEs will not decide on a clear policy pathway. 
For example, American foreign policy elites find it difficult to assess China’s threat status. This is partly 
because of the security dilemma, partly because of China’s size, making it “too big to contain” and 
partly from Washington’s pluralistic nature of decision-making.  
 
Broadly speaking, the many voices speaking on America’s Asia policy have coalesced around two 
policy-coalitions called Mahanians and Continentalists. This division was particularly useful during the 
Bush White House, since those factions implemented policy in variance to each other. However, in 
other times, they have attempted both approaches, as with the first Obama White House, which saw 
Mahanian and Continentalist approaches in the same administration. This unusual behavior stems 
from genuine confusion of foreign policy elites as to what to do about China. Influenced by a range of 
factors, “mainstream” policy shifts incrementally with each new presidency or cabinet reshuffle, 
resulting sometimes in confused and contradictory foreign and security policy behavior.  
 
Like FPEs in other liberal democracies, American foreign policy elites have certain socio-political 
assumptions about the transformative and integrative nature of trade, and often used as an implicit 
argument against balancing policies. Dan Kliman has even argued that liberal democratic states find 
authoritarian states even more difficult to assess because their opaque foreign policy-making 
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structures “generate considerable uncertainty about [their] intentions.”195 Faced with this 
indeterminate threat assessment, foreign policy elites carry out a mixture of engaging and balancing 
policies with a potential adversary. This ambiguity sits well in Kitchen’s “competition of strategies” 
and Lobell’s threat-assessment debates. In terms of the trilaterals, American FPEs debate whether 
they should balance against the rise of China (security dilemma), or attempt to broaden the alliances 
into a community-building exercise, risking a weakening of the old bilateral commitments (intra-
alliance security dilemma). 
 
  
 
 
In summary, this thesis argues that FPEs are pushed and pulled between (I) the two security dilemmas, 
and between (II) two policy options for dealing with China (balance or accommodate). At times, they 
even try to make a virtue out of this indecision. In Hard Choices, for example, Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton, gives a summary of the three strategic policy choices facing American policymaking in the Asia 
Pacific:  
 
One option was to focus on broadening our relationship with China, on the theory that if we 
could get our China policy right, the rest of our work in Asia would be much easier. An alternative 
was to concentrate our efforts on strengthening America’s treaty alliances in the region (with 
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia), providing a counterbalance to 
China’s growing power. A third approach was to elevate and harmonize the alphabet soup of 
regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 
and APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization). […] I decided that the smart 
power choice was to meld all three approaches. We would show that America was ‘all in’ when 
it came to Asia.196  
 
Her attempt to deal with the decision was actually to avoid making a choice, as a form of “smart 
power”. As this thesis will endeavor to show, Clinton is merely one in a long line of American 
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policymakers who were uncertain about the correct policy choice to make in America’s Asia policy 
because of conflicting structural drivers and conflicting internal variables. 
 
2.11. Conclusion  
In conclusion, trilaterals are not alliances. They are in fact quasi-in-nature because of the lack of a 
trilateral mutual defence obligation between the principal members. This halfway arrangement 
developed because the foreign policy elites of all three countries were pushed in two directions by 
two different security dilemmas. They were conflicted about whether a key power in the region – 
China – constituted a threat, and were unsure if balancing through alliance-formation would improve 
or worsen their overall security. This mixed with the intervening variables of policy debates in the 
American domestic system created conflicting policy outputs.  
 
This domestic conflict is also a by-product of internal politics and debates on how to deal with a rising 
state. The two facets of China’s rise which intensify this debate inside the US are Beijing’s critical role 
as a trade partner and its importance to the global economy; and its rise as a possible challenger to 
US hegemony due to the increase in its military hard power. Faced with this unpredictable growth in 
power and intentions, surrounding states struggle to build a consistent approach toward the 
potentially threatening state. Kliman writes that democracies tend to favor binding as a strategy for 
dealing with a rising power challenge, but will incorporate hedging when dealing with ‘closed system’ 
states. Autocratic states like China have closed-system foreign policy-making processes, which defy 
prediction, have veiled intentions and have low permeability to external influence. As a result, 
democracies avoid binding as stand-alone policy, since that would likely open them up to concessions, 
appeasement, and military adventurism on the rising state. In addition, rising powers may not even 
know their own intentions, given the fact that rising powers have sudden growth in capacities. This 
may be described as ‘rolling ambition’, a process by which a state’s policy objectives incrementally 
expand, matching the growth of its hard power capabilities.  
 
As may have been shown thus far, American foreign policy elites and their alliance counterparts are 
heavily influenced by ideas about international relations. These ideas – arising from the tradition and 
academic study of international relations – shape how FPEs see threats in the international system, 
how they prescribe various solutions, and finally, how they promote certain real-world policies over 
others. Given the fact that these theories disagree, they have been unable to chart a clear set of 
policies toward China. How was it possible for the United States to attempt to create a networked 
regional alliance in 2001, and then consider sidelining it only four years later? Simplistic though it 
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sounds, it came down to how two rival foreign policy coalitions viewed international relations in the 
Asia Pacific. On the one hand, Mahanians grouped around Assistant Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage were pessimistic liberals regarding China’s ability or willingness to integrate into a liberal 
order, seeing values as a binding element with their allies. On the other, Continentalists grouped 
around Tom Zoellick, were optimistic liberals, and thought that shaping China’s behavior through 
trade and engagement was paramount. Up until the present day, the Obama administration has tried 
to follow both policy paths, as a form of “smart power”.  It has carried out a push into Asia – the 
“Rebalance” or “Pivot” – which has attempted to strengthen US military, political, and economic 
influence in the region. It has strengthened its Pacific alliances, and continued the hard-power 
element of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral; it has opened up new avenues of engagement and trust 
building with China.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. CHAPTER 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND PERCEPTION 
This chapter seeks to examine the conditions that brought about the US-Japan-Australia trilateral by 
looking at the structure of the international system, how American FPEs perceive that system, and 
how the interplay of these two impacts US foreign policy outputs. The first part of this chapter will 
examine the proposition that structure is actually a complex arrangement of factors. For example, 
structure might be said to include (i) the international system; (ii) the so-called “Pax Americana”; and 
(iii) the Asia Pacific region. In turn, the Asia Pacific region can be broken down into three structural 
features. They include 1) the San Francisco System, particularly Japan’s prominence therein; 2) 
nascent regional architecture in Southeast Asia; and 3) the position of China in the system. After 
looking at these structural features, this chapter will examine how FPEs assess structure and make 
decisions. Taking our lead from previous critiques of the rational actor model of decision making, we 
will then consider threat-assessment, and how that shapes – or hinders – effective policymaking. The 
role that indecision and inconclusiveness have in shaping mainstream American policy toward a rising 
China, for example, will be examined more closely, as we seek links between those debates and those 
surrounding the formation of the trilateral. Finally, this chapter will examine the decision-makers, 
namely the foreign policy elites (FPEs). Their inability to perfectly comprehend changes and possible 
threats in the international system is influenced directly by a range of factors, including professional 
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background, exposure to international relations and economic theory, as well as the usual range – 
bureaucratic, organizational, or otherwise – of foreign policy factors, explored in the FPA literature.  
 
 
 
3.1.  The International System 
Kenneth Waltz and other realists put forward the idea that state behavior can be explained through 
systemic drivers. One of the intriguing questions of international power is that of hierarchy. As NCR 
approaches note, correctly perceiving power in the system stands as one of the greatest foreign policy 
challenges for statesmen. It is not clear that American FPEs are in agreement about hierarchies of 
power in the Asia Pacific system. Despite a traditional emphasis on anarchy among American realists, 
some scholars have argued that a strong historic feature of the Asia Pacific has been its hierarchical 
nature  – as Kang has suggested in his work on the Chinese tributary system197. Other theorists agree 
asserting that hegemonic stability – an influential theory put forward by economist, Charles 
Kindleberger198 – underpins the current global order. This idea that the stability and openness of the 
system is critically dependent on the willingness and power of the United States to “lead” the 
system199, has gained much traction among American scholars, with David Calleo writing, “the 
prevalent historical consciousness seems ensnared in the fantasy of a reborn Pax Britannica”, 
especially, “the American political imagination.”200 It is against the hierarchy of power within the 
global structure that the American alliance system within the Asia Pacific should be examined. Japan’s 
ambiguous role in that system, and the exclusion of China – by far the largest regional power and 
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traditional regional leader – from that system are vitally important aspects of hierarchy in the Asia 
Pacific sub-system, and are critically important to this study.  
 
3.2.  Pax Americana 
Before turning to the Asia Pacific region and the American San Francisco System, it is important to first 
examine the US post-war settlement which is the basis for the shape of the modern global order. In 
After Victory, Ikenberry describes the establishment of the “Western Settlement”, which was based 
on “economic openness, political reciprocity, and multilateral management of an American-led liberal 
political order.”201 This led to the United States supporting the creation of a number of global 
international institutions and organizations in the immediate post-war period. These included the 
United Nations (UN), the Bretton Woods institutions202, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), among others. As this system was developed, it was clear that these institutions had a role to 
play in US foreign economic policy in Asia. Japan with its privileged position in the system, exemplified 
the three goals of the bilateral system and the trade system, namely defraying the costs of occupation, 
strengthening Japan’s economy as a bulwark against Chinese communism, and advancing the 
international free trade system. This Washington did by supporting Tokyo’s bid to join the advanced 
economies through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1949 and 1955, 
securing for it Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, introducing the New Special Procurements program 
for the duration of the Korean war203, and encouraging Japan-Southeast Asian trade links. “The revival 
of Japan’s economy in the regional context was seen as a way to encourage burden-sharing, or to 
reduce the costs of US foreign policy in another significant way. A strong Japan, it was predicted, would 
facilitate the economic recovery of the entire Far Eastern region.”204 Additionally, the US supported 
other minor regional economic mechanisms, like the Sterling Area Trade Agreement, signed by Britain, 
Australia, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. Finally, it developed a foreign policy of regional 
economic aid205, after realizing that trade alone would not be sufficient for strengthening Southeast 
Asian economies in the short-term206. 
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3.3. The Asia Pacific  
The Asia Pacific is the world’s most populous region, and by some predictions, could account for 52 
per cent of the global economy by 2050207. Despite this, it also represents some of the most dangerous 
flashpoints between great powers, as seen on the Korean Peninsula, in the South China Sea, and in 
the Taiwan Straits. Dominated by the Pacific Ocean, it is a uniquely maritime-dominated region, with 
major trade routes and energy sea lanes of communication crossing its eastern shores at critical 
chokepoints. While American FPEs see the alliance system, as “the pillars upon which the region’s 
sustained peace and security rest”208, the system is, as William Tow asserts, “increasingly challenged 
by indigenously generated alternatives for defining and sustaining regional order.”209 These have 
come both from the rise of China, and the evolution of ASEAN into a focal point for regional 
multilateralism.  
 
 
It is in this context that the trilaterals have been generated, both as a response to the criticism that 
the old bilateral system was no longer relevant to modern human security challenges – as presented 
by the growing need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and – simultaneously, an 
as attempt to maintain US security interests in the face of a rising China. 
 
3.4.  “The San Francisco System”  
At the end of the 20th Century, American power and influence in the Asia Pacific looked unassailable. 
The region was crisscrossed by a series of alliances between Washington and regional states. Unlike 
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the multilateral incoherence of NATO, this system was bilateral210 in nature, marked by 
“exclusivism”,211 and resembled the “hub and spokes” of a wagon wheel, which increased the weight 
of American policy preferences in each capital. Sometimes called the San Francisco System (SFS) – 
after the peace conference and treaty that ended the war in the Pacific – the system was composed 
of separate basing arrangements, consultations, and training exercise arrangements between 
Washington and each of its allies, with little overlap or coordination between those allies. Kent 
Calder212 has summarized the following as features of the system: 1) a network of bilateral alliances; 
2) an absence of multilateral security architecture; 3) deep asymmetry in alliance relations; 4) special 
place for Japan in the system; 5) liberal access to American markets, with basic development aid 
assistance.213 Cha argues that the asymmetry of power between Washington and the allies that 
constituted the spokes, gave US preferences great weight in each capital, and offered members 
economic trade advantages, aid, and military assistance214. Overseen by the joint work of the 
Department of State and Department of Defense, the US San Francisco System shapes how American 
FPEs view the region, how they view their choices, and how America engages in the region. While 
much work is done in Washington, the Department of Defense carries out much defense diplomacy 
and operations through the Pacific Command (PACOM) headquarters in Honolulu, Hawaii. In addition 
to this four-star command post, it hosts a three-star command in Japan overseeing US Forces Japan 
(USFJ) and another four-star command in South Korea, overseeing US Forces Korea (USFK). 
 
A major feature of the US system in the Asia Pacific is the fact that US military bases are hosted on the 
territories of its allies. This type of “forward-deployed” alliance system is historically atypical, and 
indicates to some extent a hierarchy of military, economic, and political capabilities between the US 
and its allies. Eminent historian John Downer states, “the San Francisco System and this militarized 
Pax Americana go hand in hand. They have defined the strategic status quo in the Asia Pacific since 
the 1950s.”215 The system also creates a maritime order in which non-allied states reside, simply by 
virtue of their geography. Singapore – lacking a formal defence commitment from the United States 
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– is an example of a state that “sits” within this maritime order. As Melvyn Leffler has written, this 
maritime order has guided American conceptions of national security in the region ever since216. 
American military strategy has consistently emphasized control of maritime choke-points217, strategic 
areas of interest, and mastery of the seas218, with the aim of defending the larger maritime trading 
order219, mentioned above.220 In Embattled Garrisons, Kent E. Calder states, “Both nations (the US and 
the British Empire) wanted a stable, open global order, in which trade and cross-border investment 
could flourish.”221 While the United States removed 60 percent of its bases after the Cold War, it has 
maintained many of its bases in Asia.  
 
If one chose to paraphrase Lord Ismay’s pithy summary of NATO, one might argue that the San 
Francisco System was originally built “to keep the Communists out, the Americans in, and the Japanese 
down.” While the US often justified during the Cold War the US-Japan Alliance as a means for keeping 
a lid on Japanese militarism and as a means of preventing expansion by a Communist China, this 
reasoning has been absent from policy statements or papers from 1990. Indeed, the 1990s has been 
characterized by the opposite drive within US FPE circles. The US has promoted a “normal” security 
posture for Japan within the Asia Pacific, while sought greater trade relations with China. The 
promotion of China as a welcome member to the Asia Pacific served US post-Cold War notions of 
developing China into a responsible stakeholder, while also serving domestic economic interests, 
which benefitted from offshoring manufacturing to China222. In regards to Japan, US pressure during 
the 1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Joint Declaration,223 and other occasions exemplify that shift within 
Washington to encourage Japan to contribute to regional security, albeit in the narrow area defined 
by Japan’s Constitution and public opinion. This push fell on fertile ground as politicians within Tokyo 
began to search for a post-Yoshida doctrine foreign policy for Japan. This break from Japan’s Cold War 
posture centered around Japanese politicians like Ichiro Ozawa promoting the shift into a “normal 
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country224”. This shift has been welcomed by some US allies, like Australia and the Philippines, but has 
been greeted by other states in the region with ambiguity and even hostility. This latter reaction has 
been prominent among Chinese and Korean foreign policy elites, who criticise Japan’s historical legacy 
and seeming lack of remorse.  
 
John Downer alleges the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the alliance system perpetuated a number 
of contradictions centered around Japan’s posture in the region: first, it allowed five major territorial 
issues to go unresolved,225 three of which involved Japan; second it has maintained large forward-
deployed forces in Japan, which ties Tokyo to the defence of US interests and vice versa; third, it has 
provided a buffer for Japan’s historical responsibility in the region; fourth, it has extended the nuclear 
umbrella over Tokyo; and fifth, it has encouraged Sino-Japanese competition by excluding China from 
the alliance system. These “contradictions” form cracks that split off from Japan and extend far into 
the region. 
 
3.5.  The Rise of China  
One of the most important structural features of the past two decades for American FPEs, has been 
the rise of China, and no study of trilateralism or US alliance policy would be complete without 
examining the role China plays in their formation. Using its new economic power, China is offering 
regional states a competing vision of order to the previous US-centric system, constructed around 
trade relationships, and various free trade regional groupings, part of an overall “charm offensive.” 
This was facilitated when Washington put in place the One-China policy, effectively shelving the 
Taiwan issue. A tacit agreement held that as long as America’s alliance with Japan suppressed that 
country’s militarism, American regional leadership had some legitimacy226. While China was weak, 
Downer argues, this implicit deal was somewhat accepted by Chinese leaders, but as market-oriented 
reforms began to change the nature of China’s economic standing, as well as its interdependence 
within the global economy – not least its interdependence with the American economy – this began 
to change. China began to assert itself as a great power – insisting on a “new model” of great power 
relations with the United States after Xi Jinping ascended to the role of leader. While this proposed 
that in exchange for the United States accepting the “peaceful rise” of China as a global power, China 
would accept a continued role for the US as a stabilizing presence in the Asia Pacific.  
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While American FPEs continue to express a willingness to accommodate China’s new role as a global 
power, this apparent willingness has been eroded by China’s recent maritime assertiveness over 
waters in its near periphery. The increased assertiveness over these claims, matched by the growth in 
Chinese naval capabilities has triggered alarm in Washington, and among US allies, dependent on 
those waters for fishing, trade, and energy. Regional claimants, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia have become unsettled by China’s increasing willingness to threaten force or to use coercive 
diplomacy to effectively claim large swathes of the South China Sea. Critically, claimants also include 
US allies, Japan, and the Philippines, which thus raises questions about Washington’s ability to protect 
shipping, about its willingness to maintain peace and stability in the region, and to deter Chinese 
adventurism with a rapidly dwindling military advantage. Such fears have been increased by the 
substantial and steady increase in Chinese military spending, which saw nearly two decades of double-
digit increases. In 2015, China announced an increase of 10%, a drop from the previous year’s 12.2% 
increase. This brings it to nearly $150 billion. Although that is still a fraction of US defence spending227, 
and still only accounts for 1.33 per cent of China’s total GDP228, some have argued that Chinese military 
expenditure is around three-quarters that of the United States on a purchasing power parity (PPP) 
basis229. It is also concentrated in one region, while US military power is spread across a number of 
regions. Additionally, the PLA has inaugurated numerous structural and administrative reforms, to 
increase combat capability, provide better training. Under Xi Jinping, the PLA reforms have reduced 
the autonomous military administrative hubs – such as General Departments and Military Regions – 
replacing them with Five Theater Commands – focused solely on operations. According to one 
account, “this bears substantial similarity to US military reorganization under the Department of 
Defense supervision through [1986] Goldwater-Nichols [Act].”230 
 
More worrying than the actual military spending has been the impact of that spending on the military 
balance in the Asia Pacific. Chinese military spending and military modernization can be traced back 
to 1991, after the Persian Gulf War, when Jiang Zemin stated that the new PLA should be able to “win 
local wars that might occur under modern especially high-technology conditions”. Since then, it has 
focused on developing information capabilities, precision-guided munitions, and space-based C4ISR 
capabilities that target the vulnerabilities of American systems. In 2015, following the Third Plenum 
of the 18th Central Committee President Xi Jinping inaugurated the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), Strategic 
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Support Force (PLASSF), which will focus on space and cyber warfare. At a giant military parade in 
Beijing in 2015 to commemorate the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, China revealed dozens 
of “carrier-killer” anti-ship ballistic DF-21D missile systems. It has also procured from Russia or 
developed indigenously a range of weapons systems that have the ability to target US carrier 
groups231. This includes Chinese aircraft carriers, anti-satellite weapons, J-20 stealth bombers, J-31 
stealth fighters, J-15 aircraft carrier fighter planes, S-400 air defence systems, Type 052D guided 
missile destroyers. Additionally, it has increased its satellites from 10 in the year 2000 to more than 
181 in 2016.  
 
Tensions are likely to be accentuated by the advent of the Trump presidency. The Sino-American 
structural rivalry has been likened to a “Thucydides Trap”232 by Graham Allison, indicating that current 
Sino-American tensions have deeper structural drivers. 
233 
By this account, there are three trends related to China’s rise: (1) China’s assertion of its place as a 
regional power; (2) the relative decline of American power; and (3) the demographic and economic 
decline of the Japan and subsequent normalization of security behavior. If we look at power transition 
and hegemonic stability literature, we find that scholars such as Ogranski234, Schweller235, Kliman236, 
Gilpin237 and others assert that rising powers seek to reorder the system to their advantage, often 
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resorting to war, particularly when the gap between the rising power and the dominant state closes238. 
Given the massive gap between China and its nearest neighbours – which is increasing year by year – 
American FPEs have been concerned about the growing risk of conflict between China and the US or 
between China and one of its regional allies.239 
 
3.6. Regional Integration  
The region today is crisscrossed by a range of ASEAN-linked bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism 
(ACCT), the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ 
Meeting (ADMM). Notably, none of the region’s great powers – China, Japan, the US, or Russia – is a 
member of ASEAN, though they all have engaged heavily with both ASEAN and its sub-organizations. 
One could argue that alongside the more traditional military competition, there is also a rivalry 
between the US, Japan, and China on who will lead regional integration. This competition revealed 
itself in Sino-Japanese rivalry in the early 2000s – as will be discussed in Chapter Seven – with Japanese 
conceptions of order vying with Chinese conceptions of order. This took the shape of competing plans 
of the Beijing-backed Asian-ethnic ASEAN Plus Three vision versus the Tokyo-backed inclusive ASEAN 
Plus Six vision. In the case of the latter vision, Japanese diplomats sought to get fellow democracies 
Australia, New Zealand and India included to balance what they perceived as a China-led club240. It has 
also seen the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) competing with the Japan-led 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). This rivalry has also taken place between the United States and China 
in the economic sphere, with Chinese-backed proposals for Regional Cooperation Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) vying against the US-backed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).  
 
3.7. The Interaction of External and Internal Variables 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the current security structure of the Asia Pacific can be broken 
down into three features: The American alliance system, the rise of China, and regional integration 
initiatives. As Hilary Clinton reveals in Hard Choices241, American FPEs in the Obama administration 
viewed these three features as policy choices, seeing prioritization as a form of strategy. Debates 
among FPEs on which of these three areas should be prioritized are complicated by the two security 
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dilemmas, constrained by “butter versus guns” budgetary factors, and influenced by their Mahanian 
vs Continentalist approaches. Additional factors include bureaucratic interests, and domestic 
constraints. Moreover, this thesis notes that American FPEs in particular often define their policy 
objectives through the lenses of IR theory. 
 
3.8. Intervening Variables – Perception 
Neoclassical realism disagrees with neorealism on how external stimuli shapes state behavior in a 
number of different ways. Randall Schweller states that the balance of power idea is an ambiguous 
concept, which is “treated as a law of nature, where the whole universe is pictured as a gigantic 
mechanism or a clockwork created and kept in motion by the divine watchmaker.” The inherent 
weakness in any simple calculative model is, as Hans Morgenthau, Arnold Wolfers, and Aaron 
Friedberg have written, the difficulty in correctly perceiving the complex, shifting, changes of different 
resources in an ongoing, continuous manner, and updating policy accordingly. As Friedberg notes, 
“…in most structural realist formulations, assessment through rational calculation plays the part of a 
reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective change to adaptive behavior.”242 
Neoclassical realism examines intervening variables at the domestic level to get around this 
perception problem. One of the key variables in international relations – indeed, one upon which this 
thesis relies heavily – is that of threat assessment. 
 
3.9. Threat Assessments 
If we consider Wilkin’s argument that trilaterals are a form of alignment, then we are obliged to think 
about threat assessment.243 After all, Snyder points out that alignment theory “does not say much 
about what cases states in a multipolar system use to identify each other as friends or enemies or the 
consequences of such identification.”244 While Waltz’s neorealist framework has an attractive clarity, 
it does little to explain why some states are viewed as threats and why some are viewed as allies. 
Waltz asserts that states are able to perceive who their enemies are through the mechanism of the 
balance of power245. However, even a brief acquaintance with the history of nations tells us that this 
is simply not enough. Why didn’t Churchill accept overtures of peace from Hitler and align with Nazi 
Germany against Soviet Russia? Why didn’t Europe balance against American unipolarity after the 
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Cold War? Why hasn’t the United States balanced against China and created a full-treaty alliance like 
the NATO alliance in Europe? Since many of these examples might be explained as underbalancing – 
that is, not balancing to the level expected by circumstances predicted by neorealism – we must ask, 
why states underbalance?  
 
Other neorealist scholars sensed that something more was required to Waltz’s parsimonious 
explanation. Stephen Walt attempted to clarify this missing piece of the puzzle in The Origins of 
Alliances,246 when he wrote on different “sources of threat”. He mentions a number of sources, which 
include “aggregate power”, “geographic proximity”, and “offensive power”. In some ways, these are 
all strictly neorealist in nature, that’s to say, they are elements of structure or hardware. However, he 
continues, mentioning “aggressive intentions” and “unifying ideologies”, which are really domestic 
variables and are important in explaining many real world outcomes that neorealism cannot. These 
intervening variables might be called “threat assessment” and “regime type”. This is relevant to the 
trilaterals because, as I argue throughout this chapter, they were formed in a specific way because of 
how American FPEs perceived regional security, and how they viewed the rise of China within that 
region. Instead of Waltz’s power balances, these thesis thus explores three variables: structure of 
power, threat assessment, and regime type. I also note that this domestic interaction between foreign 
policy elites and the perceptions of systemic power, threat assessment, and regime type also occurred 
in Tokyo and Canberra when the trilateral was being developed. 
 
3.10. Foreign Policy Elites and Threat Assessments 
By examining the various groups that make up the domestic foreign policy elite of a country, we can 
understand why states do not always act in the same way under similar sets of circumstances. We 
understand that “Even if one acknowledges that structures exist, and are important, there is still the 
question of how statesmen grasp their contours.”247 We can see from a number of foreign policy 
studies that the rational actor model is far from perfect. Scholars like Robert Jervis248, Jeril Rosati249, 
Alexander George250, Graham Allison251, and Irving L. Janis252, have all examined different ways in 
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which domestic variables impact policymaking outcomes. They also note that many domestic actors 
were unable to comprehend systemic features uniformly253. The rational actor model – as explained 
by Allison and Zelikov – distinguishes between comprehensive and bounded rationality. In the first 
instance, “the actor is assumed to have a utility function that consistently ranks all alternatives the 
actor faces and to choose the factor that has the highest utility.”254 Innenpolitik scholars, by contrast, 
accept that this model is more often the ideal than the reality, and that policymakers are bounded by 
constraints in knowledge, power, and organization, and often must play “two-level games” 255 in order 
to pursue their chosen policies.  
 
In Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (2009), Steven Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and 
others explore this relationship between external stimuli, domestic actors, and their policy responses. 
In particular, Lobell’s work explores how states assess threats, and what happens when state and 
societal leaders disagree about whether a foreign state is a threat256. Disagreements can come for a 
variety of reasons: In Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (2016), they identify four: (1) 
leader images; (2) strategic culture; (3) state-society relations; and (4) domestic institutions. In turn 
these influence perception, threat-assessment, decision-making, and policy implementation.  
 
In the case of China’s rise, the primary debate among American and allied FPEs has been on whether 
China has revisionist or limited-aims ambitions257. The implicit assumption is, of course, that a 
revisionist power will challenge the status quo – one established and maintained by the United States 
and its allies – and seek to overturn that order through force258. A limited-aims power on the other 
hand, may only seek changes that accord to its own preferences, while maintaining the overall 
integrity of the system. While Stephen Walt has argued that neoclassical realism tends to apply these 
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intervening variables in an “ad hoc”259 manner, Ripsman et al, argue that these four groupings cover 
most various domestic level variables raised by FPA and NCR scholarship. They may come into 
operation because various domestic groups are competing for the goods produced by a state’s foreign 
and economic policies; they may represent different bureaucratic interests260; they may represent the 
different economic and regional261 interests of a country. 
 
Beliefs 
One of the most important intervening variables concerns the beliefs, ideas, operating assumptions, 
and core values of the FPE. Their ideological or ethnic affiliation may affect their decision-making262; 
they may also disagree over the nature of the international system. While undertaking field interviews 
for this thesis, it was obvious that foreign policy elites within the United States disagreed on the nature 
of the international system, disagreed about what the rise of a challenging power meant, and 
therefore disagreed on the solutions available to them. Nicholas Kitchen has written a neoclassical 
realist account of the impact of ideas on strategy formation, which “occurs when individuals with 
shared ideas coalesce into groups, organizations, and common practices within the state to form 
institutions that operate in both formal and informal sectors of the policymaking process.”263 Certain 
groups of experts can form “epistemic communities”, acting as couriers for certain ideas in the 
policymaking process. A strong example of this might include the rise of the neoconservative 
movement in the United States in the late 1990s, early 2000s. As we often discover, there are many 
historical events cannot be fully understood, without reference to the history ideas. Some, like “Social 
Darwinism”, “human rights”, and the “responsibility to protect”, have such a glaring providence that 
we cannot ignore their force upon historical events.  
 
Many of those concepts are used out of context, politicized at the party and societal level, but they 
often arise from greater academic debates. Liberalism and realism are such debates, which have been 
taking place for many centuries in the West. It is not surprising then, to find that certain assumptions 
from Realism or Liberalism bleed into the discussions and debates of practitioners. For example, FPEs 
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influenced by the one might be more pessimistic about human nature, the nature of the system (and 
of states’ motivations), while FPEs influenced by the other might be more optimistic about the power 
of institutions and trade to ameliorate conflict. Upon reflection, this relationship between theorists 
and practitioners is unsurprising. If we accept the constructivist assertion that all social and political 
reality is socially constructed, and we accept that ideas play a part in shaping the “working 
assumptions” of practitioners, then we must naturally accept that policymakers are affected by the 
realist and liberal debates and cleavages that broadly describe international relations. John Ikenberry 
has traced these debates in US foreign policy making in the Asia Pacific region, arguing that at times, 
it has exhibited either realist or liberal logic.264 This influence makes itself felt through the FPEs, who 
attempt to interpret or match concepts to the real-world problems they encounter. 
 
3.11. The impact of History and Structure on Perception 
This raises the interesting possibility that structure is not only perceived, but socially-created. As an 
example, consider how the Cold War played a central role in creating a “structure”, the “teams”, and 
the “rules of the game”, which have shaped American foreign and security policymaking in the Asia 
Pacific region since 1945.  This is particularly true of American FPEs who work on alliances and are 
thus socialized into its norms, structure, and objectives. As later chapters will show, American 
diplomats have life-long relationships with their alliance counterparts, which help establish trust and 
build sets of common “working assumptions”. Ashton Calvert – the senior Australian diplomat, who is 
at times credited with proposing the trilateral – had been friends with his Japanese and American 
counterparts, Richard Armitage and Ryozo Kato for nearly 20 years, at the time. In creating something 
new with possible geopolitical repercussions – an act about which bureaucrats are not always 
enthusiastic – the three men had to understand each other’s intentions and reservations at a very 
deep level.  They also had to understand structure and possible threats to the structure in a similar 
way in order to agree to embark on a new institution. 
 
Ideology also plays a role here. After all, it was the possibility of Communist expansion during the Cold 
War, which drove the US to develop a network of alliances that might not have come into being 
otherwise. Washington has defence pacts with Japan, Korea, Australia, and has complex alliance-like 
relationships with Thailand and Singapore. Conflicts over Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam have also 
shaped the military competition, while the ideological nature of the Cold War shaped American 
economic and trade policies for the region. It has defined much of American foreign policy toward the 
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region, even as Cold War hostilities have waxed and waned, effectively by freezing a number of 
conflicts, such as the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam, and Taiwan. These became central features in 
defining what Christopher Hughes calls “the complex balance of power that evolved between the PRC, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States during the Cold War.”265  
 
In the modern period, the legacy of US Cold War alliances can be seen in the continued American 
relationships with the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. However, the modern 
period has been marked by changes in the structure of the system, and this has been in two ways. 
First, perceptions of who constitute a friend and who constitutes an enemy have become less clear as 
ideological divisions have given way to economic partnerships across the broad spectrum. Australia 
and Japan may be strong allies of the United States, but geopolitical alignment over regional policies 
is not always guaranteed. Despite this, states outside the alliance system continue to view it as 
divisive. At the 2014 ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting, Chinese Vice Minister Liu Zhenmin stated that a 
“problem with military alliances is that [they] often draw a line between allies and non-allies when 
problems occur, without due regard to the merits of the matter. Support will be given to whatever 
the ally does regardless of whether it’s right or wrong.”266 In many ways, the defining feature of the 
foreign policy elites identified as Mahanian in this thesis, is their adherence and loyalty to the 
geopolitical concept of an open, maritime system and this network of allies. The extension of Chinese 
power over its near seas has been for Mahanians a deeply threatening event and explains both the 
trilateral and the wider hedging policy. 
 
Over the past century, different American FPEs have viewed China through the prisms of ideology, 
transformative capitalism, and national interest. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe 
the back-and-forth of Sino-American relations for the entirety of the Cold War, the next three chapters 
will seek to explain changes in the US-Japan alliance and other American alliances by referencing 
changes in attitudes toward China. It will chart how American foreign policy elites debated whether 
China was adapting responsibly to the international system or challenging it, for more than three 
decades, and how – as Chinese military power and intention grew – those who viewed China as a 
threat – initially, a minority – have steadily grown in number. As those voices in Washington grew 
louder, so then did those who advocated the renewal and updating of the old postwar bilateral system 
upon which Washington’s Northeast Asian allies rely. As has been argued, the US system in the Asia 
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Pacific was defined by two settlements: a liberal, maritime-based trading order and a network of 
bilateral military alliances, both centered around Japan to some extent. In both cases, US security and 
economic policy were heavily defined by the Cold War.  
 
3.12.  The Great China Debate 
No other power has excited quite the same level of debate among American policymakers and 
academics as China. The swift growth of its economy, paralleled by its rapid military modernization 
increasingly defined American foreign policy in the post-invasion of Iraq space, which in turn 
promoted concern among American Mahanian FPEs. China’s increasing willingness to deploy its forces 
into the maritime space of US allies has raised both day-to-day policy challenges, as well as deeper 
strategic concerns about China’s ultimate intentions. This debate has often pitted those within the 
realist tradition against neoliberal institutionalists. The history of China in American policy has an 
interesting arc. Following the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, Sino-American relations 
underwent a deep freeze. Despite this, George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) encouraged the resumption of 
high-level political ties and vetoed attempts by Congress to link the political relationship to progress 
in human rights. There was a belief that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization. 
Until that time, American policy would hedge against two outcomes: a friendly, liberal China and a 
strong, challenger China.  
 
This binary reveals itself in the varying articles about China in the early 1990s. Was Asia ripe for rivalry? 
Friedberg’s pessimistic 1993 International Security article thought so. Others – like David Shambaugh 
– wondered if the US should enact an engagement policy or containment policy. Some like Patrick 
Cronin, Kenneth Lieberthal, and James Shinn argued for various forms of engagement, which deeply 
colored President Clinton’s policy on China. Others like Arthur Waldron, Gideon Rachman, and Gerald 
Segal recommended “constrainment” or varying forms of containment. This debate spilled over into 
the policy community, in what became known as the “Red Team/Blue Team” debates. “Blue team” 
members included congressional staffers, journalists, and policy academics who were hawkish on 
China, while “red team” members preferred engagement and accommodation. Blue Teamers painted 
the 1996 campaign finance controversy as a sign of growing Chinese influence in Washington. In 
Congress, they publicized accounts of Chinese defence-related espionage – as described in the 1999 
Cox Report – and sought to show how growing Chinese military capabilities would make it a threat 
one day, requiring from 2000 annual reports from the Defense Department and the US-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission.  
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American writing on China has seen a large uptick, commensurate with its standing as the world’s next 
largest economy and military power. Writers have tended to come from two groups: China-watchers 
and IR scholars or security experts. China watchers like Alastair Iain Johnston, Harry Harding, David 
Lampton, David Shambaugh, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael Pillsbury have tended to adopt 
culturally nuanced approaches to policy, basing their analyses on cultural, linguistic, and network 
familiarity within China. Their tone varies widely between Shambaugh’s, “The Tangled Titans: The 
United States and China” and Pillsbury’s 2014 book, One Hundred Year Marathon. Many of these 
pieces trace the arc of America’s China policy, looking at the high expectations within both countries. 
Those who have a more general IR background, focus on the US-China relationship or rising power 
debates. This includes a wide range of academics and practitioners, including Henry Kissinger, Henry 
Paulson, James Steinberg and Evan Medeiros who advocate a wait-and-see approach. Others like 
Aaron Friedberg, John Mearsheimer, Ashley Tellis, Robert Kaplan and Peter Dutton predict growing 
tensions or seek to explain growing competition. 
 
Over the past decade, much of the debate has been on whether the engagement policy vis a vis China 
has been successful in the long-term. Harry Harding’s Washington Quarterly piece, “Has US China 
Policy Failed?” traces the reasons for American disappointment in China, looking at Washington’s 
hopes for political liberalization inside China as well as the expectation that Beijing would become an 
active supporter of the international system. The fact that under Xi Jinping, political control has been 
tightened over the media, over universities, and NGOs has played into this disappointment. As for a 
global role, China’s willingness to create regional organizations like RCEP and the AIIB are seen as 
challenging to American interests, while its maritime disputes with American allies Japan and the 
Philippines are dramatically increasing regional insecurity.  
 
3.13. Conclusion  
The structure of the international system is complex. In this chapter we have seen how it is broken up 
into various systemic and sub-systemic features. The international system, the “Pax Americana”, and 
the Asia Pacific region, can be further reduced by incorporating China’s rise, the US alliance system in 
Asia, and nascent regional architecture. These various structural features shape the perceptions of 
American FPEs in a number of different ways that defy rational decision-making models. First there 
are the usual guns versus butter debates that take place, then there are also bureaucratic constraints, 
a range of elements – such as belief systems, history, and national narratives – which shape the threat 
assessment debates that take place between FPEs. These debates and the different outcomes that 
arise from them, explain why similar states can react differently to the same types of external stimuli. 
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One of the most important aspects of the nexus between structure and perception – for the purpose 
of this thesis – is the fact that American FPEs have not decided conclusively whether China is a threat. 
Or rather that some FPEs have, while others are not convinced. In some ways, this lack of threat-
assessment agreement shows the drawback of so-called structural drivers to state behavior. There is 
simply no easy way for states – or their FPEs – to read the system. Certainly balance of power plays a 
role, but what is often forgotten in balance-of-power arguments is that power variables – while 
important – do not decide whether another state is a threat or not. As Walt showed us, balance of 
threat includes a host of other considerations. In this way, one might argue that the relationship 
between structure and perception is cyclical rather than hierarchical. This will be discussed further in 
the conclusion of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
4. CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN POLICY ELITES AND HEDGING 
This chapter will examine the domestic composition of states, and look at states whose FPEs cannot 
agree on threat-assessments of a potential competitor in the international system. However, before 
doing that, it is necessary to examine in more detail what this thesis means by foreign policy elites, 
and how they break down into their component parts within the American political system. It is 
arguable that there are two types of FPEs, Level 1 and Level 2, which exist in the American political 
system. The first level contains those practitioners who have direct control over American foreign 
policymaking; the second level contains those analysts, journalists, or academics who indirectly 
influence policymaking, and influence or seek to influence the political debates held by Level 1 
practitioners. Finally, this chapter will put forward a theory of hedging in international relations using 
a foreign policy analysis approach, by examining how American FPEs have reacted to the rise of China 
over the past three decades. 
 
4.1. The State  
As many foreign policy analysis scholars have noted, states are not unified entities267. Martin J. Smith 
asserts that they are a set of institutions that define the parameters for political conflict over the use 
of resources and direction of policy by different actors. These include elected politicians, bureaucrats, 
and pressure groups, who compete and cooperate in policy subsystems according to the issue. James 
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A. Thurber states that “Policy subsystems can be characterized by networks of actors, their substantive 
policy domain, and various modes of decision-making. They are organized to make focused demands 
on the political system and to influence specific programs...”268 These networks can also cross over 
into relationships with like-minded actors in allied countries. Additionally, foreign policy elites sit at 
the nexus between external and domestic politics, blurring the lines between systemic and sub-
systemic drivers. “Leaders often act on one level, but the target is to influence the outcome on another 
level.”269 However, we can agree that foreign policy elites strive for state survival or at least regime 
survival. Because they perceive the international system to be full of dangers and threats to that 
survival, they are always scanning the horizon, attempting to discern those powers that might 
threaten them.  
 
The domestic institutional context in which foreign policy is made is said to be a chief determinant for 
neoclassical realists. In the United States, innenpolitik scholars often refer to the “foreign policy 
executive”, to mean the President, key members of the cabinet, and advisors, diplomats, and military 
officials who are charged with conducting foreign and defence polices270. This thesis argues for a 
broader term, “foreign policy elites”, which is arguably better-suited to the American foreign policy 
community. Using this broader definition, one finds that there are Level 1 FPEs who conduct, 
implement, and carry out foreign policy, but there is another grouping, which we might call Level 2 
FPEs, which include former government officials, academics, and think tank scholars who have 
privileged access to Level 1 FPEs and who seek to directly or indirectly influence the shape of America’s 
foreign and defence policy. This division is fully visible in how American FPEs carry out alliance and 
foreign policy in the Asia Pacific region, where a relatively small number of journalists, academics, and 
think tank staff regularly meet in track 1.5 settings271, and have facilitated the creation of the 
trilaterals. Additional Level 2 FPEs might include non-government organizations and other groups that 
lobby on foreign policy.  
 
This thesis holds that within Level 1, FPEs tend to have either a regionalists and/or subject matter 
background. Typical examples might be a Middle East expert, or a Counter-terrorism specialist. In the 
case of US foreign policy in Asia, one would most likely find that Asian regional experts are naturally 
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the most common to be appointed to policy positions in a new American administration. Some have 
developed their knowledge in government service, while others have come from a journalism or 
academic background. In terms of subject matter, one might find a broader array of expertise being 
called upon for the Asia Pacific, ranging from trade issues, to non-proliferation, anti-piracy, to cyber 
and nuclear weapons experts. As with classical realism, the individual’s role in shaping policy is 
reimagined and while the Mahanian/Continentalist division is an imperfect one, it imposes some 
shape on the debates that regularly take place among those FPEs formulating policy for the Asia Pacific 
region. 
 
4.2. Level 1 FPEs 
Level 1 FPEs are in direct contact with the tools of policy statecraft. The United States government has 
three branches of government, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. This thesis only 
considers the first two as actors in the making and implementation of American foreign and security 
policy. Certainly, this thesis does not hold that some departments or agencies are more Mahanian or 
Contintentalist than others, but it does acknowledge that there is some causation between one’s 
beliefs and the bureaucratic institute to which a given FPE belongs. For example, in The Rise of China 
Vs. the Logic of Strategy, Edward Luttwak, a prominent military strategist and historian, argues that 
the China policy of the United States is separated by bureaucratic interests: “It is customary to criticize 
the administration in office for not having a grand strategy and for not having a policy for this or that 
country. But this accusation certainly cannot be advanced in regard to (the US’) China policy, there is 
not merely one of them, but three – two of which are moving in diametrically opposed directions.”272 
Naturally, this directly influences the threat-assessment debates that drive overall US policy in the 
Asia Pacific. 
 
4.3. The President and the National Security Council 
The foreign policymaking powers of the Office of the President and the White House – also 
encompassing the National Security Council – are significant. The President, after all, is the 
Commander-in-Chief of the military and has the power to take American troops into conflict273 – 
barring Congressional opposition. He is also the principle negotiator of treaties and often has, 
according to Colin Dueck274, the decisive factor in determining foreign policy within political parties as 
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well as nationally. The power of the President, although limited domestically, is quite strong compared 
to the power of the other two branches of government. For example, not only is the President able to 
instruct bureaucracy through the issuance of instructions, executive orders, or the sponsoring of 
legislation, but the executive branch can appoint near 5,000 mid-level to senior-level civil servant 
positions, defending against – though not absolutely –bureaucratic interests. Furthermore, the 
personal background of the President – as with Barak Obama’s upbringing in Asia and subsequent 
personal support of the Rebalance to Asia – can play a major role in shaping overall policy shifts. While 
both President Bush and President Obama have been pivotal in supporting the trilateral initiative – 
meeting with their partners on the sidelines of ASEAN summits, for example – their support has not 
been critical to either the formation or the progress of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, which has 
taken place at a much lower level. The trilateral is by that standard, a bottom-up initiative, spawned 
by the alliance-management bureaucracy.  
 
The National Security Council 
Despite that, the White House has not been a silent partner in the creation of the trilateral, and 
staffers at the NSC have been involved at critical stages of its evolution. As a foreign policy actor, the 
NSC does have a certain amount of autonomy. Its large staff and centralized nature enable the 
President to instruct and mobilize all other branches and agencies working on particular issues within 
foreign policy by shaping the agenda in the Director-level, Deputy-level, and Principal-level weekly 
meetings275, chaired by the National Security Advisor (NSA). NSC staffers often travel with the 
President’s entourage on major trips and can carry out diplomatic initiatives on their own. This was 
seen in the pivotal role that senior NSC officials took in maintaining the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral, 
promoting it to ministerial level in 2005, after Robert Zoellick – who preferred to prioritize relations 
with China, and who did not wish to meet at the Vice-ministerial level – became the Deputy Secretary 
of State276. The NSC is able to be a “clearing house” for US intelligence, with a wider picture of events 
than other departments. On the other hand, this heightened foreign policy role of the President and 
NSC has not always created policy clarity.  After all, the size of the NSC and its relationship to the 
president may bring a questionable level of expertise to certain issues. It was not uncommon, for 
example, in Obama’s first term for White House officials with no foreign policy experience – like 
Valerie Jarrett, David Axelrod, or Rahm Emanuel – to weigh in over the advice of the actual National 
Security Advisor General Jim Jones277. On the other hand, since many would return to the private 
sector, they were “more willing to make difficult choices without worrying about their career three 
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years down the line”278 thus bypassing some of the inter-departmental logjams that occurred over key 
issues. 
 
At best, the National Security Council persuades government of the direction it wants to go. At worst, 
it becomes merely another advocate on a crowded stage. As Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
remembers about the Obama administration’s internal feuds over Afghanistan policy, “The National 
Security staff is supposed to be the “honest broker” in the policy-making process. That was not always 
the case with trilaterals since key officials like Torkel Patterson and Michal Green made the NSS an 
advocate rather than a neutral party.279  
 
4.4. The Department of State 
The Department of State (DOS) is in charge of implementing America’ foreign policy and operates 294 
Embassies abroad on a budget of (FY 2016) $54 billion280.  According to Charles W. Thayer, Secretary 
Cordell Hull had once stated he required four things of his ambassadors: to report what was going on; 
to represent the United States before foreign governments and publics; to negotiate United States 
government business; and to look after American lives and property.”281 It has the regional expertise 
and the networks abroad to make it a formidable balance to the power of the NSC. With a strong 
Secretary of State, it is possible for the DOS to prevail on key issues, depending ultimately of course, 
on the relationship between the President and the Secretary of State282. At times, it has taken on the 
job of “doing” to the NSC’s task of “thinking”. Traditionally divided between its Foreign Service Officers 
(FSOs), political appointees, and career civil servants, criticism of the Department in the past has 
focused on administrative and policy planning weaknesses, namely, “its complex organization and its 
inability to integrate its routine functions with its policy formulation responsibilities.”283  
 
While the Secretary of State shares much of the day-to-day running of alliance matters with the 
Department of Defense, it often leads broader foreign policy issues. This can even extend to DOS 
leadership during times of crisis, as with the DOS lead on creating the “Core Group” and mobilizing 
                                                          
278 Anonymous (National Security Council, 2009-2012) remarks in small roundtable, the LSE, November 15, 2016. 
279 Anonymous, (Senior Staffer, NSC), Telephone interview, Washington DC, April 15, 2016. 
280 Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, available at: 
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf (accessed November 30, 2016). 
281 Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat, (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 1975), p.81. 
282 Weak Secretaries of State can find it difficult to operate around strong National Security Advisors. The classic example of 
this was National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s ability to dominate foreign policymaking over Secretary of State William 
Rogers and NSA Zbigniew Brzezinki over Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, 2nd 
Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 89. 
283 John Dumbrell, The Making of US Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 94. 
 
 
84 
DOD units after the 2004 Tsunami284. Despite the close working relationship, there are times when 
inter-departmental rivalry plays a role. One of the primary reasons the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue 
(TSD) is DOS-led is due to the fact that Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage restricted it in the 
initial stages, though representatives of the DOD and other agencies were invited into particular 
meetings or Working Groups. This has also seen the State Department continue to take a strong 
interest in the DOD-led trilateral, the Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF). Despite 
occasional tensions, there is a fairly good working relationship between the DOS and the DOD, which 
takes place through the DOS Political-Military Affairs Bureau (PM) Foreign Policy Advisor Program 
(POLAD)285, which imbeds DOS personnel as advisors in major DOD headquarters or combatant 
commands. In the case of both Japan and Australia, the relationships are shared between the two 
departments on an institutionalized basis, in the shape of the annual Australia-United States 
Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) and the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC). 
According to Luttwak, the DOS’s China policy is to confront China286. Written when Hillary Clinton was 
Secretary of State, this policy valued cooperation with China, whenever possible, but more often than 
not, recognized that China opposed US values and interests across a wide range of interests and 
venues. 
 
4.4.1.1. The Department of Defense 
Given the place of the San Francisco System to US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific, the Department of 
Defense does have an oversized impact on American foreign policy in the region. It is close to 
America’s allies because it interacts with them on a broad range of alliance issues287, but it also has a 
proactive engagement policy with the Chinese military. It also has a much larger budget - $534 billion 
in 2016288 – than the Department of State and more resources, though this has been affected by 
automatic planned cuts of $500 billion over ten years, as mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act289. 
Interestingly, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the Department of Defense has far more exposure to 
Level 2 foreign policy elites than the DOS. In addition to political appointees at the senior levels, the 
                                                          
284 Revere, Evans (Japan Desk, Department of State 2003-4), Telephone Interview, January 30, 2016. 
285 Office of the Coordinator of the Foreign Policy Advisor Program (PM/POLAD) Department of State website, available at: 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/polad/ (accessed December 1, 2016). 
286 Luttwak, The Rise of China, 2012, p.223. 
287 Robin, Sakoda (Department of Defense, Senior Country Director for Japan 1994-99), Personal Interview by Author, 
Washington DC, April 28, 2015. 
288 Long Term Implications of the 2016 Future Years Defense Program, Congressional Budget Office website, available at: 
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51050 (accessed November 30, 2016). 
289 Luiz Martinez, “Pentagon Begins Planning for $500B in ‘Fiscal Cliff’ Cuts” ABC News, available at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/12/pentagon-begins-planning-for-500b-in-fiscal-cliff-cuts/ (accessed November 
30, 2016). 
 
 
85 
Office of the Secretary of Defense operates a three-year programme whereby think tank or academic 
experts can be seconded by their institute to the DOD as Regional Policy Advisors, or Senior Advisors.  
 
The DOD also operates its own “defence diplomacy” through its various Unified Combatant 
Commands290. The Pacific Command (PACOM), based in Honolulu, Hawaii, has more than 380,000 
uniformed and civilian personnel under its command, and operates five aircraft carrier strike groups 
in the region, carrying nearly 1,100 aircraft. Although the region is split among the services, the US 
Navy tends to dominate the policy debates when it comes to tactical matters. The DOD also operates 
a large defence attaché network in the region, something which helped coordinate HA/DR efforts 
immensely during the 2004 Tsunami291. Finally, the DOD cultivates links with rising regional military 
officers through the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies (APCSS), based in Honolulu, which 
operates something between an executive training facility and a think tank292. In terms of engagement 
and operations, the DOD has a number of funding programmes in the region to help with humanitarian 
assistance / disaster relief (HA/DR) work, capacity building assistance (CBA) programmes, and of 
course, through military exercises – all areas that are increasingly carried out on a trilateral basis with 
Australia and Japan.293. The DOD’s weaknesses include a tendency toward budgetary and planning 
rivalries between the different services.  
 
As Morton Halperin points out, the classic rivalries include the US Army’s attempt to have its own air 
wing, competition between the services for “ownership” of new non-traditional systems like missile 
defence and cyberwarfare, as well as US Army troop transport. These disagreements also take place 
over tactics and military operations, and can spill out into public. A recent example of this was the 
debate294 over the Air-Sea Battle, which as its name suggests, was controversial among US Army 
supporters as it did not envision a great role for ground forces in contingencies involving the Asia 
Pacific. According to Luttwak, the third China policy within the US Government is that of containing 
China, promoted by the DOD. This has seen China “unambiguously become the prospective ‘Main 
Enemy’, at least for planning and procurement purposes.”295 This revolves around the possibility of a 
Taiwan contingency, and sees the United States competing with Chinese strategy and capabilities, 
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with Air-Sea Battle, and its own strategy to develop counter-measures to new high-tech Chinese 
weaponry, such as stealth aircraft, growing maritime capabilities, and anti-ship missile systems. 
 
4.4.1.2. The Department of the Treasury 
The Department of the Treasury has not had a specific role within the formation of the US-Japan-
Australia trilateral. Nor does it align and coordinate economic policy around American allies in the 
post-Cold War space, except occasionally to attempt to rally like-minded states from policies it 
believes threaten US national interests. This might be seen in the G7’s use of sanctions against Russia 
after the annexation of the Crimea or in its attempt to persuade the UK and France not to join the 
Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015. However, one area where it does 
play a significant role is in the internal debates and threat-assessments of China within the US 
bureaucracy and it continues to play an active role in the US-China Security and Economic Dialogue 
(S&ED). Luttwak asserts that “China is the beneficiary of the US Treasury’s especial solicitude”296 given 
the fact that the Treasury is “naturally highly cognizant of the benefits to US public finance, and to 
private financial entities also, of having access to cheap Chinese capital”297. Senior appointees might 
also lack Mahanian tendencies because their primary working experiences of Japan and Australian 
policymakers is through the difficult and occasionally conflictual area of trade. According to one 
source, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s sometimes difficult relationship with Japanese 
diplomats was related his experience as US Trade Representative and the debates over Japan’s 
restrictions on US beef imports298. In addition to this socialization process, many senior level 
appointees come from leading financial firms, and tend to view China through the balanced lens of 
currency manipulation versus Chinese purchases of US Treasury Bonds, rather than focusing on the 
impact of Chinese trade on the manufacturing sector.  
 
4.5. Level 2 FPEs 
There are two divergent views on the utility of academics, think tank researchers, and journalist. One 
anonymous official inside the National Security Council in the Obama White House stated, “Nothing I 
read from the think tank community while I was in the NSC helped me make a decision. The fact is 
that the average government official knows two to three times more than someone writing a piece in 
Washington Quarterly – and they know the constraints of selling that policy internally.”299 On the other 
hand, this same official admitted that they had spent much of their career as a Level 2 FPE, before 
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joining the National Security Council. In the case of American foreign policy in Asia, there is much 
evidence to suggest that Level 2 FPEs have played a long-running role in shaping the debate, both on 
alliance management issues (particularly around strategic reassurance), and on dealing with China. 
This influence often plays out in so-called Track 1.5 diplomacy, in which think tanks host a mixture of 
government officials, academics, and analysts to talks. The Shangri-La Dialogue, hosted annually by 
the British think tank IISS in Singapore, is probably the most well-known example of this type of think 
tank-led diplomacy. The role of Pacific Forum CSIS in hosting the first US-Japan-South Korea trilateral 
has already been discussed, and it should be noted that this Hawaii think tank continues to host a 
large number of annual trilateral events.  
 
 
 
Track 1.5 Diplomacy 
These types of regular events can also act as screens for governments that do not wish to work on 
those issues publicly and within full view of the media. As mentioned previously, the US-Japan-ROK 
trilateral began in 1994 at the Track 1.5 level due to the sensitivities around the South Korean military 
discussing mutual security with the Japanese military. In 2012, for example, the Department of 
Defense provided funding to a US-based think tank to put on a regional maritime security event in 
Malaysia on the sensitive issue of the South China Sea. Had such an event been sponsored publicly by 
the US Embassy, regional states might have thought twice about attending for fear of offending China. 
Another area for Track 1.5 diplomacy is the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), 
which feeds policy reports to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Given the fact that all the regional 
states including India, North Korea, and Myanmar have CSCAP member committees, the various 
CSCAP conferences and forums provide regional governments – including that of the United States – 
with the opportunity for networking and socialization on a broad range of security issues. CSIS Pacific 
Forum has chaired the US Committee to CSCAP and has formed a number of working groups within 
CSCAP to promote areas of interest to the United States Government, including a Study Group on 
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Study Group), Export Controls 
Experts Group (XCXG), and a Nuclear Energy Experts Group (NEEG),  among others300. While Mahanian 
or Continentalist divisions are less obvious in these types of regional events, there is a degree of 
socialization on China’s threat-status taking place between the US and regional states because 
dialogue often focuses on Chinese-related issues like maritime security. As Robert Gates asserted, 
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“Political scientists, historians, and reporters are often completely unaware of events or experiences 
unseen by the public eye that influence important decisions. I often reminded colleagues that 
presidents and other senior officials listen to a wide array of voices other than those in official 
government channels.”301 
 
4.6. “Policy Academics”  
The bureaucracy of the United States government is unique in that so many senior civil servants are 
appointed from the public sector. There are said to be around 4,000 to 5,000 policymaking positions 
which are exchanged after a Presidential election. While there are many arguments for and against 
this system, it does provide an opportunity for many international relations and politics professors to 
penetrate the bureaucracy, which in turn, has a number of effects. First, it exposes career civil servants 
to the latest in theory from international relations, economics, and law. Conceptual ideas like “smart 
power” or “security community” are tested in the real-world cut-and-thrust of power politics and 
government. A second way that this influx influences policymaking is by actually empowering those 
academics to influence policymaking. This has the effect of bringing theoretical constructs – however 
superficially – into policymaking within the Department of State and Department of Defense. 
Furthermore, because American career civil servants are constantly exposed to Level 2 FPEs are who 
are past or future colleagues, the tone of engagement between Level 1 and Level 2 FPEs can be more 
collegial than occurs in other countries302.  
 
American academics have brought the two main schools of international relations into Washington’s 
corridors of power. Broadly speaking, although realism has its origins in classical antiquity303, there 
was a surge in writing and thinking about realism in the United States in the immediate aftermath of 
the Second World War304. Liberalism, by contrast, has its origins in Britain’s 18th Century, and Adam 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations, which made commerce a moral part of human progress305. One can see 
that Anglo-American policymakers have struggled with the broad contours of both schools more as 
international relations theory developed into a more systemic field306 throughout the 20th century307. 
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This helps explain why American foreign policy is often seen as a contradictory mixture of realist 
calculations of national interest and idealist internationalist values-based judgments, and faith in 
institutions308. It is not the State per se that holds realist or liberal internationalist assumptions. We 
have rid ourselves of the black box of state, and now must see it as an organizing principle for groups 
of individuals, who bring their ideas, background, and professional experience to the role. There are 
some who see constructivism as specific to national or cultural values and might question the idea 
that international relations schools constitute constructed reality, but this is a misreading of how IR 
influences perceptions within the policymaking community.309.  
 
While she was Secretary of State, for example, Hillary Clinton was heavily influenced by Harvard 
academic Joseph S. Nye’s310 concept of “smart power”311, which she attempted to apply to 
Department of State policy. She also chose Princeton academic Anne-Marie Slaughter as her State’s 
Director of Policy Planning, and in this guise, Slaughter applied a networking conceptual framework 
lifted from her 2004 book, A New World Order,312 to State Department policymaking, attempting to 
harness “new technologies, public-private partnerships, diaspora networks, and other new tools…into 
fields beyond traditional diplomacy, especially energy and economics.”313 In this way, policy-
academics can influence the thinking of their bureaucratic and socialize them into the greater debates 
inherent in the field of international relations. This may even be at the top level, if presidents come 
from that field – as with Woodrow Wilson. Or it may come from interaction with the President: a 
President’s closest advisors often come from academia314. Furthermore, there is a process of 
socialization between American policy-academics and policy communities in their fellow liberal 
democracies. In countries closely allied with the United States, this process of socialization may well 
be intense, with a wider community of international relations scholars working on policy-relevant 
issues. In the United States, scholars associated with Harvard, SAIS Johns Hopkins, Princeton, and 
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Georgetown all field scholars who interact heavily with policymakers on Asia Pacific policy. In Tokyo, 
scholars grouped around Keio University ad Tokyo University play this role, while in Australia, the 
Australian National University fields a large number of policy-academics.   
 
Unlike the American system, academics in Australia and Japan rarely become policymakers 
themselves, and instead are content to play an advisory role and seek to shape the debate either as 
national security advisors, or through publications, events, and media work. Also, it should be noted 
that American policy-academics do not always dominate the foreign policymaking process. Some 
presidents allow free reign to their policy advisors, while others have their own ideas and concepts, 
which may at times go against those favored by their foreign policy advisors. At other times, these 
“policy-academics” are unable to promote their ideas within the bureaucracy because of inexperience 
in politicking315. It is difficult to know how cohesive foreign policy networks are in these situations, 
and how their place in an administration actually becomes translated into policy decisions. One 
example that might serve as a case study for further analysis is the decision to commit American 
military forces to the Libya intervention. Here, a neoliberal pro-interventionist faction, consisting of 
Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power, which dominated the State Department, the 
National Security Council, and the White House, managed to overcome the pragmatic conservativism 
of Vice President Joe Biden, Defense Department officials, as well as the President himself.316 The 
complexity of variables involved in such scenarios make prediction extremely difficult317, but explain 
the fascination that foreign governments and the media have with the cabinet selection of an 
incoming President-elect.  
 
4.7. How Level 2 FPEs influenced Policy (1990-2016) 
As Hillary Clinton makes clear in Hard Choices, US policymakers perceive that they had three strategic 
options in Asia: (1) seek to transform China, by trade and high-level political engagement; (2) seek to 
strengthen and link Cold-War era alliances in order to balance a potentially threatening China; and (3) 
use the alliances to build a region-wide security community, which would both seek to integrate and 
balance Chinese power. Patrick Cronin states, the “current US strategy for managing a rising China 
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rests on a three-legged stool of engaging, binding, and balancing.”318 In charting American policy 
toward the Asia Pacific, we can see that a mixture of all three occurred from the 1990s onwards, with 
some options being favored by certain foreign policy coalitions at certain times, with others favoring 
different options at other times.  
 
The Clinton administration, spanning the decade after the Cold War focused its China policy on the 
first two options, and attempted to draw down US forces across the region319320, while simultaneously 
encouraging its alliance partners to build relationships across the region. Foreign policy elites in the 
US – as well as Canberra and Tokyo – wittingly or unwittingly utilized Karl Deutsch’s neoliberal concept 
of “security community”321 in constructing policy and emphasized the transformative effects of trade 
vis a vis China. In 1993, President Clinton called for “a New Pacific Community, built on shared 
strength, shared prosperity, and a shared commitment to democratic values322”. The concept was 
subsequently explained further in the 1994 National Security Strategy323, explaining that the “New 
Pacific Community” would be built on three pillars: first, it would include a new inclusive dialogue-
based approach to security issues like proliferation, piracy and terrorism; second, it would involve new 
overlapping security arrangements, which would include China; and third, it would provide support 
for the wave of democratic reform sweeping the region. This attempt to marry the US alliance system 
to nascent regional architecture community relied on liberal assumptions inherent in institutionalism 
and socialization, as well as promoting liberal values and norms324 
 
As has already been mentioned, American foreign policy elites did not act in a vacuum. Often, these 
debates took on a socializing aspect as different Level 1 foreign policy elites were influenced – and 
influenced in their turn – by Level 2 foreign policy elites. Akihisa Nagashima, an influential DPJ 
politician, Vice Minister of Defense325 and foreign policy advisor to Japanese Prime Minister Noda, is 
a good example of this. He was an Adjunct Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, and a visiting 
scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington DC: “I 
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used to write papers on the security community concept when I was in Washington, Karl Deutsch’s 
idea. I liked it very much...I thought Japan’s security strategy must be built on that idea, shared values, 
no conflict. So in that sense, Japan’s strategic goal has been [shaped by] that.”326 As has been 
mentioned, however, optimistic though these 1990s Japanese and American policy makers were, they 
also saw security community as a way of restraining and binding China. In an interview with the author, 
Admiral Blair – the former commander of Pacific Command, and a strong proponent of the security 
community concept in US policy in Asia327 – asserted “the more multilateral approaches you had, the 
more good things would happen without us (the US) having to do them. They would happen 
naturally…between even countries that were not ideologically aligned with us…partly to deal with 
China in a way that offered (it) a helpful role, but with sort of a backup in case China wasn’t helpful”.328  
 
Such was the speed with which these ideas began to shape thinking, that by the late 90s, there was 
concern that the alliances were in danger, and foreign policy elites in both Tokyo and Canberra made 
efforts to re-forge the alliances and update their utility in the 1996 ‘US-Japan Joint Security 
Declaration’ and ‘Sydney Statement’329. The provision of public goods by the US-Japan Alliance 
became a way of legitimizing the expansion and revival of Japanese power. To some extent, there 
were conceptual problems with how the TSD would actually foster a community in an area as 
disparate culturally as the Asia Pacific330. Japanese policymakers worried that security community 
work would lessen US commitment to Japan’s defence331. Also, it is clear that many FPEs in the 
mainstream of American and Japanese policy-making world were becoming increasingly concerned 
with China’s rise rather than with community building.332 Regional security seemed to be getting 
worse rather than better: the North Korean nuclear crisis, the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and the growth of 
Chinese military spending all caused George W. Bush’s incoming Asia team of to move the center of 
gravity back to US alliances. Unlike the Clinton team, they viewed China as much more of a potential 
threat333.  
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Throughout the early 2000s, in the first half of the new decade, they created the trilateral with 
Australia and Japan, encouraged extra-regional security cooperation, and moved the alliances down 
the track to closer intelligence and military integration. The Administration’s policy was characterized 
by realist documents like the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, which heavily 
emphasized the fight against terrorism and viewed the US alliance system (in Asia as elsewhere) in 
realist terms: the US would “support our friends and confront our enemies” according to one critic of 
the strategy334. James Kelly, President Bush’s Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia from 2001 to 
2005335, called on US allies for aid in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to increase regional security 
cooperation336. This “realist turn” was in turn reflected in the security policies of Prime Ministers 
Junichiro Koizumi, Taro Aso, and Shinzo Abe, who all viewed China with some degree of concern, 
overlaying any inclusive neoliberal aspects to trilateral cooperation. 
 
Interestingly, the second half of the Bush administration saw another shift, as new cabinet members 
and other FPEs moved the center of gravity back to one of engaging China, emphasizing trade relations 
and attempting to create a positive role for China in the US system. As can be sensed, there is much 
here derived from the idea put forward by Immanuel Kant337 and Norman Angell338 that trade and 
international interdependence reduce conflict339.  
 
4.8. How Level 1 and Level 2 FPEs Interact 
“Policy doesn’t make the people. The people make the policy.”340 
       ~Torkel Patterson 
While Luttwak’s analysis of the three bureaucracies and how their interests translate into three “China 
policies” is generally persuasive, we should really look at policy networks which develop between 
interest groups, elected officials from Congress, and members of the bureaucracy. In his analysis, 
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bureaucracies are monolithic entities that know their interests; however, as we have shown, the 
American system is marked by a high rate of turnover and agency rotation of senior policy-bureaucrats 
in the system. This is partly because the political appointee system makes it difficult to ascertain 
whether someone is a “trade” person, a “defence” person, or something else. Clearly, the old adage 
“where you stand, depends on where you sit” becomes where you stand, depends on where you have 
sat. However, until a research project can approach this question in a quantitative way, it remains a 
qualitative tool, subject to the error and oversimplification.  
 
Nevertheless, the many interviews undertaken for this research project indicate that there is a belief 
among practitioners that FPEs are socialized by their institutions. In Washington DC, broadly speaking, 
diplomats, think tank policy analysts, and defense officials begin their careers focused on one country. 
While this does necessarily influence their policy preferences, interviews suggest that one’s 
background is linked to the membership of policy networks, who may favor certain policy baskets over 
others. There have long been within the United States, for example, groups of foreign policy elites 
associated with China, who promote a mercantilist approach toward China. Termed “China Hands” or 
the “China Lobby”341, they tend to come from the Department of State, from big business, from the 
private commercial sector, or from Sinologists in academia and in think tanks. According to journalist 
James Mann, a former bureau Chief for the Los Angeles Times in Beijing and political correspondent 
in Washington, these China hands hold that China’s economic development will inevitably lead to an 
opening up and democratization of the system. This belief is held by “leading academic experts on 
China, business executives who are eager to trade and invest in China, and the think tanks and other 
elite organizations that depend on corporate contributions for their funding…has become the 
professed view of American presidents, too, both Democrat and Republican”.342  
 
There are other FPE groups in Washington’s Asia policy community. When Jim Kelly, a notable Korea 
and Japan expert, headed Asia policy in the Department of State in Bush’s first term, policies around 
alliances were prioritized. Indeed, one could argue that this split was in part the cause of the Blue 
Team / Red Team debates on China within Washington’s policy community during the 1990s and early 
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2000s343. How positions are handed out in the US system is of immense importance to the countries 
and focal points of subsequent policy. Brad Glosserman, executive director at the Pacific Forum CSIS, 
a think tank notes, “There’s usually only one Asia guy in the NSC (National Security Council). I think it 
really matters whether that guy is a ‘Japan guy’ or a ‘China guy’. It matters even more if the White 
House – like the Obama White House - tries to run a lot of foreign policy from the NSC.”344 As Torkel 
Patterson summarized, “Policy doesn’t make the people. The people make the policy.”345 And this also 
occurs in allied capitals, as many of the fieldwork interviews carried out for this thesis will reveal. As 
one senior Japanese diplomat asserted, “[the trilateral] has become a comprehensive relationship 
with a large human network on all three sides. MOFA people are so busy, so they hardly have time to 
think deeply on why the relationship is so important. On top of that, many Japanese diplomats are 
‘Australia hands’ or ‘America hands’. They don’t have any opposition.”346 Though such accounts are 
essential to our understanding of the creation of foreign policy in the US system and in its fellow allies, 
the difficulty is predicting policy behavior through the intervening variables of belief and personality.  
 
4.9. Hedging 
Thus far, we have looked at how structure, beliefs, and domestic variables impact the threat 
assessment debates of American foreign policy elites. In this section, I will look at some of the current 
attempts to define the theoretical concept of hedging in international relations scholarship, before 
attempting to synthesize the useful elements of those definitions with a neoclassical realist definition. 
In the first instance, I look at why structural theories of hedging are insufficient to explain why some 
states hedge and others do not. As with the reasoning around Walt’s balance-of-threat argument, I 
note that not all states are perceived the same way: some are obvious threats, some are obvious 
partners, and some aren’t obvious either way. It is these last that I would like to look at, and explore 
more in-depth systemic reasons for uncertainty. Then, in keeping with my approach, I will look at 
domestic causes of uncertainty, including regime type, ideology, and finally, bureaucratic politics.  
 
4.10. Past Definitions of Hedging  
In his 2005 The Washington Quarterly article, “Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia Pacific 
Stability”347, Evan Medeiros put forward a strong definition of hedging; it is, he says, a strategy 
composed of cooperative and competitive elements, with different fluctuations in each area changing 
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as time progresses. “To hedge,” he says, “the United States and China are pursuing policies that, on 
the one hand, stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-
style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military 
modernization programs.”348  US engagement strategy is intended to engage and bind China into the 
rules, structures, and institutions comprising the international system, but the US is challenged by 
uncertainty over (1) Chinese current and future power capabilities, (2) credible indicators of Chinese 
intentions, and (3) how changes in the first will affect the second349.  
 
In contrast to Medeiros, Evelyn Goh asserts that hedging is a “set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or 
planning for contingencies in a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward 
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality.”350 Because both Medeiros and Goh view 
states as black boxes, they are unable to fully explain why some states hedge in certain situations but 
not in others. Goh asserts that hedging is the prerogative of small and medium sized states, and states 
that ascribing it to China and the United States is problematic because “’hedging’” behavior is the 
norm in international relations – engagement and diplomacy are staples of international life.”351 This 
is rather weak, and neglects why some states appear more threatening to states than others.  
 
In some ways, both are right in asserting that hedging arises from indecision, but Medeiros is incorrect 
in thinking that hedging is deliberate reaction to that indecision. Goh is incorrect for thinking this is 
purely a behavior of small and medium-sized states352, and fails to explain why states are unable to 
make clear policy decisions. Neither has really attempted to frame hedging from a domestic foreign 
policy perspective, though Goh does recognize that “threat perceptions” shape state strategies. 
Unfortunately, like Victor Cha, she treats such perceptions as uniform within a state and does not give 
room for internal debate between various domestic actors or policy coalitions. Goh mentions 
“Singapore policymakers” and “Singapore officials” and comes close in domestic coalitions in 
mentioning “the change in leadership when Lee Hsien Loong took over as Prime Minister in August 
2004”353, but unfortunately, does not pursue these terms to the logical conclusion that foreign policy 
in a country is at essence a contested activity. In a sense, both acknowledge that hedging as a concept 
has suddenly become salient because of China’s rise, but do not explore that more fully.  
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Atanassova-Cornelis makes a further contribution to the debate on hedging when she states that US 
hedging behavior is derived from worry that “the PRC may seek to alter the American-centered 
regional order as its power grows354,” pushing Washington to “reinforce its security alliances and 
partnerships in East Asia while simultaneously emphasizing common interests and bilateral relations 
with Beijing.” In one sense, her recognition that threat assessment is a part of hedging adds to the 
concept’s utility. However, this thesis goes one step further, and argues that hedging is the result of 
uncertain threat assessments, driven by a combination of systemic and domestic factors. Simply 
defined, hedging is the inability of a country’s foreign policy elites to make a clear threat assessment 
about a potentially threatening state, resulting in inefficient and – at times – contradictory – policies. 
 
4.11. Systemic Causes of Hedging 
In line with an NCR approach, a new definition of hedging might emphasize the interaction between 
domestic elites and their perception of the distribution of capabilities in the system. There are two 
systemic points that cause uncertainty among domestic elites: those that have to do with changes in 
power balances, conflicting behavior, and the nature of modern warfare. First, the uncertainty 
brought about by sudden changes in the distribution of power and capabilities causes uncertainty and 
fear among what Arnold Wolfers, Peter Trubowitz355, and Randall Schweller356 call “status quo” states. 
This is vitally important, because it represents change to those who benefit most from the current 
distribution of power and privileges. Such status quo states will seek to maintain their position in the 
system. Some states may welcome change and see this as an opportunity to increase some limited 
gains in the system; others look to overturn the entire system, and reshape the order. These 
unlimited-aims revisionists include well-known empire-builders, like Alexander the Great, Napoleon 
Bonaparte, Shaka Zulu, and Adolf Hitler, among others, and often found their power in military 
prowess and might. However, not all rising powers have the will or the capability to overturn the 
orders they join. Woodrow Wilson’s United States, Meiji Japan, and Soviet Russia357 were all limited-
aims revisionists. That’s to say, they wished to increase their influence upon the system, not displace 
or dominate it. Certainly, they came to have much greater influence on the global system over time, 
but their initial aims were limited.  
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In looking at the rise of China from the perspective of status-quo oriented United States, one is 
confronted by a number of contradictory drivers. On the one hand, China’s potential power 
capabilities mean that it could seek to displace the United States as hegemon or system leader. Its 
population is currently the largest in the world, more than 4.25 times larger than that of the United 
States358, and larger than the combined populations of North and South America, Australia, New 
Zealand, and all of Western Europe359. By some accounts, its economy is already larger than that of 
the US360; by other accounts, it will overtake the US economy by 2019361. Its military power is fast 
approaching regional parity with that of the United States. All of these factors feed bilateral tensions. 
On the other hand, China’s population is a major untapped market for American companies, an 
opportunity for economic revival. Chinese policymakers have long sought to play down such structural 
elements, arguing that China’s would be a “peaceful rise”362, that China had no interest in displacing 
American power363. They argued that Beijing did not seek Chinese hegemony, and that it was only a 
limited-aims revisionist state seeking “win-win cooperation”364. Such consistent and long-term 
messaging, combined with attempts to join global institutional architecture created by the liberal 
democratic states, have relieved the concerns in Western Europe and the United States, and found 
resonance among “Continentalist” policy coalitions365. China’s willingness “to play by the rules” seems 
evident in its willingness to be a constructive member of the United Nations, the Security Council, the 
World Trade Organization, and many other institutions. However, it should be noted that China’s 
reassurance strategy has only been partly effective. 
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As was discussed in the last chapter, perception plays a major part in assessing systemic features. How 
do American policymakers judge China’s intentions? As Mearsheimer and other realists, note, it is 
impossible for states to perfectly ascertain the intentions of other states in the system. “It is simply 
impossible, for example, to know what Germany or Japan’s intentions will be toward their neighbors 
in 2025.”366 The China that eschews global hegemony today, may not do so tomorrow. Furthermore, 
there is the question of China’s actual behavior. Though potentially threatening states can send out 
overt messages meant to reassure status quo powers, those status quo powers do not rely on such 
messages alone. They assume some level of dissembling inherent in inter-state relations. Instead they 
seek to understand the intentions of a power by gaining intelligence on the state’s leadership and on 
its military spending367. Powers that invest in aircraft carriers, heavy-lift and bombers, for example, 
are investing in power projection, while those who only develop anti-aircraft defences, infantry and 
armour, are not. Status quo states may also take their cues from how a rising power behaves in its 
foreign policy and this can vary from leader to leader. Bismarck’s ability to keep the peace Europe was 
maintained by his adept handling of diplomacy and alliances. By contrast, Kaiser Wilhelm the Second’s 
brash style of diplomacy, his bullying of non-allies, and Germany’s military build-up in the 1890s, all 
led to Germany’s neighbors balancing against it for mutual protection368. China’s attempts to reassure 
the United States have had a mixed record, in part. On the one hand, it has shown a willingness to 
play a constructive role in regional multilateral architecture and cooperated with the US and others 
to resolve the North Korea issues. On the other hand, this has occurred concurrently with a large 
military build-up, and encroachment upon the territories of neighboring states – some of whom are 
American Treaty allies. The fact that in 2016, China began building islands across a trade route of 
global importance, struck many as a sign that China’s viewed the global rules-based system with 
ambiguity369.  
 
Interestingly, the systemic feature of power-changes may also cause uncertainty within the foreign 
policy elites of the rising power. For example, some FPEs within Beijing may promote closer ties with 
the West, while others may emphasize China’s power. The fact that no one knows how powerful China 
will ultimately become is a source of uncertainty that works both ways, affecting elites in the region, 
in Washington, and in Beijing370. Will its rise eventually eclipse that of the United States, or would it 
falter on the economic problems that prior powers have – the so-called middle-income trap, and 
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“Japanese disease”371 of negative growth. China’s power is in flux and until its growth slows down, it 
will be monitored closely by FPEs on all sides. Many foreign policy elites inside the US work from the 
assumption that China’s advantage is growing, day by day, and that the risk of conflict grows as the 
two become closer in power parity. Is it in China’s interest to press for its’ interests sooner – while 
perceptions favor its bargaining position – or later, if and when it has surpassed the US? This state of 
constant flux also permeates the uncertainty over China’s willingness to use its ever-growing military 
power to further its interests in the international arena, and whether such usage will challenge 
American interests372. China’s willingness to deploy forces abroad in Syria, its willingness to partner 
with Russia and Iran, and its new base in Djibouti, are all watched closely for this reason. But perhaps 
more worrying for American policymakers is the fact that Chinese planners have sought to consolidate 
military power in the Asian regional theatre first, threatening the security of the US maritime system, 
upon which its East Asian allies depend.  
 
4.12. Domestic Causes of Hedging 
It is a core part of the argument of this thesis that hedging cannot be explained from the systemic 
level of analysis alone. This is because hedging arises from domestic debates between FPEs who are 
undecided on the level of threat posed by a potential challenging state. Broken into different policy 
coalitions, the divergent groups seek to press their foreign policy vision upon the state, either through 
legislation or through appointments of like-minded government officials to offices that affect that 
particular issue. In the wake of a crisis with China, for example, the executive may wish to appoint 
someone “who’s tough on China” to the Department of State. These types of appointments however 
are rarely the primary consideration, and it is more than likely that such appointments are subject to 
the domestic-level game and the internal haggling that takes place within administrations. Once 
officials are appointed to office, the push and pull of policy that takes place between them and FPEs 
who view China in a different light produces different types of output. If bureaucracies fall in line with 
certain lines on a foreign state, then this hedging behavior might also take place. While National 
Security Councils and Executives exert some control over bureaucracies and appointed officials, much 
depends on the autonomy extended to the cabinet within a given government.  
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4.13. Conclusion 
It has been argued above that states are not monolithic entities. Instead, they are sets of institutions 
with networks of different domestic actors moving around and through them, competing for both 
resources and competing for the direction of state policy. One finds that in the American system, there 
are actually two types of foreign policy elites: level 1 and level 2. Level 1 comprises those who actually 
wield state power, and level 2 comprises those who have privileged access to level 1, including 
academics, think tank analysts, journalists, and even former or future officials. This trend is 
accentuated among the American FPE community which deals with the Asia Pacific, and one finds a 
confluence of mid-ranking Level 1 officials and senior Level 2 FPEs who helped facilitate trilateralism 
inside the corridors of power. This thesis puts forward the proposition that where you sit influences 
where you stand, and asserts that this has particular relevance to the Asia Pacific, where American 
FPEs policy-orientation can be linked to both their host bureaucracy and to their regional background. 
This can also be found in Level 2 FPEs, who are a mixture of insider and outsider. As outsiders, they 
bring “high” theory from international relations and economics academia into the different 
bureaucracies through their appointments to positions within the administration. They are both 
agents of socialization and receivers of bureaucratic culture. One can perceive among US FPEs dealing 
with China, a propensity for FPEs to fall into two great divides: one, prioritizes China-as-threat, the 
other prioritizes China-as-opportunity. The long-term threat-assessment debates between these 
Mahanians and Continentalists on China is what leads to the back-and-forth tussle of policy on the 
region, and is a direct contributor of the behavior characterized as “hedging”. As long as two groups 
of FPEs within United States are unable to dominate over the other, we will see more of the current 
mixture of balancing and engagement with regards to China. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY (1993-2000) 
This chapter explores the origins of the US – Japan – Australia security cooperation in the immediate 
post-Cold War period, which ultimately led to the US-Japan-Australia trilateral in the beginning of the 
following decade.373 It will do this by tracing wider “guns versus butter” foreign policy debates inside 
Washington, the first post-Cold War signs that China might present security challenges to American 
FPEs, and changes in regional security, which promoted closer trilateral cooperation. As will be 
demonstrated, systemic and domestic stimuli among US foreign policy elites (FPE) each played a part 
in promoting security cooperation between the three, but only after the Clinton Administration had 
first attempted to apply liberal multilateralism and a form of regional integration to security in the 
region. As such, the first term of the Clinton administration was very supportive of multilateral 
groupings, such as ASEAN and APEC, and it was felt that these might even overlap and conjoin the old 
bilateral alliance system. As the Cold War cleavages were dispelled in the European theater, American 
approaches to the region attempted to be highly inclusive toward previous foes of the Cold War, and 
were even highly optimistic in tone at times. This inclusivity extended to China, with which the Clinton 
administration took great pains to develop strong political and economic ties. However, as this chapter 
will show, American foreign policy elites (FPEs) were ultimately compelled to maintain the San 
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Francisco System after initial attempts at retrenchment provoked an internal security dilemma among 
America’s key allies in the region and after both North Korea and China failed to fulfill the expectations 
of key Clinton FPEs.  
 
Neorealism’s predictions of American foreign policy making during this period are not wrong, but they 
do not really provide a wholly satisfactory account of why American policy took the different 
directions it did. Nor can realism by itself explain the overriding preoccupation of US policy with trade 
liberalization as a tool for managing relations with China and other former Soviet opponents in the 
region. As China’s power increased over the period, and gradually began posing more of a threat to 
the traditional balance of power in the region, mainstream American FPEs continued to utilize an 
engagement strategy toward Beijing, according it Most Favored Trading Nation (MFN) status and 
helping it join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead, it is only by looking at the domestic 
debates between Continentalist FPEs and their Mahanian opponents inside the Beltway, that we can 
see by US policy had two very different strategic objectives under the same administration. The first 
term was characterized by a fit of neoliberal optimism about multilateral institutions, the rightfulness 
of the Washington Consensus in economics, and a sense that diplomatic solutions would become the 
preferred way of dealing with regional problems. However, as we will find, Mahanian FPEs – both 
within the administration and among the Republican opposition – saw this approach as dangerously 
naïve, and as weakening US alliances and security in the region. A number of events – North Korea’s 
nuclear ambitions, China’s behaviour in the Taiwan Strait, and the Asian Financial crisis, caused a 
Mahanian retrenchment within the Second Clinton administration, bolstered and abetted by similar-
minded policy coalitions within Canberra and Tokyo. 
 
 
Theoretically, it is nearly impossible to explain the two terms of the Clinton administration by using 
one international relations school, either liberalism or realism, since the foreign and security policy of 
these two terms differed so markedly. Furthermore, neither school enabled Continentalists or 
Mahanians to get the upper hand in the policy debates that took place over Asia inside the Beltway 
over this 8-year period. One of the most cited areas where neorealism provides insufficient 
explanatory power is the failure of Japan to rearm in the 1990s, and challenge the United States for 
regional leadership. Instead, US-Japan relations deteriorated initially as the US sought to correct 
perceived trade imbalances, but then recovered as US FPEs began promoting a renewal of the US-
Japan Alliance. Certainly, it is impossible to ignore China’s rise as a factor in this, or other foreign policy 
problems such as North Korea, the Taiwan Crisis, and the Asian Financial Crisis. The primary – though 
 
 
104 
not the only driver – for these inconsistencies lay with FPEs and their inability to agree on a common 
threat assessment for regional security. This inability to agree manifests itself in a number of ways, 
from hard power balancing strategies mixed with trade engagement strategies to battles between the 
various arms of government. There arose in Washington, a very clear division between those FPEs 
who sought to engage China diplomatically and economically, and those who saw it as a future threat 
to US interests. The Blue Team / Red Team divisions on Capitol Hill – as they came to be called – were 
symptomatic of these debates, and would influence many Mahanians in the subsequent Bush 
Administration, leading to a renewal of purpose in the alliance system and a hedging approach toward 
China. However, even then, US policy would continue to see-saw over China. This chapter will also 
chart how Japanese FPEs, reacting in part to American pressure and systemic features, sought new 
security partners across the region. We will also see what factors contributed to the development of 
a strong Japan-Australia bilateral. 
 
5.1. The First Term of the Clinton Administration (1993-1997) 
The Clinton administration did not come into office seeking closer security cooperation with Japan or 
Australia. It was open to changing the alliance structure, but did not seek to do so as part of a grand 
strategy. Rather, its initial priority was focused on the economy and domestic issues: as a result, 
foreign policy was a slightly hodge-podge mixture of democratic enlargement and economic 
growth374. In Clinton’s Grand Strategy375, James Boys argues that there was an attempt at neo-
Wilsonian vision articulated by National Security Advisor Antony Lake376 and Ambassador to the 
United Nations, Madeline Albright377 in the early part of the administration, but President Clinton was 
too interested in domestic politics and trade378 to take part in fostering the vision. While Kenneth 
Lieberthal has cast Clinton’s approach toward East Asia as pragmatic379, it may well be that he simply 
applied domestic answers to foreign policy problems. His core belief that greater prosperity would 
lead to greater mutual security was a mark of classical liberalism. This prioritization of the economic 
had profound implications for the US San Francisco System.  
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During the Campaign, Clinton’s team emphasized that America’s long-neglected domestic concerns 
needed to be prioritized: “It’s the Economy, Stupid”, James Carville’s pithy phrase epitomized this shift 
from foreign policy issues. Clinton promised that “a post-Cold War restructuring of American forces 
will produce substantial savings beyond those promised by the Bush Administration, but that 
restructuring must be achieved without undermining our ability to meet future threats to our 
security.”380 He had also promised to further trim $60 billion from Bush’s defence budget over five 
years381. He and others in his campaign team strongly believed that ‘geo-economics’ was rapidly 
replacing geopolitics382. In a 1992 campaign speech at Georgetown University, Clinton had promised, 
“We can and must substantially reduce our military forces and spending…the Soviet threat is 
decreasing and our allies are able to and should shoulder more of the defense burden…the American 
people have earned this peace dividend through 40 years of unrelenting vigilance and sacrifice…”.383 
 
Coming into office, the Clinton administration inherited a 1990 policy known as the East Asia Strategy 
Initiative (EASI) from the Bush White House, which sought the following: (1) to reduce overall defense 
spending by reducing troops numbers in the region from 140,000 to 90,000; (2) to encourage allies to 
do more to share the costs of regional security; and, (3) to encourage non-ally regional states to 
participate in multilateral security efforts. The new administration embraced this policy with gusto. 
Christopher Warren, Clinton’s first Secretary of State, set the tone in his first speech on the region, 
“America’s Pacific Future,” made in November, 1993 in Seattle. “In Asia, we see most clearly that 
economic policy stands at the center of our foreign policy. Last year, our exports to the region totaled 
$128 billion and created 2.4 million American jobs…Asia has asked us to remain engaged in the region, 
and we will do so. But for the American people to appreciate the benefits of such engagement, Asia's 
markets must be open to our goods and services.”384 This focus on economic growth and the desire to 
open Asian markets to US trade pervaded Clinton’s first term. Accounting for just 8% of global GDP in 
the 1960s, Asian economies grew at three times the rate of developed economies, and represented 
more than 25% of global GDP by 1994. By 1996, 30% of US merchandise exports went to APEC’s Asian 
members385. While trade was good for the region, this emphasis on multilateralism and force 
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reductions led to a sense of lost cohesion within the alliance system: trade frictions weakened ties 
with Japan, while regional multilateralism weakened ties with Australia. Despite the feeling of post-
Cold War uncertainty386 about peace on the Korean Peninsula that was beginning to pervade American 
thinking, the second year of the Clinton administration revealed an attempt to articulate an optimistic 
approach to the Asia Pacific region. However, this optimism was to eventually founder as a series of 
regional crises proved that US engagement was still necessary to providing security to the region. 
 
By 1993, US allies had become “very nervous about that [East Asia Strategy Initiative] policy because 
they saw the US withdrawal from Asia as creating a vacuum, and the big concern and worry was ‘who’s 
going to fill that vacuum?’”387 Victor Cha, who was later a Mahanian appointee to the NSC under 
George W. Bush, voiced a note of caution, then prevalent among East Asia experts in Washington at 
the time, “With this threat (the USSR) now gone, the alternatives should not be simply reap the peace 
dividends and retrench. Instead, there must be a proactive willingness to bear the costs and burdens 
of preventing problems …from magnifying in the future.”388 In writing about the region, Thomas 
Christensen notes that to many, the region “appeared more dangerous in the aftermath of the Cold 
War than did other areas…such as Western Europe. The common bond that the Soviet Union had 
provided for the US-PRC and even for the Sino-Japanese relationship had been removed.”389  Some 
American writers at the time had even predicted that US-Japan relations would become adversarial390. 
Satake argues that the origins of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral can be found in a growing “sense of 
crisis” and abandonment among Japanese and Australian alliance managers in the 1990s, that these 
years of drift formed the basis for the drive to renew relations391. When North Korea threatened to 
withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1993, the trilateral model suggested itself as a 
logical framework for alliance cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The 
relative success of this first trilateral opened up a range of possibilities to American, Japanese, and 
Australia FPEs, then considering the future of regional security architecture. 
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5.2. Hub and Spokes to Security Community? 
In order for trilateralism to evolve, the policy preference for the “strict bilateralism” of the San 
Francisco System in Washington DC had to end. Although the Clinton administration did not plan to 
network its alliances, its policies did represent a break from the past, seeing the bilateral system as 
outdated. Indeed, many in the region were then filled with a “global enthusiasm for 
multilateralism…heavily influenced by internationalist euphoria and growing movements of 
institutional renewal and ‘new regionalism’”.392 The Clinton administration was no different and 
during the Senate confirmation hearings of Winston Lord as Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, Lord identified a commitment to enhanced multilateral security dialogue as one of the 
Administration’s top ten goals. For a time, the White House even entertained ideas of an American-
led security community developing across the Asia Pacific. In November 1993, Clinton hosted the first 
APEC Summit in Seattle, Washington, where he trial-ballooned the concept with foreign leaders. 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the new multilateralism would mimic the “open 
architecture” that was then found in the software industry.393 In his first visit to the region in 1993, 
Clinton announced a “New Pacific Community Initiative” in a speech in Seoul. This new community, 
he stated, would be built on three core elements: shared prosperity, shared strength, and shared 
commitment to democratic values. It sought to “place U.S.-Japan relations at the center and promoted 
economic cooperation through APEC, democracy and human rights across the region”394. Praising the 
role of NATO in Western Europe, he stated: “In the Pacific no such institution exists…The challenge for 
the Asian Pacific in this decade, instead, is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple 
threats and opportunities. These arrangements can function like overlapping plates of armor, 
individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security 
concerns.”395 In this way, he gave room for American policymakers to conceive of the old bilateral US 
alliance system as another “overlapping” set of arrangements. In many ways, as will be shown, this 
optimistic approach to the region did still contain a pessimistic hedge toward regional security, and 
did not completely jettison hard power principles or the alliance system.   
 
In addition to undermining strict bilateralism that then pervaded US government, the new approach 
fostered an inclusive regional approach to countries with which the United States had previously 
excluded during the Cold War. One could see this new attitude the administration’s efforts to integrate 
                                                          
392 Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia 1996-2006, (Sydney: ABC Books, 2007), p.216. 
393 Warren Christopher, “America’s Pacific Future,” Speech by Secretary of State, University of Washington, Seattle, November 
17, 1993 http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9311/931117dossec.html (accessed February 24, 2016). 
394 US Department of State Archives, History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency, 1993-2001, 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/8530.htm (accessed February 8, 2016). 
395 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46829 (accessed February 6, 2016). 
 
 
108 
China into American policy. In his 1993 speech in Seoul, President Clinton proclaimed, “The goal of all 
these efforts is to integrate, not isolate, the region's powers. China is a key example. We believe China 
cannot be a full partner in the world community until it respects human rights and international 
agreements on trade and weapon sales. But we also are prepared to involve China in building this 
region's new security and economic architectures. We need an involved and engaged China, not an 
isolated China.”396 It was clear that although the Tiananmen Square Massacre had only been five years 
before, most FPEs in the administration did not share a high threat assessment of China. The 1994 
National Security Strategy aptly called for Engagement and Enlargement397. Admiral Blair, the 
Commander-in-Chief at PACOM and a supporter of the security community notion, argued that “this 
idea of security communities would enable cooperation to happen even between countries that were 
not ideologically aligned with us, to do good things without bringing in the things like democracies 
versus autocratic governments, or China versus the rest..”398 Despite the inclusive nature of the 
security community policy toward China, American FPEs never completely forgot that China might 
emerge as a threat, as Admiral Blair makes clear, “…It [the security community] was also partly to deal 
with China in a way that offered a helpful role to China, but with a sort of back up in case China wasn’t 
going to be helpful, it would form a containment net around China, not of our actions, but of China’s 
actions.”399 The seeds of America’s hedging policy were already being sown, even during this most 
inclusive of era of American policymaking. 
 
5.3. Regional Security Reconsidered   
Initially, the optimistic approach taken during Clinton’s first term seemed justified as various troop 
numbers around the region were reduced and regional conflicts were resolved through great power 
cooperation. The founding of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 – with a major role played by Japan 
– seemed to herald a new multilateral approach to security400. However, the two security dilemmas 
can be dated to this period. The first intra-alliance security dilemma took place after the East Asia 
Strategy Initiative sparked abandonment fears among Japanese and Australian alliance managers. The 
shift in the mid-to-late 1990s to reinvigorate those alliances and give them new purpose across the 
region provoked the second security dilemma, that with China. Four crises rocked the Asia Pacific 
during the first term of the Clinton administration, which seemed to strengthen the hand of realist 
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scholars who thought the region “ripe for rivalry”401 and increased the grip of both security dilemmas 
on American FPEs. 
 
The first indicator of this was the North Korean nuclear crisis, which began in March 1993, when North 
Korea announced its decision to withdraw unilaterally from the NPT402. The second crisis occurred in 
1995, when China fired a number of missiles into the seas surrounding the Taiwan Straits, sparking off 
the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The third crisis took place in the East China Sea in 1996 after Japanese 
nationalists built a lighthouse on one of the Chinese-claimed East China Sea islets. Subsequent anti-
Japanese protests rocked East Asia, targeting Japanese embassies, consulates and companies across 
Macao, the PRC, the ROC, and Hong Kong, ending with the large scale maritime intrusions by Chinese 
nationalists into Japanese territorial waters in September and October 1996403. The fourth crisis to 
dispel Clinton’s optimistic liberalism was the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which shook regional 
confidence in American leadership, and once more raised the possibility of a China-centered order. As 
a result of these crises and of allied concerns404, the Pentagon issued the East Asia Strategy Report 
(also known as the Nye Report) in 1995. The report heralded the end of American efforts to draw down 
forces in East Asia, putting a floor on US troop strength in East Asia at 100,000 and sought to redefine 
the alliance with Japan. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis 1993-4 had found policymakers405 more 
cautious about regional institutions taking up the slack.  
 
5.4. Japan, Korea, and the creation of the trilateral model  
The growing crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1993 was the catalyst for the first trilateral dialogue 
between the US, Japan, and the ROK. With little fanfare, the trilateral model was created in 1994 by 
the Former-Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Carl Ford. He was troubled that there was a 
complete absence of military-to-military contact between his Japanese and Korean counterparts. Due 
to political sensitivities, Seoul and Tokyo would only agree to an “unofficial” track 1.5 meeting, and 
Ford began organizing it with support from George Washington University. The first meeting was not 
held in Washington, but rather at a PACOM-connected think tank, Pacific Forum in Hawaii in August 
1994. The meeting saw the first grouping of American, Korean, and Japanese defence and foreign 
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ministry officials attempting to build closer relations between the two security partners of the United 
States.  
 
There seemed to be three drivers for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral. In his interview for this research 
project, former-Secretary Ford states that he intended the meeting to be primarily a mechanism for 
ending Japan-ROK enmity406, in order to foster closer cooperation over North Korea. However, some 
attendees of that first meeting already viewed the strengthening and networking of the US alliance 
system into trilaterals as a means of dealing with the rise of China407. Admiral Michael McDevitt – a 
prominent naval thinker, and James Kelly – Undersecretary of State for East Asia under the Bush 
administration – wrote, “The real key to long-term stability in Northeast Asia is the UK-Korean-
Japanese strategic triangle. The best way to ensure that Northeast Asia remains stable in the future is 
for the United States and its two closest allies in Asia to become strategically coherent. If, as [Hisahiko] 
Okazaki asserts, Japan and the United States alone can influence the direction China pursues, one 
must consider how much more influential this balance of power would be if it included the ROK.”408 
Another attendee, a senior Japanese defence official, Noboru Yamaguchi, wrote that the three sides 
“exchanged views on the regional security environment, explained national security policies, and 
discussed scenarios for future trilateral cooperation.”409 Here, in the first trilateral meeting, were five 
of the key ingredients that were also to drive US, Japanese, and Australian security cooperation: 
continued US engagement in the region; burden-sharing among allies; the normalization of Japan and 
a regional role; and maintaining a balance of power vis a vis China.  
 
5.5. Weakening of US Alliances  
Although the newly-formed US-Japan-ROK trilateral gave Japan a role in the North Korean crisis, the 
trilateral evolved slowly, hampered by South Korean – Japanese mistrust and historical issues410. As 
will be shown in the next two chapters, this mistrust would over time, derail what many assumed 
would be the primary US-Japan trilateral. Furthermore, outside the small number of State Department 
and Defense Department bureaucrats working on the Northeast Asia, Tokyo’s relations with 
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Washington were characterized by trade disputes. President Clinton came into office determined to 
reset trade relations with both Australia and Japan, seeing the latter through the trade imbalances of 
the 1980s. The collapse of the Soviet Union means that alliances “must be justified anew, regardless 
of any utility they had in the Cold War.”411 Prominent members of both parties in Washington blamed 
Japan for the US economic slowdown and criticized both Japan’s restricted access to key sectors of its 
domestic market, as well as its current-account surpluses. He placed the New Economic Framework 
at the top of its agenda with Tokyo, seeking to pressure Japan into accepting targets for American 
exports to Japan412. In one of his first speeches, Secretary of State Warren Christopher made it clear 
that trade imbalances were a priority for the administration:  
 
…with Japan, we are negotiating a new economic framework. The security and political 
dimensions of our partnership with Japan are in sound condition. But the economic pillar is 
urgently in need of repair.  This Administration attaches as high a priority to improving our 
economic ties with Japan as it does to maintaining our security and political links. That is why 
we are working to correct our persistent trade imbalance. We are determined to forge a more 
equitable and mutually beneficial partnership.413  
 
5.5.1. Abandoning Japan? 
The sudden end of the Cold War had caught Japanese policymakers by surprise. Although the 1990 
National Security Strategy had reiterated Japan’s place as the “centerpiece of (US) security policy and 
an important anchor of stability”414, Tokyo found itself confronted first with the East Asia Strategic 
Initiative (EASI), which threatened to undermine American guarantees over Japanese security by 
dramatically reducing the number of US military troops in the Asia Pacific from over 140,000 to 
90,000415. The sudden 1992 withdrawal of troops from the Philippines and draw down in bases, as 
well as unilateral withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula Japanese fears of 
abandonment were compounded by the “Gulf War Shock” 416,  in which Japan’s financial contribution 
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of $13 billion to the Gulf War were seen as “too little, too late”417. In both cases, Japanese FPEs realized 
that Washington increasingly expected more from Japan, expecting it to step up its global and regional 
contributions to security. To their surprise, Japanese FPEs found that the country lacked the military 
capabilities418 to do so. It had simply not built the logistics capabilities to operate forces outside of 
Japan – even in a humanitarian or peacekeeping role. As the incoming Clinton administration came in, 
Japanese observers were concerned that the end of the Cold War would highlight trade issues 
between the two allies. 
 
Although, President Clinton had sought to reassure Japan’s Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, that 
“there is no more important relationship for the United States than our alliance with Japan,” at their 
first meeting in 1993,419 it was also clear to others – such as former US Ambassador to Japan Michael 
H. Armacost – that “trade frictions generated mistrust and resentment that threatened to 
contaminate our security relations”420. Indeed, in a telling sign of the weak state of the bilateral, 
Ambassador Armacost is said to have told a Japanese delegation prior its mission to Washington DC 
that “there was no point in Mr. Miyazawa’s visiting Washington unless he had something specific to 
offer.”421  
 
The alliance with Australia also suffered during this period. The Keating government in Canberra was 
also seen as less interested in the Australia-US bilateral, preferring instead to focus on multilateral 
institutions in Southeast Asia422. Tomohiko Satake notes that this preference revealed itself in the 
number of joint exercises between Australia’s Defense Force (ADC) and its neighbors. In the early 90s, 
38 percent of its exercises were with ASEAN defense forces, with only 29 percent were with US 
forces423. This lack of interest seemed to be reciprocated when neither Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, nor Defense Secretary Les Aspin attended the Australian-US ministerial (AUSMIN) talks 
in 1993. Instead, DFAT was far more concerned with pursuing strong relations with ASEAN. Gareth 
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Evans, Australia’s Foreign Minister, pursued a “comprehensive engagement”424 on regional diplomacy, 
negotiating a peace in Cambodia, and playing a lead role in establishing the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In a 1993 address to the ASEAN – 
Australian forum, Evans remarked that Australia was in the middle of a “remarkable transformation”.  
The defence deal with Indonesia and Canberra’s role in negotiating the Cambodia peace deal425 (1989-
1991) suggested to Evans: 
 
Our preparedness to risk our prestige in pursuit of a primary regional security goal, and to do so 
in the closest cooperation with our regional friends, especially Indonesia, [has] established a new 
type of Australia in the minds of nations of the region, an Australia putting the region first, staking 
out ambitious goals and pursuing them in a sustained and sophisticated way.426 
 
There was an increasing sense of “drift” within elements of the military bureaucracy in all three 
countries, prompting fears of abandonment. Robin Sakoda, a DOD official remembers the mood after 
EASI: “What we found was the region was getting very nervous about that policy because they saw 
the US withdrawal from Asia as creating a vacuum, and the big concern and worry was ‘who’s going 
to fill that vacuum?’ The US [was] giving a sign that indicates it is no longer committed to the region, 
and they want to withdrawal and go back home”.427 The rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three 
American Marines in September 1995, was a low point for the alliance. As a result of this horrific 
incident, Secretary of Defense William Perry ordered the creation of a Special Action Committee on 
Okinawa (SACO) in November in order to minimize the political fallout and reduce the burden on the 
local community. Perry also instructed the DOD to carry out a review of the US presence in Japan and 
establish a minimum baseline for US troops to defend Japan.  
 
The 1995 East Asia Strategy Report (EASR), or Nye Report428, named after the prominent Harvard 
academic who was then serving as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 
sought to reassure Japanese and Australian policymakers and redefine the alliance system. In terms 
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of addressing fears raised by the 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative (EASI)429, the EASR capped US troop 
reductions in the region at 100,000, and the 1997 National Security Strategy proclaimed that the 
“…Treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, and our 
commitment to keeping approximately 100,000 US military personnel in the region, serve as the 
foundation for America’s continuing security role.”430 Nye also gained the help of two prominent Japan 
experts, M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, in writing a strategic paper, Redefining the US-Japan 
Alliance431, which sought to expand the remit of the alliance to peacekeeping, sea lane defense and 
nonproliferation. Green, a noted Japan expert, would later come to play a prominent role in the 
creation of the US-Japan-Australia trilateral during the Bush administration. 
 
On April 15th, 1996, SACO issued an interim report, which in turn fed into the Joint Security Declaration 
(JSD)432, a key document in restoring the strength of the US-Japan alliance. This was announced by 
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in the Rose Garden of the White House, 
two days later. The JSD described an alliance that would operate “bilaterally, regionally, and 
globally”433, and combined elements of the American EASR and the November 1995 Japanese National 
Defense Program Outline (NDPO) 434. It was the first step redefining the US-Japan Alliance as a regional 
force, opening up areas of operation “in the areas surrounding Japan”, which might have “an 
important influence on the peace and security of Japan.”  It established that the alliance was also a 
provider of public goods, a bold decision that put both states on the trajectory to trilateral and 
minilateral security cooperation with states around the region.   
 
Perhaps most importantly – in terms of the future trilateral with Australia – was the opportunity 
presented by the 1990 Cambodia Peace conference, in which Japan committed to the deployment of 
more than 1,800 peacekeeping troops to Cambodia for noncombatant duties. This put Japanese 
troops in the field with Australian troops for the very first time435. Internally, Japanese FPEs argued 
that it was time to move beyond a purely defensive posture and advocated peacekeeping cooperation 
across the region.  
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5.6. The China Factor  
As this thesis has argued, the rise of China plays an integral part in driving trilateral cooperation among 
the three allies. Tracing the arc of US-China relations and the domestic debate in the United States, 
there is evidence that American FPEs were splitting in two very different factions. For much of the 
Clinton Presidency, however, one might argue that America’s China policy was firmly Continentalist. 
This was in keeping with the economic prioritization of the Clinton administration’s first term and 
could be seen in Assistant Secretary of State for Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord’s confirmation 
hearings in the Senate. There he argued that Chinese leaders were gambling that they could liberalize 
the economy, while maintaining a closed political system. Lord advocated a long-term “nuanced” 
approach of waiting for this to fail436. A brief effort in May, 1993, by President Clinton to link human 
rights with China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) Trade Status was hastily dropped after garnering a 
strong reaction in Beijing and across the region437. The US 1994 National Security Strategy reiterated 
this optimistic engagement policy vis a vis Beijing:  
 
We are developing a broader engagement with the PRC that will encompass both our economic 
and strategic interests. That policy is best reflected in our decision to delink China’s Most Favored 
Nation status from its record on human rights. We are also working to facilitate China’s 
development of a more open, market economy that accepted international trade practices. Given 
its growing economic potential and already sizable military force, it is essential that China not 
become a security threat to the region. To that end, we are strongly promoting China’s 
participation in regional security mechanisms to reassure its neighbours and assuage its own 
security concerns.438  
 
 
Despite this, mistrust continued to affect the relationship. The 1989 Tiananmen Massacre had 
reminded American policymakers – particularly in Congress – that China had a values-system 
ideologically opposed to that of liberal democracy. There was also concern that Chinese growth was 
such that it might one day threaten and even eclipse American power439. There were – even in the 
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1990s – growing Mahanian concerns about the future of China, which were taken into consideration 
when American policymakers thought about the future of the American alliance system. There was an 
alleged attempt by the Chinese Embassy to manipulate American politics in the 1996 campaign finance 
controversy440. Finally, there began a growing awareness of the build-up and modernization of China’s 
armed forces throughout this period. These concerns about China revealed themselves in the “Red 
Team-Blue Team Debate”441 which pervaded Washington DC during the period and showed that the 
“China threat” was being revived among some American foreign policy elites. Having said that, the 
majority of policymakers sought policies that would shape China’s choices, rather than contain it. As 
a temperature take of the mood in Washington, it should be noted that all of the presidential 
candidates in the 1997 election campaign remained positive about China, focusing on trade-relations, 
constructive engagement, and inclusion of Beijing into international institutions.  
 
Despite this, Chinese FPEs increasingly viewed the US-China relationship in competitive terms442 and 
one can see the growth of the security dilemma from this period. From Beijing’s perspective, there 
was a significant shift between 1993 – when it worried about an American withdrawal and possible 
Japanese remilitarization – and 1995 – when it became concerned with the newly reinvigorated 
alliance between Tokyo and Washington. This combined with a growing Tokyo-Taipei relationship 
seemed to point to an anti-Beijing coalition to contain Chinese power, and directly struck the 
Communist Party at one of its most sensitive spots: the province of Taiwan, which is the link between 
the Party’s legitimacy to rule and its mission to unite the nation443. As will be shown, the latter half of 
the Clinton Presidency would see this security dilemma blossom into a full-blown crisis, and would 
taint US-China relations and impact overall regional security. 
 
5.7. The Second Term of the Clinton Administration (1997-2000) 
During its second term, the Clinton administration began to shift away from the optimistic approach 
toward regional integration and inclusive multilateralism. As the crisis with North Korea deepened in 
the first term, and Sino-Taiwan relations began to approach crisis, the administration hurriedly 
returned to the Cold War-era prioritization of the Asian alliances. At the same time, Continentalists 
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inside the administration – and the President himself – continued to see the engagement of China as 
a central policy package. Dropping regional integration from the list of priorities, the new Secretary of 
State, Madeline Albright, reiterated the administration’s strategy of engagement with both US allies 
in Asia and China in her testimony to Congress, saying, “Our priorities here are to maintain the 
strength of our core alliances while successfully managing our multi-faceted relationship with 
China.”444 Mahanians – like Joseph Nye – inside the Department of Defense swiftly began undoing or 
reversing the “peace dividend” policies that had characterized the first administration. Regional allies’ 
push-back on the policy, combined with a number of regional crises, induced a period of reflection in 
the Department of Defense. The 1995 East Asia Strategy Report (EASR)445, had capped EASI-planned 
troop reductions in the region at 100,000, and the 1997 National Security Strategy proclaimed that 
the “…Treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, and our 
commitment to keeping approximately 100,000 US military personnel in the region, serve as the 
foundation for America’s continuing security role.”446 Furthermore, changes in government in both 
Tokyo and Canberra, favoured this Mahanian return to alliances. 
 
All of these were important, but the October 2000 report The United States and Japan: Advancing 
Toward a Mature Partnership447, or so-called Armitage-Nye report, was bipartisan in nature and was 
to have the most influence on the future of US alliance policymaking. It was seen by many in 
Washington as the guide to future alliance cooperation, and marks the rise of the Mahanian 
perspective to the centre of US policymaking in the Asia Pacific and opened the first step to US-Japan 
minilateralism and Australia-Japan bilateral cooperation. Many of the authors of this ‘Mahanian 
manifesto’ –Richard Armitage, Michael J. Green, and James Kelly – would go on to be appointed to 
influential policy positions in the Bush administration and would play direct roles in networking of US 
alliances, including the creation of the trilateral. Clintonian Mahanians like Joseph Nye, served in the 
Clinton administration, but continued to have a heavy influence over Bush-era Mahanians. Other 
Democratic Party Mahanians who contributed to the Armitage-Nye Report– like Kurt M. Campbell – 
would go on to play influential roles in the Obama administration, working on alliances in the Asia 
Pacific. In essence, the document can be seen as a reaction to the Clinton first administration’s focus 
on China, and an effort to halt the slide in US-Japan alliance relations. “In the aftermath of the shared 
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victory [of the Cold War], however, the course of US-Japan relations has wandered, losing its focus 
and coherence – notwithstanding the real threats and potential risks facing both partners.”448 The 
report went on to link the alliance to deterrence of future threats in the region, “Because the stakes 
are so high in Asia, it is urgent that the United States and Japan develop a common perception and 
approach regarding their relationship in the 21st century. The potential for conflict in Asia is lowered 
dramatically by a visible and ‘real’ US-Japan defense relationship.”449 Interestingly, the report calls for 
an alliance modelled on that which the US shared with the UK and notes that “intelligence sharing 
with Japan contrasts sharply with the increasing close relationships we have enjoyed with our NATO 
partners”450. Given the fact that Australia was a Five Eyes intelligence partner451 with the United 
States, this focus on intelligence was prophetic. 
 
As this shift was taking place, the Clinton administration was still attempting to ameliorate the post-
Taiwan Straits Crisis security dilemma with Beijing with an unprecedented week-long trip of the 
President to China in the summer of 1998. However, bilateral tensions continued to increase over the 
NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, culminating in the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 
Belgrade. The Red Team / Blue Team debates continued to debate the China threat, with a small 
victory going to the Blue Team when it produced the 1999 Congressional Cox Report452, highlighting 
Chinese espionage inside the United States. North Korea represented both an opportunity and a 
challenge, as funding the 1994 Agreed Framework became nearly impossible with a newly-elected 
Republican Congress. However, the various problem-states in the region also gave Japan the 
opportunity to partner with other allies, working with Australia on peacekeeping missions in East 
Timor and as Tokyo agreed to work with Washington and Seoul within the framework of the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)453. The US-Japan trade dispute decreased in 
intensity as Washington began to realize the full scale of Japanese economic woes. Throughout the 
second administration, American policymakers switched from criticizing Japanese protectionism to 
encouraging Japan to make the necessary structural reforms to revive the economy. Indeed, this was 
a defining feature of President Clinton’s Tokyo visit in 1998. The second term saw a friendlier 
relationship between the US and Australia, as the incoming John Howard government revealed its pro-
Alliance leanings. This positive relationship was to have direct benefits as the two worked together 
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closely on the East Timor Crisis in 1999. In the end, Australia carried out the UN-authorized mission 
(INTERFET), but had US naval and logistics backing.  
 
5.8. Moves toward Trilateralism  
In the wake of the downturn in the alliance, Japanese FPEs began to view new alliance structures and 
behavior more favorably. First, the US was not only encouraging, but adamant about promoting a new 
security relationship, which gave Tokyo a stronger voice in regional security. Second, there was cross-
party support for the evolution of Japanese security policy as it combined the “interwoven influences 
of the US alliance, UN-centric policies, and regional interests balanced and complemented by military 
dispatch”.454 This allowed for growing cooperation between Australia and Japan on “soft” regional 
security issues, and included the aforementioned PKO cooperation in Cambodia and then East Timor. 
These missions were critical in strengthening “what Australian diplomats characterized as an 
underdeveloped or “weak third leg of Australia-Japan security relations.”455 For one Japanese 
diplomat, it was clear that Japan-Australia bilateral cooperation always had a trilateral element to it, 
saying, “…when we talk about strengthening the relationship with Australia, that is always something 
to do with our relationship with the United States. So, these days, because our alliance has been 
strengthened, and we try to be more operationally integrated, seen from the US side, of course 
Australia and Japan should be in the room”.456  
 
The first trilateral interaction took place at this time in the form of military exercises. Inaugurated in 
1999, the Cope North air exercises involved all three air forces taking part in large scale military 
scenarios, and remain an annual feature of trilateral military cooperation457. A second area was the 
development of the trilateral model on the Korean peninsula. Despite the failure of trilateral 
cooperation to resolve either the North Korea nuclear issue or Japan-Korean tensions, growing 
institutionalization provided a ready framework for future alliance cooperation. Third, the relationship 
between China and Japan deteriorated dramatically, despite the best efforts of the Hashimoto 
government to keep things pragmatic and based around the Tokyo’s engagement strategy. The impact 
this had on Japan and its willingness to partner further with US allies became an increasingly important 
factor for trilateralism458. 
                                                          
454 Garren Mulloy, Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Overseas Dispatch Operations in the 1990s: Effective International Actors? Thesis 
submitted for PhD (Newcastle: Newcastle University, 2011), p.2. 
455 William Tow, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue: Facilitating Community-Building or Revising Containment?” NBR Special 
Report: December, 2008. 
456 Anonymous (Senior Japanese Diplomat) interview with author, Tokyo. 
457 Joshua Gray, “Cope North 2013 Kicks off on Guam,” Pacific Air Forces – PACOM Air Force, US, February 04, 2013. 
458 Jim Schoff, (Senior Advisor for East Asia Policy 2010-2012) “The Evolution of the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral,” Address 
made at the Simpson Center, April 16, 2015. 
 
 
120 
 
5.8.1. The Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group  
By 1999, the US-Japan-Korean variant of the trilateral had become one of the most exciting features 
of American foreign policy in northeast Asia. US officials described the intricate diplomacy required to 
come up with the Agreed Framework as follows: “Managing the Korean crisis felt like playing a multi-
tiered chess game on overlapping boards. It required dealing with the North, the South, China, Japan, 
the IAEA, the UN, the non-aligned movement, Congress, the press, and others.”459 Minilateral 
approaches seemed to suggest themselves to resolve this tangle. The US and its partners established 
the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as a means of following through with the 
commitments made in the Agreed Framework460, but quickly discovered that mutual suspicion, 
technical difficulties, and domestic politics threatened from all sides. The trilateral talks between 
Korea, Japan, and the United States became “four party” talks, with China occasionally joining from 
1997. In November 1998, former US Defense Secretary William Perry assumed the role as US North 
Korea policy coordinator and special advisor to the President and the secretary of state. As part of 
preparation for the role, he consulted with Japanese and Korean representatives. When he suggested 
that more formal and regular trilateral talks might be useful, both countries readily agreed and the 
Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) was born.  
 
As with the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, part of the driving logic of the trilateral derived from the 
intra-alliance security dilemma. South Korea and Japan were unable to work closely when regional 
security was relaxed, but as regional tensions grew over North Korea’s nuclear programme and missile 
tests, abandonment fears drove both to set aside their differences. They realized that aside from 
diplomatic considerations, there were important intelligence-sharing and military imperatives, which 
might arise if hostilities broke out on the peninsula which required closer trilateral cooperation. US 
Forces Korea (USFK) would rely heavily on Japan for logistics and as well as the quick deployment of 
US men and materiel stationed there. This included a carrier battle group and some twenty thousand 
marines. There were also significant numbers of Japanese and American civilians who would have to 
be evacuated in case of war.  
 
The first TCOG meeting took place in Honolulu on April 25, 1999, prior to a US-DPRK bilateral that 
would take place in Berlin on November 15th461. Initially, Perry led the American delegation, though 
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Wendy Sherman from the DOS assumed the lead thereafter. Lim Dong-won, a top advisor for 
President Kim Dae-jung initially led the Korean delegation, while the Japanese delegation was initially 
led by Ryozo Kato, the deputy vice-minister for foreign policy and director general of the Foreign Policy 
Bureau. Kato, a close friend of US Statesman, Richard Armitage, would go on to play a founding role 
in the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, as will be described in the next chapter. Interestingly, the format 
for the TCOG bears more than a striking resemblance to the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, with the 
foreign ministries leading, but welcoming in officials from the NSC, the OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Korean Ministry of National Defense, and the Japanese Defense Agency. Jim Schoff has argued 
that while the TCOG never became “a common negotiating platform with North Korea”462, it did 
provide trilateral solidarity, and became an important planning function for KEDO-related issues. 
American FPEs “saw the TCOG as an opportunity to get Seoul and Tokyo involved in the US policy-
making process on board with initiatives early”463. In the end, TCOG as an institution began to suffer 
from internal tensions in the Agreed Framework, and inter-agency tensions inside the new Bush 
administration. The trilateral had met in 1999 eight times. By 2001, this had dropped down to four. 
By 2003, the meetings were no longer labeled “TCOG”, and had stopped issuing press statements, and 
gradually morphed into “a sort of informal caucus among allies within the so-called six-party talks on 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs464. 
 
5.9. Resurgence of the US-Australian Alliance 
The late 1990s saw a significant tack in Australian politics, as the supposedly Asia-focused, 
“multilateralist”465 Paul Keating was replaced by an openly pro-American leader, “bilateralist”, John 
Howard in the 1996 Election. The campaign had been a bitter one, with Keating remarking that 
“Australia’s continuing emergence as a successful partner and player in Asia”466 was at risk by a 
Howard government. As a result of these remarks, Howard’s new Foreign affairs spokesman and 
future Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, stressed that despite its reorientation from an Asia-focus 
to a Washington-focus, “closer engagement with Asia would be our highest foreign policy priority.”467 
The 1997 White Paper In the National Interest stressed Australia’s bilateral relationships over its 
multilateral ones, particularly that with the United States. This section on the United States was 
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directly followed by a telling section on the Howard governments ambitions on Japan: “Over the next 
fifteen years, Japan is likely to become a more important defence partner of Australia as it works, with 
the framework of a firm alliance with the United States, gradually to assume greater responsibility for 
its own security and to develop closer defence links within the region…this is a logical extension of the 
close partnership between the two countries and of our shared perspectives on regional security.”468 
US-Australia ties experienced the first surge in 1996 during the Taiwan Straits crisis, when Canberra 
urged restraint on Beijing, and offered public support for the Clinton administration’s decision to 
deploy aircraft carrier groups to the Straits469. Closer ties seemed cemented at the US-Australia 
Defence talks (AUSMIN), with the US sending one of the most senior delegations to the event, 
including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Defence Secretary William Perry, and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General John Shalikashvili.470 In the 1996 Joint Security Declaration on Security, also known as 
the Sydney Statement, the two sides agreed to extend the lease on the Pine Gap Joint Defence Facility, 
to pursue closer training, stage a major joint exercise in early 1997, and reaffirmed the centrality of 
the alliance to each, and confirmed that both would cooperate regionally and globally in their 
“common security interests”471. Interestingly, Secretary Christopher noted that both countries saw 
“eye-to-eye on the importance of the US-Japan Alliance as well as…China’s integration as a strong and 
constructive member of the international community.”472 
 
Howard had inherited from Paul Keating one strong new relationship with an Asian ally: Japan. In 
1995, he met Prime Minister Murayama and the two issued the Joint Declaration on Australia-Japan 
Partnership. Howard’s cabinet looked to take this relationship even further, holding their first political-
military and military-military talks in Tokyo in February 1996. In a speech at the Australia-Japan 
Symposium in May 1997, Foreign Minister Downer explicitly linked the US-Japan Joint Declaration to 
the AUSMIN Joint Declaration on Security, noting “the new patterns in the power relationships and 
security interests of countries in the region”. Australia and Japan, he continued, are “natural 
partners”, which “both recognize that regional security and stability depends on an increasingly 
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complex web of linkages at the bilateral, sub-regional and regional level”473. Canberra welcomed 
Tokyo’s inclusion as a regional security partner, and saw any overlapping functions between the US-
Japan Alliance and the US-Australia alliance as necessary to regional security. The first proper 
peacekeeping mission in which Japanese and Australian forces co-deployed and cooperated was 
Cambodia, however this was followed by the UNTAET peacekeeping mission in East Timor (1999-
2002), which went well and was considered “very natural”474 and increased trust for Australia among 
Japanese diplomats475. According to Murray MacLean, Australian Ambassador to Tokyo in the mid-
2000s, the Australian-led mission and subsequent UNMISET, “presented both with good opportunities 
to work together. They were the beginnings of confidence-building, inter-operability, and working 
together.”476  
 
Regional dynamics were beginning to see-saw during this period, and to some extent, the Asian 
Financial Crisis played a role in fostering closer trilateral discussions. Positive feelings about China 
among Japanese FPEs had already experienced a dramatic decline in 1995 after Beijing tested a 
nuclear weapon at Lop Nur477.  However, in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis both Australian and 
Japanese diplomats realized that Chinese initiatives and preferences were getting far more traction 
than their own among Southeast Asian states, while Americans felt that they were being left out478. in 
the wake of a December 1997 ASEAN+3 meeting, in which ASEAN states invited Korea, Japan, and 
China to participate in crisis talks, Japan sought to use the occasion to promote regional integration. 
Japanese diplomats sought – unsuccessfully at the time – to enlarge the format to ASEAN+6 (including 
fellow democracies Australia, New Zealand, and India). One senior Japanese diplomat remembers, 
“Essentially, that was a political process and our motivation came from the idea of regional 
integration…What worried us at that time was the emergence of China in the region. And it was very 
clear that most of the Southeast Asian countries were developing countries and were hurt by the 
economic crisis, and IMF austerity measures were very unpopular in many of those countries. If we 
were unable to show an alternative vision for the future, there was a real danger that those countries 
would become anti-Western. Anti-democratic…well, democracy was not contested at that time, but 
economic issues were very important for many of those Asian countries for very obvious reasons, it 
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was just after the Asian Crisis. The element of democracy, free speech, and those democratic values 
were emphasized to differentiate ourselves from China.”479 In the process of formulating the trilateral, 
regional integration played a minor but important role in mobilizing Australian, Japanese, and 
American diplomats to start talking with each other about regional dynamics. 
    
5.10. US-China Relations in the late 1990s  
The Taiwan Crisis of 1995-6 had a deep impact on US FPEs during the second-term, though changes 
within the Clinton White House were less apparent. The administration’s policy on China was still 
aspirational, forward-looking, and might be described as Continentalist. In a joint statement issued 
during President Jang Zemin’s 1997 visit to Washington, the two agreed that “the two Presidents are 
determined to build toward a constructive strategic partnership between the United States and 
China…”480 As laid out in the 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS), this still seemed overridingly 
optimistic and inclusive, indicating the administration had not fundamentally altered course on its 
neoliberal strategy of binding China into global liberal institutions and norms, but it did include a new 
desire for China to behave “responsibly”. The new NSS stated: “There is an overarching US interest in 
China’s emergence as a stable, open, secure and peaceful state. The prospects for peace and 
prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China’s role as a responsible member of the international 
community.”481 This linkage to responsible behavior was emphasized again by the administration and 
again by Senator Feinstein in the Foreign Relations Committee482 and traces the arc of Robert Zoellick’s 
“responsible stakeholder” concept over a decade later. In October 1997, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Stanley Roth, stated at the World Economic Forum: “We want China 
to take its place as an active and responsible member of the international community.”483 Despite this, 
however, there were growing signs that American FPEs were raising their threat assessment of China. 
This occurred across political party lines, as evidenced by the 1999 Congressional Cox Report484, which 
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revealed what many thought as unacceptable levels of defence industrial espionage by China inside 
the United States. 
 
It could also be seen within the defence community, particularly inside the Pentagon “think tank”, the 
Office of Net Assessment, where Andrew Marshall, a prominent strategist and influential figure on the 
DOD’s long-range precision-strike capabilities was starting to voice concern about Chinese systems 
that might target American carriers, “We [at ONA] were trying to point out that aircraft carriers were 
going to become increasingly vulnerable over time…It was…in the mid-1990s that we became aware 
of the Chinese-specific program [to target carriers]485. His conceptualization of China’s anti-access 
strategies would lead directly to mainstream American political leaders voicing concern about China, 
with Pat Buchanan, staking a hawkish campaign position during the 1999 Presidential election, “We 
must neither ignore nor isolate China, but we cannot embrace as a strategic partner an expansionist 
power that perverts our elections, plunders our nuclear arsenal, and targets our cities. China’s ongoing 
oppression of women, Christians, Tibetans & political dissidents is an affront to American values, but 
we appease them instead of shaming the regime.”486  
 
The battle lines were not always drawn so clearly, when it came to how American elites viewed China. 
At times, “Blue Team” supporters – that’s to say those who viewed China as a threat – also worked 
hard for the approval of permanent MFN trade status for China, because they believed that economic 
liberalization would weaken the Communist Party’s grip on Chinese society. In the run up to the 2000 
vote on bringing China into the WTO, House Majority Leader Richard K. Armey stated: “I consider the 
government of China to be dangerous, not only to the people of China, but at least to all peoples of 
that region,” before adding that he hoped China’s accession to the WTO would help extend “freedom 
through commerce to the Chinese people”487  
 
These apparent contradictions were brushed aside as Clinton promised that China’s accession would 
ameliorate future tensions between the two: “If you believe in a future of greater openness and 
freedom, you ought to be for this agreement. If you believe in greater prosperity for the American 
people, you certainly should be for this agreement. If you believe in a future of peace and security for 
Asia, and the world, you should be for this agreement.”488 In 1995, President Clinton told President 
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Jiang that “a stable, open and prosperous China – in other words, a strong China – is in our interest. 
We welcome China to the great power table. But great powers also have great responsibilities.”489 
Despite mutual assurances, however, concerns on both sides of the US-China relationship grew during 
this period. 
 
5.11. The Security Dilemma of the Taiwan Crisis 
Thomas Christensen has written how the Taiwan Crisis exacerbated the security dilemma: “One major 
catalyst of Chinese concerns in the period between the issuing of the Nye Report in early 1995 and 
the Clinton-Hashimoto Communique in April 1996, was the notion that changes in the US-Japan 
Alliance could easily facilitate US intervention in a Taiwan contingency.”490 When Taiwan’s President 
Lee Teng-hui was granted a US visa to address his alma mater at Cornell University in June 1995, 
Chinese fears crystalized into military action. In July and December 1995, and March 1996, the 
People’s Liberation Army held surface and missile exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan. Reacting to the 
missiles exercises, Washington dispatched one carrier group in 1995, then two to the Taiwan Straits 
in March 1996. Sino-US relations seemed to hit rock-bottom, when Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff, 
Xiong Guangkai told Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman, “In the 1950s, you three times 
threatened nuclear strikes on China, and you could do that because we couldn’t hit back. Now we can. 
So, you are not going to threaten us again because, in the end, you care more about Los Angeles than 
Taipei.”491 The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review noted that “China has the potential to 
become a major military power in Asia” and  between now and 2015, it was reasonable to “assume 
that one aspiring power will have both the desire and the means to challenge US interests militarily.” 
One can see the influence of the Taiwan Crisis in the following passage:  
 
Deterrence in a crisis generally involves signaling the United States’ commitment to a particular 
country or expressing our national interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater. 
Our ability to respond rapidly and substantially as a crisis develops can have a significant 
deterrence effect.492 
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From the Chinese side, there was fear that closer US Japanese military cooperation made intervention 
in any Taiwan contingency more likely. It also meant that Japan was assuming more military 
responsibilities within the wider Asia Pacific.493 On the American side, there was concern among senior 
politicians that the balance of military power across the Straits was shifting as China added more and 
more missiles along the coasts opposite Taiwan, acquired Russian destroyers, and other weapons494. 
The possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan began presenting itself as a possibility to American 
foreign policy elites495, and the White House still expressed confidence in American military power. In 
an interview, a senior advisor to President Clinton said of the time, “We didn’t think they could take 
Taiwan; I mean, we didn’t know if they’d try, but we thought the balance was in our favour. We simply 
had to message them and signal them without provoking an arms race. Could they take it? Perhaps. 
But if they couldn’t take it and keep it in less than 10 days, they’d lose.”496  
 
Of growing importance to American FPEs was to gain the support of allies497 like Australia and Japan498 
in the event of a contingency. American FPEs did not have to explain to their Japanese counterparts, 
the strategic importance of Taiwan to Tokyo. In an Issues and Insights report in 2001, Murata Koji 
notes that a Chinese embargo of the island would affect Japanese sea lanes. More importantly, he 
says, “Should Taiwan be forcefully unified with China…many Southeast Asian countries will perceive 
it as a US military retreat from Asia. This will undermine the credibility of US defense commitment in 
the region.”499 President Clinton’s enunciation of the three No’s500 on a 1998 trip to China seemed to 
be a concession designed to head off Taiwanese moves toward independence, while gaining Beijing’s 
support in other areas..  
 
Ultimately, the security dilemma created by the Taiwan incident would dull the multilateral and 
neoliberal vision espoused by President Clinton in the first term. The Cold War was not necessarily 
back, but the event certainly reshaped expectations about the region. National Security Advisor 
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Antony Lake warned Beijing that an attack would result in “grave consequences.” The Administration 
even stated that the US “One-China” policy could be at risk, and Congress passed a resolution urging 
the administration to defend the island nation from Chinese invasion. Christensen describes the cycle 
of mistrust: “In order to dissuade Japan from active cooperation with the United States and to coerce 
Washington, China is increasing its coercive capacity against US bases in Japan with ballistic missiles 
and land-attack cruise missiles. Such Developments feed “China threat” theories in Japan”501. This in 
turn provoked “an arms competition of sorts between Chinese offensive, coercive weapons on the 
one hand, and Taipei’s, Washington’s, and Tokyo’s defensive anti-coercion weapons on the other.”502 
Alliance managers in Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra noted the new reality. 
 
5.12. Japan’s security policy-making structures  
The second half of the 1990s, saw a resurgence in the US-Japan alliance. While the Taiwan Crisis of 
1995-6 was not the only reason for this resurgence, it certainly gave the alliance new-found purpose 
and energy. Despite expectations, Japan did not adopt a neutral tone during the crisis. Japan’s Foreign 
Minister Yukihiko Ikeda criticized China’s missile exercises as counter-productive503, while Ryozo Kato, 
head of the Asia Affairs Bureau, summoned the Chinese Counsellor, Zheng Xiangling, and called for 
restraint504. The MSDF stationed the Chikusen, a large helicopter cutter, 50 km north of Yonaguni, and 
Prime Minister sought contingency planning on evacuation of Japanese nationals, coastal safety 
measures, and rear-area support for US Forces. The 1997 Joint Security Declaration, signed by 
President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, explicitly raised policy coordination on 
“situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan”505, code, many believed, for Taiwan. The 
Revised Guidelines used similar language noting the importance of “areas surrounding Japan that have 
an important influence on Japan’s peace and security."  
 
The 1996 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation were instrumental in changing Japan’s 
defence structures in relation to other parts of the government. The calls for an acquisition and cross-
servicing agreement (ACSA) date from these negotiations. Furthermore, the domestic position of the 
Japan Defense Agency (JDA) vis a vis other ministries improved. This gave the JDA a seat at the table 
with MOFA in talking to the US in the 2+2 Security Consultative Committee506. While the shift of 
                                                          
501 Thomas J Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
25, Issue. 4 (Autumn, 2002), p.15. 
502 Ibid. 
503 Peter Starr, “Hashimoto ‘very worried’ as China-Taiwan tensions Escalate,” Agence France-Presse, March 12, 1996. 
504 “Tokyo urges Chinese Self-Restraint on Taiwan,” BBC Summary, March 19, 1996. 
505 The Joint Declaration of Security – Alliance for the 21st Century, 17 April 1996: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-
america/us/security/security.html (accessed March 23, 2016). 
506 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization (Abingdon, UK: IISS | Palgrave, 2009), p.59. 
 
 
129 
Japan’s area of operations to the region around Japan could be read as Taiwan, it was vague enough 
to include a wider regional role. In his study on Japan’s defence policy, Takao Sebata507 states that the 
1997 Revised Guidelines promised “rear support” in emergencies, something the 1978 Guidelines did 
not; second, this opened up the possibility for Japan to assume the right to collective self-defence; 
third, it was vague as to where these emergencies were located, opening up space for Japanese forces 
to be deployed theoretically anywhere in the world508; fourth, it did not require new legislative, 
budgetary, or administrative measures in making these deployments; fifth, it weakened the 
restrictions on deployment, requiring only cabinet approval, rather than Diet approval; sixth, it gave 
US forces and Japanese JSDF access to Japanese ports and facilities in times of emergency. Finally, in 
contrast to the 1978 Guidelines, which were negotiated primarily by MOFA diplomats, the 1997 
Revised Guidelines were negotiated predominantly by military officials of the SDF, increasing their 
power and influence in decision-making509. While MOFA would initially dominate the trilateral with 
Australia, the JDA would come into its own from 2007 when it became a ministry. 
 
Thus far, Japan’s experience of trilateralism – within the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group 
– was overwhelmingly dominated by MOFA. The Taiwan Crisis and subsequent revision of the US-
Japan Alliance, gave parity to Japanese Defense Agency vis a vis MOFA. Traditionally, the Agency has 
always been subordinate in policymaking to MOFA but increased roles gave it increased power 
domestically within Tokyo. These changes were welcomed in Washington, where many Mahanian 
FPEs viewed them as “ a ‘floor’ upon which further bilateral defense cooperation could be built.510 The 
Self Defense Agency was not the only agency changing within Kasumigaseki, however. The 1990s also 
saw the power of the Prime Minister to influence Japan’s security policy grow under the Hashimoto 
Civil Service Reforms. Originally, the 1955 System – as characterized by Green (2003), Shinoda (2013), 
Samuels , and others – had left the Prime Minister extremely vulnerable to challenges from within his 
own party, highly dependent on a small staff of seconded civil servants, and reactive at best in a 
bottom-up policymaking process511. Following the passing of the administration-related bills in the 
Diet in July 1999, the ability of the Prime Minister to influence and lead foreign and security policy was 
increased dramatically. This was primarily by empowering the office of the Prime Minister through 
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the Cabinet Office (the Kantei), which was made “the highest and final organ for policy coordination 
under the cabinet.”512 As will be seen, Japanese Prime Ministerial support for US-Japan-Australia 
trilateralism would be critical, particularly under Shinzo Abe. 
 
Some like Amy Catalinac, have argued that this was due to the electoral structural reforms of 1995, 
which shifted the focus of Diet Members from pork-barreling to becoming interested in elements of 
national policy513. Others like Tomohiro Shinoda514 have emphasized the bureaucratic side, arguing 
that increasing of staff of the Cabinet Office / Kantei, gave the Prime Minister more access to 
independent technocratic expertise, while giving the Kantei the ability to initiate legislation, allowed 
the Prime Minister to circumnavigate ministerial bottlenecks. These reforms have also allowed some 
Prime Ministers – like Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe – the power to expand the remit of Japan’s 
defence policy515, something that was crucial in the later development of the trilateral with Australia. 
The reforms also gave the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS), under the Prime Minister, the power to set 
the agenda at cabinet meetings and to chair administrative vice-ministerial meetings, a sub-cabinet 
meeting attended by all the senior bureaucrats. The CCS was also given the power to approve or block 
all senior appointments for senior bureaucrats (bureau chief and above). When Prime Ministers have 
had excellent Chief Cabinet Secretaries, it has helped centralize power and decision-making around 
the Kantei. The decision to send Japanese peacekeeping troops abroad, for example was decided by 
the PKO Secretariat within the Cabinet Office516. Tracking these changes at the many alliance-related 
conferences and meetings, Mahanian FPEs in the American system, were able to anticipate and plan 
future stages of cooperation517. 
 
5.13. Conclusion 
The post-Cold War decade 1990 to 2000 saw a major shift in US security policy in the Asia Pacific. 
Initially propelled by neoliberal optimism and a preoccupation with trade and financial prosperity, 
American FPEs began the decade with an open mind about US alliances in the region. Although they 
sought to perhaps link allies within the overlapping groupings, then taking place across the region, it 
is clear that they did not have a strong vision for the old bilateral system. Consequently, alliance 
relations suffered a downturn at this time, both in terms of alliance engagement and in terms of 
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military exercises. However, as the region began to show signs of continued insecurity, on the Korean 
peninsula, in the Taiwan Straits, and during the financial crisis, American FPEs felt the full force of the 
two security dilemmas – one within their allies, and the growing one with China518. Networks of 
Mahanian-minded FPEs, clustered around think tanks like CFR, CSIS and Pacific Forum CSIS helped 
coordinate a policy reversal within US government, which began to take shape in the second 
administration. Despite this, it must be noted that Continentalists were equally determined to repair 
ties with China following the Taiwan Crisis519. 
 
This shift away from regional multilateralism back toward the alliances with the US was mirrored in 
both Tokyo and Canberra, where FPEs worried about a US withdrawal from a region that seemed less 
and less stable. The result of these three Mahanian-oriented networks pushing toward each other, 
resulted in a series of incremental, but significant policy changes, such as the 1996 Sydney Statement, 
the US-Japan Joint Declaration, the 1997 Revised Guidelines, and the 2000 Armitage – Nye Report, 
which between them paved the way for enhanced US-Japan alliance engagement in the region and 
bolstered the case for Japan-Australia bilateral security cooperation. This initially centered around 
PKO missions in Cambodia and East Timor, but expanded to greater military-to-military talks and 
increased high level visits. Fundamentally, Japan’s position as a powerful economic power with little 
contribution to regional or global role came to be seen as an oddity, within both the US and Australia. 
Both were willing to promote a regional role for Tokyo, but this required Japanese FPEs to effect 
structural reforms inside Japan’s policymaking institutions to make this even possible. As was 
discussed, the Prime Minister’s office was empowered by a larger secretariat, and began to grow as a 
central hub for influencing policymaking in MOFA and the JDA. This shift would allow for policy clarity 
and hurried along the pace of security normalization that took place post-9/11, under Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi, and which has continued to this day. First seen in the US-Japan-ROK trilateral 
meetings centered around the North Korean threat, the trilateral model was imitated swiftly in a 
number of other forums, including a track-two US-China-Japan trilateral, a track-two US-India-China 
trilateral and a track-one Japan-ROK-China economic trilateral. 
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6. CHAPTER 6: THE BUSH PRESIDENCY (2001-2008) 
This chapter describes how a Mahanian coalition of foreign policy elites – in power in all three 
countries at the same time – shared a similar desire to strengthen alliances and a similar threat-
perception of China in the first Bush administration. It is also important to note changes inside Japan 
which allowed it to match the US desire for greater security alignment. As was described in the last 
chapter, the first term of the Clinton administration was somewhat economic-focused and neoliberal 
in its approach toward regional integration and in its belief in the power of multilateral institutions to 
resolve regional crises. The failure of that nascent regional architecture to deal with either the North 
Korean nuclear slow-burn crisis, or the China-Taiwan crisis caused a push-back by Mahanian FPEs 
within the Democratic and Republican Parties. Continentalists in the second term, continued to push 
for deep engagement on China, but Mahanian policymakers like Joseph Nye began to repair and 
refocus US Cold War-era alliances with Japan and Australia. The first term of the Bush administration 
came in determined to continue this Mahanian push. 
 
If we examine structural factors alone, we can see that the two security dilemmas – the intra-alliance 
security dilemma and the security dilemma with China – pulled American strategy under the first Bush 
administration in opposing directions.  At first glance, neorealism seems well suited to explain US 
policy during this period. As regional balances of power have shifted, so fears of abandonment among 
US allies have become more acute. Japan and Australia have sought to maintain US focus and power 
in the region, by aligning themselves more closely to Washington’s security objectives. As the three 
states aligned more closely and involved India in the mid-2000s however, China became threatened 
by what it perceived to be a coalition against it and pushed back diplomatically. Given China’s growing 
importance for American business, this period saw Continentalists attempting to maintain control 
over the China policy and to keep terms within Beijing on favourable terms. This same dynamic was 
also found with Washington’s allies, who were also seeing a surge in trade with Beijing. This explains 
the weaker support for trilateralism in Canberra and provided incentives against full-alliance status. 
As we will see neoclassical realism tells this same story and more by moving past the state-actor level 
to that of the foreign policy actor. It provides a thoughtful and more accurate account of how foreign 
policy elites within the US at this time actually behaved. It also explains why US policy seemed to see-
saw between very different objectives. It also explains why US allies pushed for closer relations, but 
were reluctant to develop a larger multilateral NATO-like organization. For example, Japan – though 
by far the most threatened by China’s rise – has at time behaved at variance to how neorealism might 
suggest. For example, in 2007, there is evidence that Australian diplomats were prepared to offer 
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Japan a more formal treaty, which Japan declined520. This makes sense only when one considers 
domestic variables – like Japan’s peaceful constitution and political culture – which are left out of 
neorealist accounts. Then, in 2004, the United States came very close to allowing the trilateral to lapse 
in favor of a closer political relationship with Beijing.  Again, this can only be explained by an 
examination of domestic variables. 
 
While a purely neorealist account might argue that the post-9/11 realignment of American security 
objectives were responsible for this, it is not clear why Washington would only have decided in 2004-
5 to attempt to align China more closely to its Middle East policy. On the other hand, interviews with 
various FPEs for this project point to the appointment of Robert Zoellick – a noted enthusiast for the 
“responsible stakeholder” engagement policy with China – to the position of Deputy Secretary of State 
as playing a major role in the sudden lack of interest in trilateralism in the Department of State. Nor 
does neorealism explain certain elements about the Quadrilateral initiative, which took place between 
2007 and 2008. In the end, Australian FPEs decided not to antagonize China – in what Beijing perceived 
as encirclement – and let the quadrilateral languish. While neorealism would seem to account for this, 
Australia’s behavior is somewhat a riddle. Since Canberra has always been the least threatened by 
China, it makes sense that it would only seek enough security to maintain US interest in the region, 
and would not logically have any real interest in the quadrilateral. Its disproportionately large 
economic reliance on China, would make Canberra more sensitive to Beijing’s fears of encirclement. 
By a neorealist account, therefore, it is difficult to explain why Australia ever would have shown 
interest in the Quadrilateral in the first place. If, however, we move past the black-box “Australia” to 
an analysis at the domestic unit level, we are afforded an extra level of explanatory insight. When 
Canberra’s foreign policy was dominated by Mahanian FPEs, interest in the Quadrilateral was high. 
After the election of Kevin Rudd – a self-appointed “China hand” – Australian foreign policy then 
shifted its stance and reprioritized the China security dilemma over the “China threat” assessment. In 
summary, it would seem that neoclassical realism’s domestic level variable is crucial – rather than 
supplementary – to our understanding of events.  
 
This chapter explores the origins of the trilateral using neoclassical realism, and examines how a small 
network of like-minded foreign policy elites (FPEs) in Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo, assumed or 
held office around the same time, and how that was the critical factor – not only systemic power 
balances – to the creation of the trilateral. As will be seen, these elites shared concerns about security 
dynamics enough to encourage them to agree on several policy directions, which might be seen as 
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balancing: the strengthening of alliances, the refocusing of US attention on the region, and the 
normalization of Japan’s security and defence posture. Implicitly, they saw the security dilemma with 
China as an unavoidable cost of a stronger alliance, but thought that signaling China might ameliorate 
this somewhat. We will see that they prioritized collective security: Australian scholar Michael Wesley 
has pointed out, initial statements discussed how the three might “coordinate policy” on regional 
security issues521. Finally, as we will see, Australia – the state with the softest threat perception of 
China – is actually credited with creating the trilateral, and while abandonment fears played a part in 
their deliberations, it is clear that some FPEs within Canberra were aligned with their colleagues in 
Washington and Tokyo in fearing a rising China. The very idea that states can be broken down into 
groupings like this – and how those grouping fare politically – is such an old insight, that it belongs to 
classical realism. What is neorealist about it, is the fact that power balances matter; what is 
neoclassical realist about it, is the fact that those FPEs disagree on their assessments of whether China 
is a threat or not; and these disagreements spill out into the real world of policymaking.  
 
6.1. The First Term of the Bush Administration (2001-2004)  
In the first months of 2001, a group of Mahanian FPEs who shared a common perception of the region 
began to assemble in Washington, as George W. Bush administration’s Asia foreign and defense policy 
team began to take shape. Colin Powell, a well-known Republican moderate and Gulf War hero, was 
sworn in as the new Secretary of State, emphasizing the strong ties with Asia Pacific allies “particularly 
Japan”  in his Confirmation Hearing in the Senate522. Calling these alliances, the “bedrock” of American 
security in the region, Powell, argued that “all else in the Pacific and East Asia flows from these strong 
relationships.”523 This emphasis on allies was also found in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)524 
– which though published on September 20th, 2001, was largely written before the September 11 
attacks. Arguably, the Bush first term team assembled one of the strongest groups of ‘Asia hands’ in 
the post-Cold War period. Certainly, it held some very capable individuals. Powell’s new Assistant 
Secretary of State was Richard Armitage, a special forces veteran from the Vietnam War, and 
previously, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the early years of the Reagan 
administration, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. With an 
impressive network of political elites in the Asia Pacific, he had co-written the Armitage-Nye Report 
                                                          
521 Michael Wesley, “The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’s Institutional Politics,” in William T. Tow, Mark J. Thomson, Yoshinobu 
Yamamoto and Satu P. Limaye, Asia Pacific Security: US, Australia and Japan and the New Security Triangle (London: Routledge, 
ASPI, 2007), p.39. 
522 Colin, L. Powell, Confirmation Hearing by Secretary-Designate Colin L. Powell, Washington DC, January 17TH, 2001. 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/443.htm (accessed April 7, 2016) 
523 Ibid. 
524 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report,” September 30, 2001, available at: 
http://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2001.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-110946-823 (accessed 
December 11, 2016). 
 
 
135 
in the run-up to the 2000 elections, advocating closer defence cooperation with Tokyo525. James A 
Kelly, the new Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs also had a long business 
career in Asia and had spent the past 6 years as President of the PACOM-affiliated think tank the 
Pacific Forum, CSIS, the think tank which had hosted the first US-Japan-ROK trilateral in 1994, the year 
Kelly had joined Pacific Forum as President. He would also take over as the lead American delegate in 
the US-Japan-Korea TCOG. In the DOD, the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and Andrew 
Marshall, the former Director of the Office of Net Assessments (ONA), promoted the Defense Strategy 
Review (DSR) in 2000, in order to examine global security and the US ability to “assure” allies, and 
“dissuade” and “deter” peer competitors like China from becoming a threat526, a theme that was 
picked up in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 
 
Richard Armitage remembers, “When the new administration came in, we were peopled by a team 
that had very strong views on Asia, and saw Japan as our primary interlocutor and alliance. That would 
be me, Mike [Green], and Jim [Kelly], and all of us, as well as Australia. We’d had long identification 
with Australia, from the time that I’d served in Vietnam.” 527 In the National Security Council, Torkel 
Patterson’s brief to Michael Green – the Director for Asian Affairs – was simple. He was to do 
everything he could to “strengthen alliances”528. With over five years’ experience living in Japan, and 
fluent in Japanese, Green was well-connected and influential inside Tokyo’s corridors of power. 
Although there was a slight disconnect between Powell’s State Department and Rumsfeld’s Defense 
Department, Richard Lawless, a former intelligence officer, ran the Pentagon’s posture review in Asia 
as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia Pacific Affairs, an event which would lead to the 
development of the military-to-military trilateral in the second Bush administration. In this way, one 
can see that FPEs which share common perceptions of allies and threats and are aligned on their views 
of the balance of power are more likely to clearly shape the direction of state’s foreign policymaking 
than those who are at odds with each other. They are also more willing to take risks and implement 
new cooperative initiatives. Many of those interviewed for this paper, attest to the fact that this new 
– and potentially frightening – trilateral arrangement arose from the trust and goodwill that had 
accrued from years of working together.  
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The first term of the Bush administration was one of unexpected events and immense change, and 
put immense pressure on the new team. The initial months of the administration were dominated by 
yet another crisis with China when a Chinese fighter aircraft collided with an EP-3 American 
intelligence-gathering aircraft in international airspace adjacent to Hunan Island529. The 
administration had come in thinking of China as a “strategic competitor”530 rather than a strategic 
partner and had immediately renounced Clinton’s Three No’s531. Furthermore, Andrew Marshall’s 
concern about growing Chinese military capabilities led to the identification within the QDR of six 
operational goals as the focus for DOD’s transformation. Those linked to China, included “countering 
A2/AD capabilities and investment in precision-strike capabilities, information technology and space 
systems”532 Thomas Mahnken, who took the lead in drafting the QDR, said these elements were “really 
– albeit not exclusively – about China.”533  
 
Although the EP-3 incident put the administration on the back foot vis a vis China, relations improved 
after the September 11th attacks, radically shifting the administration’s priorities534. China followed 
this up by throwing its support behind the administration’s War on Terror, giving it for UNSC 
Resolution 1368 and Resolution 1373, and publicly offering support and endorsing the American 
campaign in Afghanistan535. However, not all was calm in Northeast Asia as North Korea re-emerged 
as a crisis point. In 2002, the Agreed Framework broke down after a meeting between Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, James Kelly, and a North Korean team in Pyongyang 
amid accusations that the North were secretly engaged in a uranium enrichment program536. A new 
round of negotiations, the Six Party Talks, was begun in Beijing in August 2003 to see if US-DPRK 
differences could be resolved. The US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination Oversight Group (TCOG) 
continued meeting, but since it was replaced by the Six Party Talks as the key forum for dealing with 
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North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it became – in essence – an informal caucus within this 
framework and a means for the Bush administration to effect military transformation537.  
 
US-Japanese bilateral coordination over North Korea became at times difficult, with the growing 
domestic importance of the Abductees issue in Japan. On other fronts, however, US-Japanese alliance 
relations improved immensely, as these like-minded FPEs responsible for policy in both countries 
began a Strategic Dialogue in the background of Article 9 and collective self-defense debates in Japan. 
The Bush administration was also intent on developing relations with India at this time, and spent 
much of this time negotiating what became the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, signed in 2005. The 
Bush Administration also had to deal with the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, which revealed 
a number of possibilities regarding alliance networking across the Asia Pacific. In many ways, the 
emergency response group of the US, Japan, Australia, and India, was extremely successful in reacting 
and coordinating to the event, raising the possibility for future security cooperation in the second 
term.  
 
6.2. The Origins of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) 
As the last chapter revealed, security cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Australia 
began to take shape in the 1990s. Perceptions about growing regional insecurity in all three countries 
provided the impetus to renew the two alliances, which occurred in the 1996 US-Japan Joint 
Declaration and 1996 Sydney Statement. This was matched by a willingness among FPEs in all three 
countries to build on Japan-Australia ties, so that Japan might develop better regional capabilities. 
Furthermore, while the US-Japan-Korea TCOG suggested itself as a model for trilateral cooperation, 
and there was no interest in trying to incorporate Australia into the US-Japan-ROK trilateral, but rather 
to simply build a new trilateral. This was down to Korea-Japan tensions, and disinterest among Korea 
FPEs in joining a larger regional-minded organization. By the start of the Bush administration, FPEs in 
Canberra and Tokyo were primed for such a trilateral538: Australian support for the concept had 
existed from the late 1990s, while Japanese support grew steadily from inside the Foreign Policy 
Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2000 onwards539.  
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Political support was also growing at the senior levels of government. President Bush viewed Australia 
and Japan as “friendly” countries, a sentiment shared by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi 
and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, who also had a close personal friendship540. Indeed, 
Howard was in Washington during the attacks, having spent September 10th at a White House 
luncheon hosted by the President and his father541, following a ceremony at the naval dockyard, 
honoring the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. His speech of support in Australia’s House of 
Representatives on the 17th September was impassioned and invoked Articles IV and V of the ANZUS 
Treaty542, ultimately committing over 1,000 Australian troops as well as aircraft and vessels for 
operations543. Koizumi was also strongly supportive of the United States and had already had an 
“incredibly warm”544 first meeting with the new president at Camp David on June 30th, where the two 
men had played baseball. Partly due to the legacy of the Gulf War545, the Prime Minister was 
determined to put Japan “in the game” after the terrorist attacks, calling terrorism, “Japan’s own 
security problem”546 and swiftly passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. The warmth of 
these three leaders was partly down to the personal style of politics that all three took in foreign 
policy547. This warmth also pervaded the bureaucracy, with incoming Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Armitage telling his aides to clear his schedule if either Australian or Japanese diplomats 
requested a meeting548.  
 
The initial seed for a regular trilateral discussion was planted by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
at the AUSMIN meeting with Secretary of State Powell in Sydney in July 2001549. According to Downer, 
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he and Foreign Secretary, Ashton Calvert had been working on the idea550, which then emerged during 
spontaneously in the post-AUSMIN press conference551. Calvert – a dominant figure inside the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) – had strong personal links to Japan, spoke the 
language fluently and was a long-time friend of the new Japanese Ambassador to Washington, Ryozo 
Kato552. Kato – who had spent a number of years as the Japanese lead within the TCOG, was also very 
close to Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and to the Australian Ambassador to Washington, 
Michael Thawley. Within days of his arrival in post, the new Japanese Ambassador presented his 
credentials to his old friend at the State Department. In addition to his close connection to Kato, 
Armitage was close to the Australians, and had been personal friends with Prime Minister John 
Howard since the Reagan administration553. Calvert’s then-deputy in the DFAT, Bruce Miller asserts 
that this close relationship between the three – Kato, Calvert, and Armitage – was crucial to starting 
the trilateral, since all three had known and trusted each other for many years and were “each in their 
own way, capable of stepping above the day-to-day grind of foreign policy-making and bilateral 
relations and understood strategic power relations in East Asia, and – in a policy sense – what to do 
about it.”554  
 
The first trilateral meeting in the summer of 2001 was tacked onto the afternoon session of a US-
Japan Strategic Dialogue555 and took place between US Assistant Secretary Richard Armitage, Japanese 
Vice-Foreign Minister Yasuo Takeuchi, and Australian Foreign Secretary Ashton Calvert. Armitage 
remembers,  
 
…it was our view that this was the way of the future. A good solid anchor in the north, which 
was Japan, a good solid anchor in the south, ourselves and India – though you had to be much 
more careful about how you played India. As the overarching democracies in the region, we 
thought it was pretty good – not a containment strategy – but a pretty good signpost for the 
region. Calvert led the Australians, Takeuchi led his, and I led ours…We spoke as allies should 
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and for us – the Americans – and I think it got much more for the Japanese, I really think they 
got a sense of an alliance; that we tell each other the truth, in depth.556   
 
Atsuyuki Oike, a senior Japanese diplomat, also present at that first meeting, says of the first meeting,  
 
The mood that first meeting was very good, very constructive with some interesting discussions. 
I think it was a full meeting with Dr. Calvert, Mr. Takeuchi, and Mr. Armitage in Washington, I 
think...When you start doing things for the first time, you don’t have a big fanfare because you’re 
not sure if this is going to work and you don’t know what kind of reaction you’re going to get 
from other countries to what you’re doing. We don’t want to be too noisy about what we were 
doing. So the atmosphere that first time was, let’s have an occasion for discussions to see the 
value of this initiative.557 
 
This arrangement would last until 2004, when the meetings were upgraded to ministerial level. 
Although China did figure in the early TSD meetings, North Korea and the global war on terror were 
the immediate focus for talks, as the three countries considered ways in which Japan and Australia 
could contribute diplomatically and militarily to the new strategic imperatives of the Bush 
administration. Following the 2002 Bali terrorist attack, in which 90 Australians were killed, and the 
2004 bombing attempt of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the three agreed to hold annual Counter-
Terrorism Discussions in 2004. Some on the Australian side saw the trilateral as being “all about 
Japan”558, while some in Japan saw the trilateral as being motivated by “the idea of regional 
integration.”559 There was much to discuss, as the United States began organizing multilateral 
reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan after swiftly vanquishing the Taliban in November 2001. The 
meetings continued in this ad hoc manner, without producing joint statements, but despite that, it 
was clear that “the merits of this joint activity…were appreciated in all three capitals, and personal 
relationships among the three leaders continued to develop.”560 Both Japan and Australia supported 
the US invasion and reconstruction of Iraq after 2003, with Japan going so far as to deploy 600 Ground 
Self Defense Forces to a Provincial Reconstruction Team in the southern province of Samawah561, and 
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200 Air SDF to a logistical support mission in neighboring Kuwait in late 2003562. Then in 2003, Michael 
Green headed a new inter-agency Asia strategy for the Asia Pacific at the NSC. The report found that 
China’s rise was the primary “strategic challenge” for US security and that the report proposed “not a 
NATO per se, but a federated set of capabilities and interoperability that [would] enhance dissuasion 
without creating a security dilemma or two blocs in the region.”563 This federated network of defense 
relationships “would help dissuade China from using force in the region by demonstrating the latent 
potential for closer security ties among China’s neighbors if provoked.”564 The conceptual strategic 
logic for the trilateral was being laid out. 
 
6.3. The 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami  
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami provided a new impetus to this core group of FPEs, working on the 
trilateral and was a good test of what the three states could achieve through closer inter-operability, 
and seemed to justify the US strategy of networking alliances. According to Stacy White, such was the 
“unprecedented scope” of the disaster, that it changed how policymakers “thought about risk”565 and 
impacted how the trilateral approached HA/DR. Trilateral cooperation with Australia and Japan 
certainly helped attune US officials to the willingness of their Australian and Japanese counterparts to 
play a major role in this type of crisis in the years preceding the earthquake. The disaster also saw 
India take a large role in reconstruction efforts. The fact that India was easily incorporated into this 
“Tsunami Core Group”, would later lead directly to the Japanese attempt to upgrade the trilateral 
with Australia and Japan to a “quadrilateral”, with India. For its part, India’s role in disaster relief 
efforts highlighted its growing willingness to partner with both the United States and with Japan in 
“soft” security operations. Senior State Department official, Evans Revere remembers the ‘can-do’ 
attitude that characterized cooperation in the days after the earthquake:  
 
We could tell the Japanese wanted to be a player and had certain resources they wanted to 
commit. What was missing, was the ‘way’, the logistical capability to get what they had out into 
the field and deploy it. This is where the US-Japan Alliance came into play. While the Japanese 
had bulldozers, helicopters, water purifications, system, and combat engineers, they didn’t have 
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the logistical mechanisms to transport these things long distances in a timely manner. So we put 
them on US bottoms, aircraft carriers, and got them out there.566 
 
 It also led directly to Japan, Australia, and India cooperating for the first time around a US-led hub of 
efforts. 
 
Such was the seriousness of the crisis, that the usual red tape was avoided. Bypassing usual 
Department of Defense procedure, PACOM officials ordered a Japan-ported American Marine 
Amphibious Group – bound for Iraq – to turn around in the Indian Ocean to attend relief efforts around 
the area. American, Australian and Japanese defence attaches rang up their counterparts across the 
region in order to gain overflight permissions for relief helicopters567, bypassing the usual diplomatic 
channels. According to Revere, the concept of the “core group”568 was thought up in Armitage’s office 
in the State Department, with Robin Sakoda, Randall Schriver, and a number of others, in the days 
immediately after the earthquake. Interestingly, while humanitarian considerations trumped 
geopolitics in those early days, the strategic implications of coordinating a large scale disaster relief 
operation were realized fairly early on: (1) it was realized almost immediately that the event was 
perfect for Japanese forces to play a large expeditionary role in tandem with US forces, (2) the event 
offered a possibility to include China in relief efforts569 (though in the end, China declined, citing 
development concerns), (3) the event smoothed the way for US-India and Japan-India military 
cooperation and opened up future possibilities toward quadrilateral cooperation. The ease with which 
the Core Group functioned in the weeks after the disaster did not go unnoticed by alliance managers. 
The quick, joint movement of assets, the real-time intelligence-sharing, and the parceling up of 
strategic objectives between this core group revealed the art-of-the-possible for the future of Green’s 
“federated set of capabilities.” 
 
6.4. A New Foreign Policy Nexus in Tokyo 
Japan’s reaction to the new strategic direction emanating from Washington was key to the success of 
the whole trilateral endeavor. A Japan that could not or would not engage in this new alliance 
connectivity would have stymied American strategic direction from ever gaining momentum. 
However, structural changes taking place in the bureaucracy around the Prime Minister’s office also 
fostered a stronger and more centralized policymaking capacity. Political support from the centre 
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emboldened men on the spot – like Japanese Ambassador Ryozo Kato in Washington DC and US 
Ambassador Tom Schieffer in Tokyo – to promote the trilateral. However, as was argued in the last 
chapter, it was only the institutional reform of the cabinet office and role of the Prime Minister, which 
would enable Japanese prime ministers to pursue these foreign policy visions. Junichiro Koizumi’s 
election as Prime Minister and leader of the LDP represented more than just “business as usual”. As 
Richard Samuels has argued, the rise of Koizumi represented the rise of a generation of conservative 
young, “revisionists”, or “Young Turks”, who wanted “to transform the institutions of national security 
policymaking” 570. It was, he argues, “the most consequential political change in Japan since 1945.”571 
More importantly, these young politicians – Shinzo Abe, Taro Aso, and Shigeru Ishiba, among others 
– had both the policy expertise and the backing of alliance managers from the United States. Inheriting 
the Hashimoto reforms described in the last chapter, Koizumi wasted no time in adding personnel and 
expertise to the newly-authorized Cabinet Secretariat, creating no less then fifteen offices for policy 
development by 2004, while also merging and reducing the number of government ministries and 
agencies from twenty three to thirteen572. He made his intentions clear: “I am resolved to make this 
cabinet a ‘ceaseless reform cabinet’ that would boldly undertake reforms in Japan’s social and 
economic structures.”573  
 
Furthermore, the new Cabinet Office usurped the Ministry of Finance’s budgetary responsibilities at 
this time, creating a Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, independent of the bureaucracy. This new 
council – chaired by the prime minister – was created in January 2001 and gave Koizumi great powers 
over the budget. In addition, the Cabinet Office also gained the ability to draft and pass bills under the 
jurisdiction of the relevant ministries – something that was initially resisted by the bureaucracy. 
Koizumi instructed Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Teijiro Furukawa to serve as the secretariat to a 
new Task Force on Emergency Legislation, staffing it with young officials from the JDA, MOFA and the 
National Policy Agency. The MOFA presence in the Task Force was minimized allowing both the JDA 
and the Cabinet Secretariat more influence over the decision-making process574. Overall, one could 
argue that there was a trend of the Cabinet Office and the JDA usurped many foreign policy roles from 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
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However, it should be noted that – as so far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned, Koizumi 
was pushing on an open door and many within that department welcomed his regional integration 
policies. Japanese diplomats began to view the growth of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia with 
apprehension after the 1997 Financial Crisis, as China became a regional economic power with its own 
regional initiatives575. A senior Japanese diplomat in the Oceanic Division in MOFA, between 2001 and 
2005, remembers, “So, on the one hand, we were trying to promote NAFTA-style regional economic 
integration as a solution to the Asian Crisis. Chinese ideas were somewhat different to ours: they had 
more of a developing country style, gradual-incremental approach for regional integration. And those 
two ideas came out. And at that time, China was reasonably confident that in the context of ASEAN 
plus Three, they would prevail…”576 In the end, China’s vision for regional integration did prevail and 
Japanese concern deepened after losing what it saw as crucial diplomatic battle to lead regional 
architecture in the early 2000s. China’s lobbying in ASEAN capitals for an ASEAN plus Three ultimately 
triumphed over Tokyo’s preferred ASEAN plus Six at a Leaders Summit in Manila in 1999. One concern 
about the Plus Three format, was the Japanese fear that it would allow China to dominate the agenda, 
while the Plus Six format – including India, New Zealand, and Australia – would balance growing 
Chinese clout, by adding states that shared democratic values and norms. This common concern that 
China intended to marginalize the US and its allies in future integration efforts helped bring together 
different FPEs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expediting Ambassador Kato’s diplomacy with 
Armitage in Washington577. Some external observers have alleged that a “purge” of the China school578 
took place within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during this period.579 
 
6.5. The Rise of Sino-Japanese Tensions  
The deterioration of Sino-Japanese ties at this time also explains the shift of Japanese FPEs in their 
approach toward both Japan’s security institutions and its defence policies. Perhaps the “China 
Factor” does not entirely explain why Japan joined the trilateral, but it does explain why – once the 
idea was suggested – Japanese FPEs embraced the idea whole-heartedly. It has long had a China 
component embedded in it for Japanese policy makers580. The first half of the new decade saw a 
marked drift in ties between the two states, that were wholly avoidable, linked to the domestic politics 
of each state. In many ways, the drift in relations was at odds with their ever-closer economic 
relationship. By 2003, China was responsible for more than 90 percent growth of Japanese exports, 
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while 30-40 percent of Japanese production inside China was for the export market581. Although more 
than 10 million Chinese workers were employed by Japanese firms, China’s patriotic education – 
begun in 1994 – began building legitimacy for the Communist Party leadership through anti-Japanese 
teachings582, downplaying 30 years of Japanese official development aid and trade, and emphasizing 
instead Japan’s war time aggressions, and historical revisionism. This occurred despite the Japanese 
Emperor’s 1992 speech in Beijing to the “unfortunate era when our country caused immense pain and 
suffering to the Chinese”583. This period was marked by efforts to cooperate in the East China Sea584, 
over SARS, over policing issues, but these efforts were disrupted by incidences like the Shenyang 
Consulate incident585 (when Chinese police entered the consulate to recover North Koreans 
attempting to defect) and the anti-Japanese riots, which rocked China in August 2004 and April 2005, 
first over the Asian football championships and then over the textbook controversy. While more than 
80 percent of Japanese had polled favorable views of China in the 1980s, less than 40 percent did in 
2004.586 
 
In Japan, Prime Minister Koizumi came to power somewhat beholden by a campaign promise to the 
Nippon Izokukai,587 a political association representing Japan’s war dead, to visit Yasukuni Shrine, while 
in office. His decision to restart annual visits in 2002 – which had lapsed under Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone in the mid-1980s – was a major cause of the steep decline in Sino-Japanese relations during 
this period. Yasukuni had become a sore point between the two countries since 1978, when the head 
priest Matsudaira Nagayoshi – of his own accord – had decided to inter 14 A-Class war criminals into 
the shrine588. The existence of the Yushukan – a historical museum on Japanese imperialism – on the 
grounds, cemented the Shrine’s place as a symbol of a new type of Japanese war-revisionist 
nationalism,589 which had revived during the 1990s590. Despite his attempts to reach out to critics in 
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both Korea and China during the first year of his premiership, Koizumi’s visit to the controversial shrine 
in April 2002 caused a major diplomatic storm between Japan and China. Another issue that was to 
rear its head during this period was the resurrection of maritime disputes in the East China Sea. 
Although these had occurred intermittently throughout the Cold War, the 1990s coming into force of 
UNCLOS created new areas of disagreement. This was particularly true of Exclusive Economic Zones 
and the differing methods of delineating them (by continental shelf or by mileage)591.  
 
This period, as well as marking the rise of Cabinet Office power in Japan, also marks the rise of the 
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), a traditionally weak sub-cabinet body in the Japanese polity. Much 
of this was down to the perception of growing Chinese assertiveness on Japan’s periphery, particularly 
the Senkaku Islands. This included China’s nuclear test in 1993, its seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995, its 
missile tests over the Taiwan Straits in 1996, and the increase of its air and maritime incursions into 
Japanese territory. China’s military modernization had also taken an immense boost at this time from 
massive Russian arms sales592. According to SIPRI, 90 percent of all arms sales to China came from 
Russia between 1991 and 2011, with Beijing purchasing such advanced systems as Tor-M1 mobile air 
defense systems, Mi-17 military transport helicopters, SU-27/Su-30 combat aircraft, the Kh-59MK 
anti-ship cruise missile, four Sovremenny-class destroyers (designed as “carrier killers”), twelve kilo-
class submarines, among others. It also indirectly contributed to the 2001 purchase of China’s first 
aircraft carrier, the Varyag, which was moved to a dry dock in Dalian for refitting.  
 
By the mid-2000s, the average value of purchases is estimated at US$42 billion per annum593, and as 
can be seen, focused on building China’s existing naval and air-naval capabilities. In response to this 
build-up, Japanese FPEs began to view China with serious concern, expressing that concern for the 
first time in a government policy document, in the 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG),594 “China…continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its 
naval and air forces…and also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive 
to its future actions.”595 The new NDPG emphasized “defensive defense” replacing the Cold War-era 
Basic Defense Force Concept with a flexible response posture. In 2004, the JDA also began planning 
for three invasion scenarios at this time, based around Chinese attacks on US forces based in Japan, 
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around the Senkaku Islets, and around the East China Sea gas fields596. Japanese naval and air units 
were emphasized at the expense of its armoured tank forces, and the naval defense system, Aegis was 
upgraded through the co-development of the SM-3 missile with the United States597. North Korea’s 
missile tests and nuclear test in 2006 was also “a Godsend”598 at the time, according to Richard 
Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary for Asia Pacific Affairs, because it highlighted gaps in how the US and 
Japan shared real-time intelligence, and how Japan’s intelligence agencies shared their information 
with decision-makers within Japan’s government. This – along with the personal support of the US 
Ambassador, Tom Schieffer599 – would become one of the leading drivers for Japanese intelligence 
reform during the first Abe Premiership. 
 
The Japanese Coast Guard was also modernized during this period, receiving off-budget increases in 
Japan’s defense spending600. This period also saw the development of Japan’s defence diplomacy, with 
senior JDA ministers and officials forging security dialogues with more than sixteen countries in 
addition to NATO by 2004601. Crucially, this was a period for the JDA to develop capacity, as MOD 
policy planner Yusuke Ishihara says, “[at the time] we didn’t even have enough number of English 
speakers, and we didn’t posture the SDF for adequate changes. It needed to adjust, and it took time. 
And it’s true that…right after the end of the Cold War, our only experience was having external contact 
with the United States, but as our activities expanded, we started meeting other partners…Now 
there’s an independent division, in which I work, with about 40 people, working on external 
relationships….It took time for the bureaucratic organization to adjust.”602  
 
During this period, the JDA also successfully fought off a Ministry of Finance (MOF) proposal for a 
40,000 reduction in troops603, as the JDA was gradually taking its seat as a “normal” defence ministry 
in Kasumigaseki, a process that would be formalized in 2007604. 
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6.6. The Second Term of the Bush Administration (2005-2008)  
In many ways, the second Bush administration was a reaction to the first. The Mahanian perspective 
was seen as simplistic and over weighted by those who thought that American foreign policy in the 
region was overly weighted toward US allies.  The second administration American requests for 
increased support and cooperation in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite this, the 
trilateral did grow quickly, gaining a new military trilateral structure in 2006, which came as the result 
of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process605. Ordered to focus on allies in the Asia Pacific by 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Lawless viewed alliance inter-operability as his 
overriding mission goal. The political track, the TSD was upgraded to a ministerial level that same year, 
and then summit level event. This initial elevation took place for two reasons: partly because of US 
and Japanese concerns about Australia’s diverging position on China; and partly because of changes 
inside the Bush administration’s Asia team.  
 
The cabinet reshuffle of 2005 saw the old Asia team, with Secretary of State Powell, and his deputy, 
Richard Armitage, being replaced by Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, and Robert Zoellick, 
a former diplomat and trade representative. Coming from a trade background, Zoellick had 
dramatically different views on Japan than his predecessor Armitage, and the relationship with Tokyo 
is said to have suffered somewhat during this period606. A number of the administration’s best “Japan 
hands” left around this time: Torkel Patterson had left the NSC suddenly in 2002,607 while 2005 saw 
the biggest shake up with the administration losing both Michael J. Green from the National Security 
Council and Evans Revere from the State Department. In some ways, the shift represented more than 
just a few Japan experts. Some have argued that in all three trilateral countries, there are policymakers 
who orient themselves around “US-first, Japan-first, maritime/Mahanian democratic and 
Anglophone-values”, broadly-speaking, with Richard Armitage, Andrew Shearer, Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe, and Prime Minister John Howard belonging to that camp. He contrasts these with 
“Continentalists”, such as Hugh White, Michael L’Estrange (Calvert’s replacement in DFAT), Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuyama, and Robert Zoellick, who all stressed 
engagement and accommodation with China over alliances and values608. Furthermore, some allies 
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believed that Christopher Hill –the administration’s main Asia heavyweight – began to emphasize the 
Six Party Talks and the North Korean issue to the exclusion of other regional topics609.  
 
Despite its pre-occupation with wars in the Middle East, and the appointment of Zoellick as Deputy 
Secretary of State, the US-China relationship became marked by its increasing complexity in the 
second term of the Bush administration. As has been noted, China was generally supportive of the 
administration’s war against terrorism, seeing in it an opportunity to dampen growing tensions with 
the US610 and garner support over Uighur separatists611. Furthermore, it attempted to address growing 
American concerns about its rise with the application of the “peaceful rise” slogan612, which came to 
supplant Jiang Zemin’s “Avoid confrontation, build up comprehensive national power, advance 
incrementally” slogan. It also seemed willing to play a positive role over lingering problems with North 
Korea. In 2003, after the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, North Korea withdrew from the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Beijing managed to organize and host the first Six Party Talks, initiating one of 
the first collective approaches to security in Northeast Asia. Impatient with the Bush administration’s 
approach to talks and labelling of it as a part of an “axis of evil”613, Pyongyang tested seven Taepodong-
2 missiles in July 2006, following that up with its first underground nuclear weapon in October of that 
year. Despite both tests, the Six Party Talks would continue off-and-on until 2007, when an apparent 
diplomatic breakthrough was made in the 5th and 6th rounds of the talks. The breakdown of the Six 
Party Talks reflected – for different reasons – the widening gulf between Washington and Beijing on 
how to resolve the North Korea issue. One reason for this growing unease among American defense 
official about China’s growing military capabilities614. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
stated that China held “the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field 
disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional US military advantages”.615 As 
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if to highlight this, the Pentagon’s newest stealth fighter616 was hacked, allegedly, by Chinese cyber 
actors sometime between 2006 and 2007. Beijing also tested an anti-satellite missile in 2007, revealing 
a potentially devastating weapon against a US military, overly-reliant on C4ISR.  
 
Another concern at this time, was China’s growing influence within ASEAN. This revealed itself in 
December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, when China insisted that ASEAN Plus Three, rather than the East 
Asia Summit, be used as a forum for regional integration. Beijing’s success leading regional integration 
in this way revealed its growing leverage on ASEAN states like Laos and Cambodia. Unease among 
American and Japanese FPEs had grown since the 2007 American Financial Crisis with many arguing 
that the Beijing’s behavior constituted “increased assertiveness”617. Certainly, continued increases in 
Chinese military spending, combined with an increase in maritime-based disputes with its neighbors 
in the East and South China Seas fed into this wider geopolitical narrative. In response to these 
increased tensions, Pentagon policymakers began considering balancing strategies against Chinese 
capabilities, while simultaneously seeking improved communications and ties with their Chinese 
counterparts618. By the time the Obama administration came into office, Sino-American relations were 
seen an increasingly competitive in nature, with many in-region and within the American policy 
community arguing that the United States needed to “return to Asia.”619 
 
6.7. The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Grows  
The second term of the Bush administration saw a dramatic uptick in the structure and scope of 
activities of the trilateral initiative, with the forum becoming institutionalized and elevated to the 
ministerial and summit level. It would be easy to suppose that this was primarily because of 
neorealism’s predictions about power balances, and the rise of China, and while this is partly true, 
what actually occurred was also influenced by how FPEs perceived and reacted to changes in the 
structure of power and to events in the region – such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami. One would assume 
that American FPEs would universally drive trilaterals toward closer institutionalization at this time, 
but that is not what in fact took place. In 2005, Robert Zoellick replaced Richard Armitage as Deputy 
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Secretary of State. Unlike Armitage, Zoellick lacked enthusiasm for the trilateral strategic initiative, 
partly because he viewed it as a junior-level dialogue, and partly because he preferred to focus on 
ASEAN and US-China relations620. According to Andrew Shearer, a senior Australian diplomat close to 
the Howard government, “there was this slight shift between Bush’s first and second administrations 
when Bob Zoellick came in as Deputy Secretary of State. This caused anxiety amongst the Japanese, 
as there was a sense that Zoellick wasn't interested in the dialogue and was more focused on the US-
China relationship and the ‘responsible stakeholder’ vision.”621 Zoellick took this so far as to decline a 
meeting with a visiting Japanese delegation to show his displeasure over Tokyo’s ban on US beef 
exports622. 
 
The concept around “responsible stakeholder” was a normative policy statement of what China should 
become, and had strategic repercussions for American for strategy and foreign policymaking.623 
Zoellick had been the lead negotiator on China’s entry into the WTO, and came into office with a plan 
to make China a “strategic partner”. Concerned with the impact this new perspective might have on 
the growing trilateral, Michael Green, Senior National Security Advisor on Asia, persuaded Zoellick to 
call his new US-China meeting a “senior dialogue” rather than a strategic dialogue624. The first meeting 
of this dialogue took place in August 2005 in Beijing, and was co-chaired by Deputy Secretary of State 
Zoellick and Secretary General of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group of the CPC, Dai Binguo. An 
additional US-China meeting to the Senior Dialogue was created the following year in December. 
Named the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, this meeting was hosted by the Treasury Department 
(on the American side).  
 
Realizing that the trilateral meetings would falter without someone in the State Department to 
support them at the proper level, Michael Green, Senior Director of Asia at the NSC, and Andrew 
Shearer, a senior diplomat at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade worked on a plan 
to continue the meetings625. Since the trilateral meetings could no longer take place at the deputy 
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Secretary of State level, the two men decided to approach their respective ministers with the proposal 
to elevate them to minister-level. On a long-haul flight to the region in March 2005, Green persuaded  
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice of the need to keep the meetings going at the Secretary level626, 
while Shearer spoke to Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer in Canberra. According to 
Shearer, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura was happy to accede to the elevation, given the 
circumstances627. The elevation was announced in May 2005 in a meeting between the three in 
Washington628, with the second trilateral ministerial taking place in March 2006, with Alexander 
Downer hosting Taro Aso and Condoleezza Rice in Sydney 629. While there was a hiccough between 
Rice and Downer on nature of the trilateral (he openly disavowed the China-strategic element in the 
press briefing after their meeting), the trilateral not only survived, but thrived in political terms. 
 
Despite this, the shift of power between Mahanians and Continentalists inside the Bush 
administration’s second term was real and also affected US relations with Tokyo and Canberra over 
the latter half of the decade. After Junichiro Koizumi stepped down in Tokyo in 2006, there was a 
period of confusion inside the Liberal Democratic Party, with three different political heirs claiming 
the leadership of the LDP in as many years. Yasuo Fukuda – Koizumi’s able Chief Cabinet Secretary, 
and a proponent of engagement with China – became prime minister in 2007-2008, sandwiched, 
however, by two Mahanian China-skeptics, Shinzo Abe and Taro Aso. Abe’s tenure saw a brief uptick 
in enthusiasm from the Japanese side as he promoted a trilateral summit in Sydney in 2007 and the 
Quadrilateral initiative in 2008. However, all three leaders would be out of office within a year of the 
summit.  
 
In Canberra, Howard lost the premiership to Labor Party Kevin Rudd, a Continentalist, just two months 
after the APEC Summit in September. Rudd, a former diplomat who spoke fluent Chinese, was known 
for his more-accommodating stance vis a vis China. What is interesting about this period, is that 
despite the electoral gains of the pro-engagement Continentalist group, the trilateral managed to 
continue growing. This was possible, partly because of the Green-Shearer upgrade described above, 
and partly because the trilateral became more diffused among the various agencies of government. 
In the wake of the success of the Core Group during the 2004-5 Indian Ocean Tsunami reconstruction 
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efforts, for example, the US Department of Defense in 2006 proposed another separate trilateral 
forum, dedicated to increasing security cooperation and interoperability between American, Japanese 
and Australian forces630. The new Security Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), came about partly 
because Pentagon officials had found large deficits in inter- and intra-ministerial planning and 
cooperation inside Japan as part of the 2001-2004 Global Defense Posture Review ordered by 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld631. Traditionally, MOFA had dominated strategic dialogues with 
the DOD, but without the relevant military expertise, conversations with MOFA personnel had their 
limitations for the DOD. Therefore, in creating the SDCF, the DOD preferred that the newly-elevated 
Japanese Ministry of Defense lead, with MOFA taking more of a back seat.  
  
6.8. Expanding Australia-Japan and trilateral Security Ties   
Japan-Australia bilateral security ties continued of their own accord, seemingly drawing momentum 
from the military bureaucracy and from events on the ground. They had experienced an immense 
boost from cooperation in the Indian Ocean Tsunami, and this was increased in early 2005, when 
Canberra agreed to provide force protection for the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group 
in Samawah Province, Iraq. Due to Japan’s Constitutional constraints, Japanese Ground Self Defense 
Forces (GSDF) deployed under extremely restrictive rules of engagement, a serious liability in 
Southern Iraq at the time. The deal for Australia to provide force protection was initially negotiated 
by Jack Straw632, the British Foreign Secretary, who sought to plug the gap caused by a scheduled troop 
withdrawal of Dutch forces in March 2005. In January, Straw telephoned Downer and made a formal 
request. Downer contacted Prime Minister Howard who was then at the annual Davos meeting in 
Switzerland633 and once the two were both back in Canberra, they worked first to persuade the 
cabinet, and then the Australian public of the need to send Australian troops back to Iraq634. Once the 
Cabinet was convinced, they approached their Japanese counterparts. Negotiating through Foreign 
Minister Nobutaka Machimura, they agreed to have Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi telephone 
Howard and make the request personally, as such a request would play better with the Australian 
public. Both the telephone call and the overall policy were successful, and in late February 2005, 450 
Australian troops deployed to the Al Muthanna Task Group, replacing the Dutch in Southern Iraq and 
providing force protection for Japanese forces.  
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The impact that this had within the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) / Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
cannot be overstated, and played a large role in overturning the traditional reticence of senior JDA 
policymakers to engage deeply with non-US militaries635, as well as influencing the view of Japanese 
political elites of the possibility of a quasi-alliance with Australia636. It also paved the way for a new 
security agreement, the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007. 
 
In September 2006, Shinzo Abe – Koizumi’s lieutenant and former Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS), and 
the scion of a notable political family – was elected leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Like 
Koizumi, he supported Japan’s strong alliance with the United States. Distinguishing himself from 
Koizumi during the LDP leadership campaign, however, Abe advocated an assertive foreign policy and 
the development of ‘strategic dialogues’ with Australia and India on the basis of common values637. 
This emphasis on values – carried out by both Abe and his close advisor Yoshihide Suga – trickled down 
to the various Japanese bureaucratic actors, helping foster the on-going enthusiasm for security ties 
with Australia638. This and the Australian troop deployment to Iraq helped pave the way for the Joint 
Security Declaration on Security Cooperation639 (herein called the Joint Declaration) signed by Prime 
Ministers Abe and Howard in Sydney in March 2007640. In a moment that stands in contrast to 
neorealist expectations, Australian diplomats opened a discussion formalizing the Joint Declaration in 
a treaty of alliance similar to ANZUS, but both pulled back at the last moment due to the constitutional 
concerns of Japanese government lawyers641. By all reckoning, Japan should have accepted such a 
treaty, given its increasing fears about China, but without understanding the political culture of Japan, 
one cannot understand why Japanese FPEs rejected the unusual offer. 
 
In light of the PKO operations in Cambodia, East Timor, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Japan and 
Australia sought to institutionalize such cooperation in the Joint Declaration and included in the 
document, “peace operations”, “humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief:, and sought 
to conduct further exercises and training642. It was, according to one Australian Defense official, “a 
                                                          
635 Anonymous, (Senior Japanese Defense Official) interview with author, Tokyo. 
636 Toyama, Kiyohiko, (New Komeito Diet Member, Secretary-General of Komeito’s Special Committee on Security-Related 
Legislation, 2013-2016), interview with author, Tokyo, February 16, 2015. 
637 Bert Edstrom, The Success of a Successor: Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Foreign Policy, Silk Road Paper, (Sweden: Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2007), pp.38-39. 
638 Holloway, Trevor, (Japan Desk, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013-2015), interview with author, Canberra, 
March 10, 2015. 
639 “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/joint0703.html (accessed on October 14, 2016). 
640 John Howard, Lazarus Rising: A Personal and Political Autobiography, (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2013), p.536. 
641 Greg Sheridan, “Security Treaty Rejected by Tokyo,” The Australian, March 12, 2007. 
642 H.D.P. Envall, “Community Building in Asia? Trilateral Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief,” In Yuki 
Tatsumi (ed.) US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges (Washington DC: Simson Center, 2015), p.53. 
 
 
155 
phenomenal thing and only hinted at the types of things that Australia could do with Japan”643 and a 
significant step for both countries644. It has provided the momentum for further institutionalization645, 
including the Japan-Australia “2+2” Defense and Foreign Minister’s meetings, which took place in June 
2007 in Tokyo. This meeting marked the first time that Japan had carried out these types of talks with 
any state other than the United States. Other forms of institutionalization between the two would 
materialize over the next five years with the Japanese military now committed to the bilateral and 
trilateral relationships646. In June 2008, the three ministers met in Kyoto, where they issued the 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement. The first area of cooperation raised in the document was 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and in the Annex, the Joint Statement committed the 
three to technical level meetings, for information-sharing and lessons learned, and committed to 
conducting “exercises to build understanding of respective emergency response procedures and 
capabilities.”647 According to David Envall, trilateral HA/DR activities took place in September 2009 
after the Sumatra, earthquake, and in July 2010 after the Pakistan floods648.  
 
6.9. The Quadrilateral Proposal and US-Japan-India Trilateralism   
The rise and fall of the Quadrilateral dialogue with India is an interesting point in demonstrating the 
need for unit level analysis in the story of the trilateral. Neorealism might predict why states that 
shared a high threat assessment of a fifth state might band together for protection and deterrence. It 
might even predict why they might bandwagon and eschew such an option, but it cannot explain why 
states promote and then abandon alliance-like structures. In order to understand why the short-lived 
project between Washington, Canberra, Tokyo and New Delhi, got off the ground, but was then 
abandoned, unit level analysis must be used. For it is only by understanding that FPEs within all three 
states were not agreed on China’s threat assessment and that they alternated in holding the reins of 
policy that we can understand this confusion. Therefore, a neoclassical realist interpretation might 
run as follows: Mahanian FPEs, holding power and sharing a common threat assessment of China, 
judged a quadrilateral as necessary. However, their initiative was seen as dangerous, and possibly 
counter-productive by Continentalists, who promptly lobbied within their own governments to 
overturn the idea. This perspective would have been magnified if elections or cabinet reshuffles put 
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more China-oriented FPEs at the reins of policymaking in their respective capitals. In fact, field 
research suggests that this is exactly what occurred between 2006 and 2007. 
 
The first event that promoted the possibility of quadrilaterals among Mahanian FPEs was the ease 
and success with which India had been included into the relief efforts of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami Core Group649. The fluid and ad hoc approach of networking among America’s like-minded 
allies, was supported by Armitage in the State Department, and Stephen Hadley, Scooter Libby, and 
Michael Green in the NSC. According to Green, he discussed the idea with Shinzo Abe prior to Abe’s 
electoral victory within the LDP in the summer of 2006650.  
 
Green remembers, “When the Quad came up, it was a surprise to everybody. I had been talking about 
it, Scooter Libby had been talking about it. Armitage had been talking about it. Hadley put it in a 
speech, but it was all based on the experience of the tsunami, which was so effective. So we all kind 
of liked it and I talked about it with Abe in person. But he’s the one who put it in the book, and made 
it a campaign promise. And then all of a sudden, he wanted to implement it”651. In the wake of closer 
US-India ties exemplified in the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement and New Framework for US-
India Defense Relationship, it was a perfect opportunity for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to showcase 
his vision for a new Japanese diplomacy based on common values and interests. His decision to 
prioritize security and foreign relations with India was a strong aspect of his pre-campaign foreign 
policy, put forward in his book, Toward a Beautiful Country [Utsukushii Kuni E]652, which sought to 
create a values-based “arc of freedom” stretching across the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Prime Minister 
Abe’s friendship with Manmohan Singh was such that he called the Indian leader “a dear friend” and 
“mentor”. To American policymakers, the idea of linking India and Japan was a “dazzling opportunity” 
653, who thought that “as the two grow closer, the US needs to pounce on this moment of opportunity 
to shape the direction diplomacy takes in this region in the coming decades”.654  
 
Indeed, the 2005 US-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement was preceded by the signing of a US-India New 
Framework for the Defense Relationship, which envisioned greater collaboration in defence 
technology, expanded partnerships, joint exercises, and by expanding “interaction with other nations 
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in ways that promote global peace and stability”655. This event, which also saw a close personal 
relationship between Singh and President Bush develop656 set the stage for US-Japan-India trilateral 
meetings, and a trilateral naval exercise off the coast of Tokyo in April 2007. Thereafter, Prime Minister 
Abe proposed a Quadrilateral meeting to take place at the ministerial level, to discuss security and 
intelligence-sharing issues, with his advisors Nobukatsu Kanehara and Tomohiro Taniguchi leading the 
diplomatic charge. According to Rory Medcalf, the Quadrilateral meeting began on the sidelines of 
ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Manila in May 2007, when foreign policy officials from the three 
countries met under the rubric of “shared values and common interests”,657 without a fully-planned 
agenda. Promoted by Libby Scooter in the White House, the Quadrilateral found support with 
President Dick Cheney and Senator John McCain, who viewed it in light of the “concert of 
democracies” concept outlined in the 2006 Princeton Project Report658. The Manila meeting was 
swiftly followed up by a planned week-long war games in the Bay of Bengal in September, with 
Singapore joining the US, Japan, India, and Australia, as well as a Japan-India security agreement 
ratified by Prime Minister Singh on a visit to Tokyo in October 2007. 
 
Despite this enthusiasm, the Quadrilateral would not meet again. Indeed, before the Quadrilateral 
had even met in Manila, Chinese diplomats were approaching Continentalist counterparts in all four 
countries demanding information on the quadrilateral’s purpose and issuing demarches659. Chinese 
concerns continued growing after the Quadrilateral meeting and in October, President Hu Jintao 
approached Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the G8 Summit in Germany, reiterating 
Beijing’s concerns and fear of encirclement.660 His response, “India is not part of any so-called contain 
China effort,”661 which did little to reassure Hu. China continued to apply pressure on the right points 
in the governments of all four countries. At times, they even seemed willing to stoop to petty 
punishments, such as stalling visas for Indian delegations visiting China662. While support for the 
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Quadrilateral was strong in the American National Security Council, within the Prime Ministers’ offices 
in Australia, Japan, and India, concerns began to reverberate around the various foreign ministries 
over China’s strong reaction to what it saw as a “little NATO” in Asia. The initiative’s primary supporter, 
Shinzo Abe, resigned in September 2007, citing ill health. The timing was not auspicious: The Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was deeply divided, and under immense financial pressure at that time663.  
 
According to some sources, a small group of Continentalists from within the State Department, 
approached Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Christopher Hill, and 
persuaded him to abandon the concept664. His skepticism was shared by Australian Secretary of DFAT, 
Michael L’Estrange and India’s Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, both of whom were becoming 
increasingly aware of Continentalist opposition to the idea665 and who were concerned that such a 
body might antagonize Beijing and ratchet up tensions further. The electoral victory of Kevin Rudd, in 
Australia, cemented the end of the initiative, with Rudd privately reassuring China’s foreign minister, 
Yang Jiechi that Australia would no longer join the Quadrilateral meetings in late 2008. This was 
followed up by Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith’s public announcement that Australia was 
unilaterally withdrawing from the Quadrilateral when he met with Foreign Minister Yang at the first 
Australia-China strategic dialogue in early 2008666. Despite this apparent diplomatic defeat of the 
Quadrilateral, meetings continued to take place at the track 1.5 level667. With regards to India’s 
participation in strategic discussions, these continued under the rubric of US-Japan-India trilateral 
meetings, which began in 2006, with the first ‘official’ meeting in 2011, when Assistant Secretary of 
State for South and Central Asia and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell hosted their Japanese 
and Indian counterparts in Washington668. This has recently – as of September 2015 – been upgraded 
to a Ministerial, with Secretary of State John Kerry hosting Japanese and Indian foreign ministers, 
Fumio Kishida and Sushma Swaraj in New York. 
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6.10. China and Regional Security   
Despite Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s efforts to give coherence to America’s China policy, 
Sino-American ties continued to deteriorate in the latter half of the decade. This period also saw a 
continuing decline in Sino-Japanese relations. This decline took place despite a brief political warming 
between Tokyo and Beijing, during the premierships of pro-engagement prime ministers, Yasuo 
Fukuda (2007-8) and Yukio Hatoyama (2009-2010). The goodwill China had earned with its maritime 
neighbours with the 2002 China-ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
(DOC) and the 2007 Sino-Japanese Agreement for Joint Hydrocarbon Development, was lost during 
the latter half of the decade. In the first instance, China pressured BP not to develop with Hanoi two 
gas fields 230 miles off of Vietnam’s southeastern coast; then, in July, a Chinese naval patrol fired on 
a Vietnamese fishing vessel, killing a sailor, finally in December 2007, Beijing created a county-level 
city, Sansha on Hainan island to administer China’s claims, including the Vietnamese-claimed islands 
in the Paracel Island chain. Such was the level of feeling in Hanoi that anti-Chinese demonstrations 
broke out in Vietnam throughout 2007669. This pattern was repeated for the Philippines, where a Joint 
Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), initially hailed as a “historic diplomatic breakthrough for peace 
and security in the region,” by Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a political 
liability, since it appeared to apportion one-sixth of Philippines claimed territory to China670. This, and 
China’s diplomatic pressure, on the Philippines as it attempted to update its archipelagic baseline 
claims ahead of its continental shelf submission to the UNCLOS671. 
 
American FPEs remained divided over China. In 2007, two prominent books on China in the United 
States neatly exemplify this division: James Mann’s The China Fantasy: How our Leaders Explain Away 
Chinese Repression attacked the Continentalist approaches in the US toward China, while Susan Shirk’s 
Fragile Superpower, promoted the idea that China was weaker – and thus less threatening – than 
many believed. Both were “insiders” to some extent, but their opinions of China varied dramatically. 
However, by this time, American and Japanese Mahanian FPEs were becoming increasingly aligned 
over China’s “non-transparent” military expansion and spending. In the US, these concerns found their 
way into the 2006 National Security Strategy672, and became a regular feature of security journals and 
annual reports on China. The 2003 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments had been the first 
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to link anti-access, area-denial technologies with strategic intent to China673, though the report did 
not limits its concerns to China. By the latter half of the 2000s, however, this anti-access, area-denial 
strategy, shortened to A2AD, was being increasingly linked to China in US government reports, as the 
PLA developed its C4ISR capabilities, increased its mobile SRBM systems across the Taiwan Straits, and 
built up the PLAN and PLAAF with further Russian arms packages, in ways that countered and 
neutralized American advantages674. The Chinese strategic intention of “fighting and winning local 
wars under conditions of informationalization”675, extended to space, with the PLA testing an anti-
satellite weapon in January 2007. The 2006 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of China 
stated that China’s build-up was not only upsetting the balance of military power in the Taiwan Straits, 
but also across the region, explaining that: “The pace and scope of China’s military build-up already 
placed regional military balances at risk. Current trends in China’s military modernization could 
provide China with a force capable of prosecuting a range of military operations in Asia – well beyond 
Taiwan – potentially posing a credible threat to modern militaries operating in the region.”676 At this 
time, the US military approach toward China began to take two strong directions: balancing Chinese 
capabilities, and seeking closer military-to-military ties with both alliance military leaders and Chinese 
military leaders677, in the hope of avoiding miscalculations and escalations. This became more urgent 
from 2007, when American military leaders perceived some military actions of the PLA – such as the 
harassment of a US Naval vessel Impeccable – to have occurred without the knowledge of the civilian 
leadership678.   
 
6.11. Conclusion  
The Bush presidency (2001-2008) initially saw the end of the optimistic Clintonian approach toward 
collective security architecture and a lessening of emphasis on “engagement”. Instead, the Asia policy 
of the United States could be characterized by Torkel Patterson’s brief to Michael Green in the NSC: 
“strengthen alliances”.679 This matched the approach of Donald Rumsfeld and Andrew Marshall in the 
Defense Department as they sought to strengthen US alliances and US capabilities against a 
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potentially-threatening China through the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process. This would 
ultimately result in the creation of the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) in the second 
half of the Bush presidency. It also chimed with Richard Armitage, who had long-sought to make the 
US-Japan Alliance more symmetrical. His deep personal connections inside the governments of Japan 
and Australia helped facilitate an Australian initiative to broaden and network US alliances with each 
other, seeing the creation of the trilateral forum as an informal ad-hoc meeting. According to many 
close to events680, Ashton Calvert and Andrew Shearer played a critical role on the Australian side, 
with Ryozo Kato and Nobukatsu Kanehara doing much the same on the Japanese side. Having this 
enthusiasm among critical players in key points of the bureaucracy allowed for the trilaterals to 
develop quite strongly. This was maintained in the second term, by Michael Green, who managed to 
have the trilateral elevated to the Secretary of State level. This he did, by working with Shearer, with 
both men persuading Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to 
upgrade the trilaterals to the ministerial level. This bureaucratic enthusiasm was mirrored at the 
leadership level, as Shinzo Abe saw in the trilateral, the answer to his quest to broaden Japan’s security 
partnerships within a broad pro-American family of nations. His interest in developing Japan’s 
relations with NATO, the UK, and Australia all attest to this, and while his India policy falls a little 
outside this area, it met with strong American approval.  
 
The Trilateral and Quadrilateral both mark a sort of hesitant search for security by their participants. 
The hesitancy comes from the fact that all three (and including India), have policy coalitions of FPEs 
who are pushed and pulled between the two security dilemmas: that of alliance 
abandonment/entrapment, and that of competition with China. As a result, these FPEs have been 
divided on whether they should prioritize security with allies or prioritize engagement efforts with 
China. Mahanians were mobilized by North Korea and by the experience of the 2004-5 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami reconstruction and disaster relief operations, but have also been propelled by other 
interests, including defense industry cooperation, intelligence-sharing, and collective security. What 
has been interesting to note is how China has interacted with these trilaterals – seeing in them as 
efforts at containment rather than of deterrence. With its complex set of economic relationships with 
Australia and India, it has managed to reveal its displeasure at the groupings, and though it initially 
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managed to nix the quadrilateral initiative, it has not been able to halt the growing US-Japan-Australia 
trilateral or the Japan-Australia bilateral.  
 
There have been broad efforts by these states – in turn – to appease Chinese concerns, by inviting it 
into separate trilaterals or security groupings. The United States developed, under Robert Zoellick, 
two different strategic dialogues with China. The rapid of these discussions has been helpful, but they 
have not, however, prevented the growth of “China threat” narratives, and “assertive China” 
narratives inside the Beltway. Chinese military spending, its targeting of American strategic 
vulnerabilities through A2AD, and its unwillingness to negotiate in the East and South China Sea, have 
not helped its case. Despite all the flourishes of language around “human security”, it is clear that 
China has helped play a large role in creating the alliance-like trilaterals, by wittingly or unwittingly 
justifying the need for future security against military buildup. Finally, Japan and Australia have both 
played large roles in developing the trilateral. Australian diplomats really are responsible for bringing 
the idea to the Americans and Japanese, and once that idea was borne, keeping it going. The Japanese 
for their part, are in the midst of immense political and strategic change, and the times and the pace 
of change suited something like the trilateral. Australian diplomats – and the first term, Bush team – 
were pushing on an open door in Tokyo, one that may have been shut only five years previously.  
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7. CHAPTER 8: THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY (2008-2015) 
This chapter will explore how after swinging between Mahanian and Contintentalist -led foreign 
policymaking in the Asia Pacific during the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama 
administration sought to balance Washington’s attention to China with its commitment to alliances. 
Indeed, such was its determination to balance American commitments to the region that it 
policymakers in Obama’s administration now divided its Asia foreign policy into three focus areas, that 
of engaging carefully and at the most senior levels with Beijing, that of continuing the alliance 
networks that were building between allies, and by returning to a commitment to regional integration 
in Southeast Asia, a priority last seen in the first Clinton administration. Notably, refocusing of 
attention on ASEAN and other integration policies was not the optimistic variant tried by the Clinton 
administration in its first term. Indeed, it was a rather more realistic version that could be said to have 
a China-balancing element, as the South China Sea rose on the administration’s radar. As interviews 
in this chapter will show, the Obama administration not only focused its diplomatic resources on 
ASEAN, it also began to fund maritime security awareness projects among the smaller states that had 
conflicting claims with China in the region. The trilateral between Australia, the US, and Japan also 
began cooperating over security-related initiatives in the region; initiatives that had both a soft 
security aspect and a hard security aspect.  
 
Initially, Obama’s administration seemed more interested in retrenchment and burden-sharing, 
seeking to partner with American allies in the provision of security, and attempting to rein in the two 
“open-ended” wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Peter Trubowitz notes, that before the election, President 
Obama spoke about “the limits of American power and the importance of keeping the US effort 
proportional to the interest at stake in any particular situation.”681 This could be seen in the first 
National Security Strategy which lessened focus on terrorism and spent a quarter of its space 
discussing strengthening the domestic economy and rebuilding infrastructure. Simultaneously, Robert 
Gates, the Defense Secretary sought to both cut spending and oversee future spending. In a speech 
given on the 65th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Gates said “The attacks of 
September 11, 2001, opened a gusher of defense spending that nearly doubled the base budget over 
the last decade…the gusher has been turned off and will stay off for a good period of time.682” The 
development of the trilateral – in tandem with the basket of policies that would come to be known as 
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the “Pivot” – would have to accommodate these fiscal tensions. The question arose as to whether the 
United States afford to balance the growth of Chinese power internally. 
 
Gates sought in 2010 to trim $100 billion in cuts from major systems, including a missile defence 
system, a new stealth bomber, and production of the F-22 Raptor683. There were also efforts to 
increase efficiency and get rid of waste, by overseeing reforms of the Pentagon bureaucracy and 
procurement system, and to lessen the dependence on civilian contractors to pre-2001 levels684. In 
some ways, it is difficult to know how much these trends contributed to support for the trilaterals, 
especially after the administration made it clear that spending in the Asia Pacific would be ring-fenced. 
Certainly, the burden-sharing component of trilateral cooperation was used internally as a justification 
for greater integration, but this was not prioritized over geopolitical elements. Furthermore, the 2010 
and 2013 defence budget plans indicated that although the administration would seek to cut $487 
billion over the next decade, this would not affect the DOD’s ability to “be prepared to respond to 
future threats from ‘near peers’ (e.g., China)”.685 It would retain 11 aircraft carriers, maintain and 
expand the F-35 and F-18 jet programmes, expand its cyber and UAV programmes.686 Clearly, the 
administration remained cognizant of the need for a strong military to maintain stability in the Asia 
Pacific region and to deter China from military adventurism. It also continued with the force posture 
changes proposed in the 2001 QDR and 2004 Global Posture Review (GPR), shifting troops around the 
region to minimize vulnerabilities to long-range precision-strike weapons, and rotating systems 
through the region for local capacity building and for deterrence and dissuasion687.  
 
Unlike the previous two administrations, the Obama administration shared policymaking power 
between the Mahanians and the Continentalists, with key roles inside the Department of State, the 
Department of Defence, and the National Security Council, going to key individuals who subscribed to 
each approach. Prominent Continentalists like Jeffrey Bader and prominent Mahanians like Kurt 
Campbell – a co-author of the Nye-Armitage Report - viewed balancing China and networking alliances 
as two sides of the same coin. By networking the bilateral system, the US and its allies would maintain 
an edge in the power balance, allowing them to dissuade and deter Chinese adventurism, while also 
engaging Beijing in what would be an optimistic and constructive manner. Hillary Clinton reveals this 
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administration’s attempt to combine these two approaches with that of regional integration in her 
book, Hard Choices, “One option was to focus on broadening our relationship with China, on the 
theory that if we could get our China policy right, the rest of our work in Asia would be much easier. 
An alternative was to concentrate our efforts on strengthening America’s treaty alliances in the region 
(with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia), providing a counterbalance to 
China’s growing power. A third approach was to elevate and harmonize the alphabet soup of regional 
multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and APEC (the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization). […] I decided that the smart power choice was to 
meld all three approaches. We would show that America was ‘all in’ when it came to Asia. I was 
prepared to lead the way, but success would require buy-in from our entire government, beginning 
with the White House.”688 Despite protestations to the contrary, it was clear that the Pivot to Asia 
policy contained internal and external balancing elements toward the rise of China – though even 
now, it balanced this with heavy political engagement. As in past administrations, FPEs with a stake in 
the US trade relationship with China, were most likely to continue stressing the transformative nature 
of American engagement with China, and promote “trust-building”689 on issues sensitive to Beijing, 
such as Taiwan and Tibet, but from 2008 this began to subtly shift. No longer did Continentalist FPEs 
espouse the transformative and liberalizing nature of trade. They seemed to realise that Chinese 
leaders had set the country on a different path. This path saw China remaining an authoritarian power 
for the foreseeable future, and becoming a regional great power and even global power. American 
FPEs noted that the domestic slogan “China Dream”690 put forward the notion that the CPC would 
make China “strong and powerful again”, and noted the apparent transition deal offered by China– 
notably in Xi Jinping’s “New Type of Great Power Relations”691 policy – proposed in 2014. Dismissive 
of this attempt in 2014 by Beijing to shape the relationship to China’s advantage, US FPEs have since 
encouraged the process of trilateral military inter-operability with allies, and prepared for a worsening 
cycle of bilateral relations with China.  
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In many ways, this emboldened Mahanian FPES in the Obama administration who favoured strong US 
alliances, and the trilateral began to take on a particularly robust shape at this time, ‘trilateralising’ – 
for example - two conventional warfare exercises that had previously been bilateral. In 2012, the Royal 
Australian Air Force was invited into the US-Japan air exercises, Cope Guam North, while in 2015, 
Japanese Ground Self Defence Forces were invited into the US-Australian Southern Jackaroo ground 
exercises. Additionally, the three navies began an annual series of submarine warfare exercises in 
Exercise Pacific Bond, which was “designed to advance participating nations’ military-to-military 
coordination and capacity to plan and execute tactical operations in a multinational environment.”692 
For many nations, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises are extremely sensitive because they 
enable forces to determine the capabilities of their partners. For this reason, only real allies are usually 
allowed to take part in this exercises. While the US is alliance partners with both Japan and Australia, 
their lack of a common treaty alliance should make trilateral ASW exercises problematic. However, 
despite the lack of a full Japan-Australia alliance, the two have been able to carry out this and many 
other types of sensitive hard-warfare cooperation. 
 
US defence officials in the Obama administration assert that all three are designed to develop a 
common communications infrastructure, common rules of engagement, as well as unit-level 
operational familiarity.693 The Australian DOD has stated that the trilateral air exercise, Cope North 
Guam, seeks to “develop multilateral interoperability and coalition procedures in humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief, air power missions, to include air superiority, close support interdiction, 
electronic warfare, tactical airlift, aerial refueling and airborne command and control.[italics 
added]”694 Whatever the public statements made about them, it is clear that these exercises are 
becoming increasingly large and complex as time passes. The largest of these trilateral exercises – the 
US-Australia combined forces Talisman Sabre – has combined air, land, and sea components between 
the three countries, with more than 33,000 personnel taking part. Japan and Australia are also regular 
partners in large-scale American exercises, such as the US-Japan-India Malabar exercise, the annual 
air exercise Red Flag in Alaska, and the biennial RIMPAC maritime warfare exercise (the world’s 
largest), often hosting up to 22 participant nations.   
As we will see, the Obama administration’s focus for trilateralism was the US-Japan-Australia trilateral, 
after the US-Japan-Korea trilateral broke down over continued bilateral tensions between Tokyo and 
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Seoul in 2003 and again in 2011. The failure of the Japan-ROK intelligence-sharing GSOMIA agreement 
to gain approval in the South Korean Assembly in 2012695 was a part of this breakdown of the older 
trilateral. Subsequently, the growth of maritime tensions in the South and East China Sea also suited 
a refocusing of trilateral cooperation as the US sought to partner with Tokyo and Canberra in building 
up the naval and maritime capacity of Southeast Asian states, and re-oriented its military posture in 
both Japan and Australia. Lacking similar historical legacies, the Australia-Japan leg of the trilateral 
continued to grow increasingly inter-operable, and sought to develop new areas of defence industrial 
cooperation in a high-profile submarine deal. Jeffrey Bader, a key advisor to President Obama, asserts 
that US regional policy was shaped by the following three guidelines: (1) China’s growing influence 
and legitimate expanded role should be welcomed by the US; (2) the US should resolve to see that 
China remained consistent with international rules and norms; (3) the US should shape the Asia Pacific 
environment – particularly with its key alliances – to ensure China’s rise is stabilizing rather than 
disruptive696.  
 
7.1. The First Term of the Obama Administration (2008-2012)  
Even before it had assumed office, the incoming Obama transition team had located Asia as one of its 
key areas of focus. Despite the Defense Department “shift to Asia” underlined in the 2001 QDR and 
2004 GPR, key advisors in the Obama camp saw themselves as “correcting” the mistakes of the 
previous Bush administration, such as the overriding concern with terrorism, the middle east, and 
penchant toward unilateral action697. According to Tom Donilon, President Obama’s National Security 
Advisor, US policy had been “over weighted” in the Middle East, and “underweighted” in the Asia 
Pacific698. There had been, they thought, serious policy incoherence on China699, compounded by a 
neglect of Southeast Asia, a view prominent in academic and policy circles at the time700. The US, for 
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example, had failed to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, failed to hold US-ASEAN 
summits, and often did not send key officials to regional meetings. However, the lines between the 
Bush administration and the Obama administration on Asia were not by political party. Mahanian 
Republicans, like Jim Kelly, the former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific from 
the first term of the Bush presidency also thought that the second Bush administration had not paid 
enough attention to what was becoming a global center of economic and political power. A 2006 
conference at the prestigious East – West Center in Honolulu, chaired by Kelly stated, “The region still 
values US engagement and role, and while the current relative inattention in Washington to 
developments in Asia does some harm to US interests, the damage is still manageable. However…Asia 
is not waiting for the United States, and Washington must actively re-engage if it is to maintain its 
influence.”701The incoming administration’s criticism of the previous Bush administration actually 
masked an internal feud between Mahanians and regionalists, who thought that the second term 
administration had been overly focused on China and North Korea in the Department of State. In the 
first instance, Robert Zoellick continued to build diplomatic and economic forums for Washington and 
Beijing to build upon, and in the second instance, Christopher Hill, Special Representative on North 
Korea, began to drag the alliance bilaterals with South Korea and Japan into the all-encompassing Six 
Party Talks, which lasted until 2007. 
 
In the months after the presidential victory, Obama’s Asia team swiftly took shape, with key 
appointments divided between the campaign foreign policy teams of Barack Obama and Hillary 
Clinton presidential campaign team. As she mentions in Hard Choices702, Clinton was able to appoint 
most of her team to the DOS703. Asia policy was initially shared between Jeffrey Bader, Obama’s new 
senior Director for Asia in the National Security Council, Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, 
and Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, though this gradually shifted, when Clinton appointed 
Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. Arguably a Mahanian, Campbell was a 
previous Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia, and joined the administration later in the 
year704. According to Admiral McDevitt, much of the intellectual work for what became the 
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“rebalance” or “Pivot” originated with Campbell during the mid-2000s705. Michael Schiffer, from the 
Obama team, became the new Deputy Assistant for Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the 
Department of Defense. Additional team members with strong Asia experience included John 
Huntsman, Obama’s appointee as Ambassador to China706. President-elect Obama’s biography – 
growing up between Hawaii and Indonesia as “America’s first Asia Pacific President”707 – also meant 
that the rebalancing policy had the personal support of the president himself708, and was less impacted 
by personnel changes between his first and second term. Hillary Clinton’s first speech – at the Asia 
Society in New York709 – boldly proclaimed the administration’s intention to strengthen ties with Asia 
and she chose710 to go to the region for her first overseas trip,711 the first time a Secretary of State had 
done so since Asia-hand Dean Rusk had done in 1961.  Despite this strong start, the first two years of 
the Obama administration were spent attempting to manage the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and 
much Asia policy – particularly that relating to China and Japan – was on collaborative diplomacy 
aimed at ameliorating a global recession as well as fighting perceptions of American decline.  
 
7.2. New Political Winds in Japan   
As has been discussed, the intra-alliance security dilemma realized itself in the entrapment / 
abandonment dichotomy. Along with the fear of abandonment, came the fear that a former ally might 
bandwagon with what had previously been a competitor712. If and when such behavior takes place, a 
foreign policy analysis (FPA) approach might suggest that it comes when there is a change in 
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government713, when one group of FPEs replace another. In 2009, the Obama administration began 
its Asia policy with a small-scale crisis in relations with the newly-elected Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ) government in Japan. As the first country to be visited by Secretary Clinton on her February tour 
of the region, and the first national leader714 to be welcomed to meet with the new President in the 
Oval Office, Japan was high on the list of the Obama team’s diplomatic priorities. To some extent, the 
US was seeking as well as providing reassurance on Clinton’s trip to Tokyo, since there growing worries 
about the direction of DPJ party leader, Yukio Hatoyama’s foreign policy vision. During the election 
campaign, he had committed his party to removing a major US Base from Okinawa715 and stopping 
the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Forces’ (MSDF) refueling mission in support of the US Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF)716. This and the possibility that senior DPJ leaders favoured a “more 
balanced”717 relationship between Beijing and Washington718 raised alarm bells with alliance-oriented 
FPEs in Washington. Following a historic electoral win, the new DPJ Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, 
laid out his foreign policy vision in a New York Times article, “A New Path for Japan”, in which he 
stated, 719 “we [Japanese] must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia. I believe that the 
East Asia region, which is showing increasing vitality, must be recognized as Japan’s basic sphere of 
being.”720 Despite its strong beginning, Prime Minister Hatoyama’s premiership was not to last the 
year; this was partly due to the fact that the DPJ had only ever held office for four years over the past 
60, struggled to implement policy, and had a poor working relationship with Japan’s bureaucracy after 
vowing to “tame” the civil service in the media721. Within months of taking office, the Hatoyama 
Cabinet was in crisis in several different areas, including a financial scandal in political contributions, 
a failure to adequately cut public spending, and reneging on a promise to abolish a tax on gasoline. In 
June, 2010, Naoto Kan replaced Hatoyama as DPJ leader and Prime Minister.  
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Despite Hatoyama’s wish to develop an equidistant relationship between Beijing and Washington, the 
DPJ government still developed strong links with Australia722, a policy that ran throughout the three 
years of DPJ rule. How was this possible? A straight forward structural explanation would predict that 
Japan would bandwagon more fully with China by also loosening ties with other US allies, but this is 
not what in fact occurred, revealing the subtle nuances brought by a foreign policy analysis approach. 
In fact, the continuation of a strong Australia policy reveals the deep cleavages within the DPJ foreign 
policy community. Despite the views of Hatoyama and Ozawa, they could not prevail over those of a 
powerful backroom DPJ politician Toshimi Kitazawa, who was the Minister of Defence from 2009 to 
2011, and who continued to support close ties with the US and Australia. In contrast to the rest of the 
cabinet, Kitazawa also seemed to command the loyalty of his civil servants723. Written during his 
tenure, the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, explicitly noted China as a concern: “China is 
steadily increasing its defence expenditure. China is widely and rapidly modernizing its nuclear and 
missile force as well as navy and air force, and is strengthening its capability for extended-range power 
projection. In addition, China has been expanding and intensifying its maritime activities in the 
surrounding waters. These trends…are of concern”.724  Said to reflect the views of a powerful Defense 
Official, Nobushige Takamizawa, the 2010 NDPG also raised the “gray-zone”725 disputes, increased air 
and maritime capabilities, introduced the idea of maritime capacity building in Southeast Asia726, 
encouraged joint operations, and shifted focus to Japan’s southwestern region  – widely seen as a 
response to the 2010 Senkaku fishing boat incident. Its emphasis on “multi-layered security 
cooperation” with Australia and South Korea saw a surge in Australian-Japanese defence relations, 
which had begun in 2010 with the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Australia, 
which Kitazawa promoted within the coalition cabinet as enabling joint peacekeeping727. Prominent 
DPJ parliamentarian, Akihisa Nagashima, Assistant Defence Minister under Kan and Security Advisor 
to DPJ Prime Minister Noda in 2011 was another strong supporter of alliance ties to the US and 
Australia.  
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A second reason why Japanese FPEs began to favor strong ties with Australia around this time was the 
growing realization among Japanese FPEs that the US-Japan-Korea trilateral had grave problems. In 
an apparent confirmation of Robert Putnam’s theory of the two-level game728, Japanese FPEs grew 
concerned about how Japan-Korean ties began to be increasingly tied to domestic debates inside 
Korea. One senior Japanese politicians – a key foreign policy voice in the LDP-Komeito coalition, 
remember, “Compared to other frameworks – like that with Seoul – the US values the ROK [trilateral] 
as much as with Australia, but while one [with Canberra] is going very smoothly, the second one with 
Seoul is going very badly.”729 Relations began to spiral in 2010, after a Korean non-government group 
established the first memorial to comfort women outside Korea, in Palisades Park, New Jersey730. 
Security dynamics on the Peninsula also exerted contradictory pressures, both encouraging and 
spoiling trilateral cooperation. A US-Japan-ROK tabletop exercise held in Seoul in 2012 on a North 
Korean contingency found that the trilateral was easily splintered in an emergency731, with each 
country pursuing wildly different foreign policy objectives. Nagashima – a DPJ legislator – states that 
under the DPJ, “the Kantei was very interested in strengthening the connection with Canberra on 
maritime security. At the same time, MOD was looking for some other nation next to the US. We 
assumed that would be Korea, but Korea was still difficult, so we just skipped past Korea to go to 
Canberra.”732 Then in January 2011, the ongoing Japan-Korea talks to sign a General Security of 
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between Tokyo and Seoul confirmed the increasing 
emphasis on ties with Australia.  began talks on a possible submarine deal between Japan and 
Australia at this time, widely seen as a back-door to deeper strategic cooperation733. Nagashima noted 
how support for closer ties with Australia were both top-down and bottom-up, and explicitly linked 
the trilateral to concerns over China:  
 
Australia is a unique country and in a unique position between US and Asia, they’re English 
speaking, very close to the US, at the same time, they’re concerned [with] the rise of China. 
They’re also very interested in regional stability. So all of these factors are really important to 
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Japan to deliver our own national strategy in this region. So, I think it’s very natural for us to 
cooperate with Australia.734  
 
A senior Japanese defence official who worked Australian relations at the time commented on the 
combination of non-traditional security and deterrence (vis a vis China) that the trilateral represented 
for MOD policy planners at the time; “…of course, we [had] to be united to deal with the different 
sorts of non-traditional security issues, like maritime security, piracy, counter-terrorism, and 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, but we also [had] to face power structures, traditional 
threats like China, so the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) framework is also effective to counter the 
rise of China as well. Because China’s sense of value[s] is completely different from others, from ours, 
like Japan, Australia, and US.”735 This sense of cultural, political, and strategic affinity with Australia 
and the United States was heightened by the March 2011 Tohoku Earthquake, Tsunami, and nuclear 
disaster. While a number of countries sent search and rescue teams, only the militaries of the United 
States and Australia were allowed to deploy within Japan to take place in HA/DR operations. The 
Australian frigate, HMAS Sydney, and heavy landing ship HMAS Tobruk, were both deployed, as were 
three RAAF C-17 Globemasters, which flew a large number of cargo missions within Japan. At one 
point, the success of Australian military participation provoked a discussion within Japan’s Ministry of 
Defence on whether a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Australia should be negotiated, 
thereby putting Australian defence forces on a legal basis, though this is yet to take place. While a 
SOFA does not necessarily lead to alliance-like behavior, it is a strong sign of general trend of the 
Japanese bureaucracy for closer military inter-operability and strategic cooperation. 
 
7.3. The Pivot is Unveiled  
By 2010736, the Obama administration had begun to signal the region on its new approach. Unlike the 
Bush administration’s Asia policy, which had been split between the strongly pro-alliance Mahanian 
approach in the first term and the more China-centric Continentalist approach in the second term, 
policymakers in the Obama administration attempted to synthesize both approaches. In Hard Choices, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the three choices facing the transition team for America’s 
policies in the Asia Pacific: “One option was to focus on broadening our relationship with China, on 
the theory that if we could get our China policy right, the rest of our work in Asia would be much 
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easier…an alternative was to concentrate our efforts on strengthening America’s treaty alliances in 
the region (with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia), providing a 
counterbalance to China’s growing power…a third option was to elevate and harmonize the alphabet 
soup of regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN, and APEC…I decided that the smart power 
choice was to meld all three approaches.”737 Thus, the Obama team sought to combine the “wheels 
to webs” ethos of Admiral Blair, the symmetrical policies of Richard Armitage, the “federated 
network” of Michael Green, and the comprehensive China-engagement approach of Robert Zoellick. 
It was thought that each leg would be mutually-reinforcing.  
 
As mentioned above, the first Obama administration contained both Continentalist and Mahanian-
oriented FPEs in positions of prominence. With his emphasis on alliances, Assistant Secretary of State 
for East Asia, Kurt Campbell emphasized that a “defining element of the Pivot is to focus on 
strengthening ties to our Asian allies, including Japan, South Korea, Australia…”738. Citing the 
“federated approach” of Michael Green, Campbell notes that the US can “act as a convener in efforts 
pulling regional states together, especially through regularized multilateral initiatives”739, which might 
“provide a foundation for knitting together a still-nascent Asian security community.”740 With regards 
to China, Campbell states that the Pivot must “avoid implementing a ‘China first’ approach often 
pursued by American administrations, which is based on the flawed assumption that getting the 
bilateral relationship right is key to getting Asia policy right.”741 Similar trilaterals to the US-Japan-
Australia variant including “US-India-Australia, US-India-Japan, US-Japan-Philippines, among other 
formations, will be crucial to building a more integrated network of alliances and partners”742 The NSC 
and Treasury seemed to be more inclined to engagement policies, and the 2010 National Security 
Strategy welcomed a “responsible leadership role”743 from China, and accompanied a real effort to 
engage more closely with Beijing. One sign of this was the administration’s decision to combine the 
various Bush-era dialogues into one senior level Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which was 
announced on April 1st, 2009. As Bader comments, the dialogue was “unknown in US relations  with 
any other country in the world and therefore indicated the importance that the Obama administration 
attached to China.”744 
                                                          
737 Hillary Rodham Clinton, Hard Choices (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). p.42. 
738 Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, (New York: Twelve, 2016), p.198. 
739 Ibid., p.206. 
740 Ibid., p.207. 
741 Kurt M. Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia, (New York: Twelve, 2016), p.232. 
742 Ibid., p.207. 
743 National Security Strategy: May 2010, p.43 Available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf (accessed on October 11, 2016). 
744 Jeffrey Bader, Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of the America’s Asia Strategy, (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2012), p.22. 
 
 
175 
 
Signaling on the rebalance first took the form of a speech made by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton at 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi, which was widely seen as an implied challenge to growing 
Chinese assertiveness745 in the maritime domain746. It was also a response to those voices that 
predicted American decline in the wake of the financial crisis. Tacitly supported by a number of 
regional states,747 Secretary Clinton stated that “while the US does not take sides on the competing 
territorial disputes” 748, the US had a “national interest in the freedom of navigation”749, and “opposed 
the use or threat of force by any claimant”750, indicating a harder line vis a vis China on the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea. The response was fierce, with China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi 
characterizing Clinton’s remarks as “an attack on China”751. Then, in October 2011, attempting to show 
that the rebalance was not wholly about China, Secretary Clinton more fully laid out the 
administration’s definitive approach to Asia, in a significant Foreign Policy article752. In brief, the pivot 
included three different policy choices in three different areas of government activity. According to 
Kurt Campbell, the pivot included “a military component, a political component, and an economic 
component”753, and the term “rebalance” or “pivot” was immediately coined by media observers.  
 
In terms of diplomacy, the Pivot can be characterized by a “diplomatic offensive” in the region, in 
three broad directions. Washington continued intensifying strategic cooperation and military 
interoperability with allies, it intensified its presence in Southeast Asia, and intensified its high-level 
meetings with China. This also included accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the 
appointment of a newly-permanent American Ambassador to ASEAN and accession of the US to the 
East Asia Summit in 2011754. It also attempted to present its new approach as regional economic 
leadership, working hard to ratify the Korea-US (KORUS) Free Trade Agreement in 2011 and giving 
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White House support in 2013-4 for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)755. Despite this, the TPP was, 
according to President Obama himself, in direct competition with China’s own model, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)756 and was seen in those terms by many commentators 
in China757. In terms of military alliances, the administration sought to strengthen alliances in the 
region, and in keeping with tradition, kept the US-Japan alliance as the “anchor of security in northeast 
Asia.”758 While this policy initially stumbled in Japan between 2009 and 2010 – as described above – 
due to the ambivalent policies of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, they continued more smoothly 
under his successors. This would have repercussions for the role the administration envisioned for the 
US-Japan-Australia trilateral, and saw administration support at the highest levels for increased 
trilateral activities. At the same time, the administration stressed alliance relations with South Korea 
and the Philippines, and invested large amounts of diplomatic capital in Southeast Asia. As Jim Schoff, 
a defence advisor with responsibility for the trilaterals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD),  
remembers, “we were primarily focused on operationalizing regional architecture”759. This included 
building new relationships with Myanmar, facilitated by a visit by Secretary Clinton in 2011760, and 
reinvigorated ties with Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines. More significantly, the US also 
dramatically increased its defence diplomacy, sending Defence Secretary Robert Gates to many more 
regional events761, and investing in new and old military-to-military relationships762.  
 
7.4. The Evolution of the US-Japan-Australia Trilateral  
Because of the rebalance to Asia, the Obama administration came into office already well predisposed 
toward the various trilaterals which fit into its broader strategic objective of reinvigorating the United 
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States’ alliances in the region763. Tom Donilon gave due prominence to alliances in a Financial Times 
article, saying they were “the foundation for the region’s prosperity.”764 Kurt Campbell was confirmed 
into office, emphasizing the need for closer US, Japan, ROK ties, referring to, “ambitious steps to 
increase trilateral [US-Japan-ROK] cooperation”765 at a Senate hearing in May 2011. Despite this 
energy, the US-Japan-ROK trilateral continued to suffer from Japan-Korean tensions, while the 
trilateral with Australia developed slowly in the initial years of the Obama administration. This was 
partly due to the new DPJ government in Japan, partly it was due to bureaucratic silos. Jim Schoff, at 
the DOD remembers:  
 
It [the TSD] wasn’t centralized in one office, whereas the US-Japan-ROK trilateral was a couple of 
cubicles right next to each other, which were working together on all this stuff, and we only had 
one Deputy Assistant Secretary to work with on that front, because the DASD766 for East Asia had 
responsibility for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, and China. However, for the Australia trilateral, 
you had to involve the office across the hall, with another person that you didn’t necessarily know 
or get involved with that often, a separate DASD, and they had had some meetings that I was told 
about, but there was no real drive to place a high priority on this…767  
 
Part of this lukewarm interest between 2009 and 2010 was due to a lack of political interest from 
Canberra and Tokyo who both emphasized engagement with China, and wished to avoid antagonizing 
Beijing768. This was partly because American DOD and State Department FPEs still thought US-Japan-
Korea trilateral relations might still become the dominant paradigm of US alliance networking. Jim 
Schoff, a senior DOD advisor remembers, “When I started at DOD in 2010, of the trilateral initiatives 
that we had, the ROK one was more important and had more energy behind it. It was dynamic. It was 
hard, but everyone was galvanized by the 2009 North Korean nuclear test, the sinking of the ROK 
Cheonan frigate, and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. And there was a clear structure behind 
it. On the other hand, the Australia trilateral was easier to get together and talk frankly, without all 
the political, historical baggage that came with the other trilateral. But US-Japan-Australia trilateral 
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cooperation was built on a fuzzier premise, a more diverse set of priorities, and a very disconnected 
set of initiatives”769. This enthusiasm also was the result of strong political support from within the 
NSC, which had seen President Obama personally disappointed by the Chinese reaction to the sinking. 
Despite this, it became increasingly clear throughout the first term of the Obama presidency, that the 
US-Japan-Korea trilateral would be hampered by Korean-Japanese tensions. Akihisa Nagashima, 
Assistant Minister of Defense in 2010, remembers:  
 
The Cabinet Office was very interested in strengthening the connection with Canberra on 
maritime security. At the same time, the MOD was looking for some other nation to partner 
with next to the US. We assumed that would be Korea, but Korea was still difficult, so we just 
skipped past Korea to Canberra.770 
 
Broadly speaking, the Obama administration viewed the trilaterals as tools in a broader two-stage 
strategy of engagement and regional security integration, a return to Admiral Dennis Blair’s “wheels 
to webs” concept from the late 1990s. Jim Schoff, states that the administration was “trying to build 
stronger connections between wheels, that ally-to-ally cooperation could essentially build more of a 
NATO-type of arrangement, even if it’s not really a NATO, but you have a more functional, flexible 
alliance network.”771 The first stage was concerned with the allies themselves, allowing them “to 
strengthen politico-diplomatic consultations, and where appropriate, calibrate defence collaboration 
at both bilateral and trilateral levels with other key regional security players, such as India and South 
Korea.”772 The second stage involved using minilateralism to engage with Southeast Asian states773, 
particularly in non-traditional areas of security, like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief774. The 
political justification for trilateralism became more publicly acceptable after the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
and 2008 TSD Joint Statement, which committed the three to technical working groups, exercises. This 
was bolstered by, trilateral cooperation in the 2009 Sumatra Earthquake and 2010 Pakistan floods. 
After a number of typhoons rocked the Philippines during this period, and in 2011, the Japanese 
Ministry of Defense established a Capacity Building Office, which began working on projects in HA/DR, 
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maritime security, PKO, and military medicine in East Timor, Myanmar, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
in the following year775. The Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami also took place in 2011. The disaster saw 
American and Australian forces working together776 with Japan’s Self Defense Forces in the rescue 
efforts. In political terms, it was thought that the discussion of regional security at the trilateral level 
offered reassurance, while lessening gaps in allied regional threat perceptions. Australian foreign 
policy elites were not, after all as worried about Chinese assertiveness as Japanese FPEs; instead, they 
tended to focus on balancing between the US as a security partner and China as a source for economic 
growth. Focusing on these non-controversial areas of cooperation were therefore driven by both 
events in the region, and by the fact that FPEs in the three countries did not agree on what – if any – 
threat China posed to their national interests. Finally, in the absence of policy agreement, the 
uniformed services were deeply interested in practical aspects of operations, and according to Schoff, 
were prominent in shaping the agendas of many of the SDCF meetings and subsequent trilateral 
exercises777.  
 
7.5. Australia Debates its Strategic / Economic Choices 
During the Rudd premiership, Australian FPEs seemed to pull back from US initiatives, while 
maintaining the trajectory of expanding defence ties with US allies, like Japan. In the wake of China’s 
strong reaction to the Quadrilateral initiative in 2008, the new Kevin Rudd government had sought a 
more nuanced geostrategic position vis a vis China and the region. A fluent Chinese speaker, Kevin 
Rudd was often criticized by the Australian opposition as a Sinophile and a “roving ambassador for 
Beijing.”778 However, with hindsight, assessing Rudd’s foreign and security policy approach to the 
region is more easily said than done. On the one hand, his government backed away from the 
Quadrilateral initiative, and sought greater Canberra-Beijing trade ties; on the other hand, it continued 
promoting a strong relationship with Japan, following up the 2007 Joint Declaration with a 
“Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership”, announced in Tokyo in June 2008779. 
It followed this, by agreeing to a number of landmark defence agreements, which were oriented 
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around regional security. The first of these was the 2010 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement 
(ACSA)780, a post-Indian Tsunami agreement, designed to promote reciprocal logistical support “in the 
field of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations, and 
other operations”781. The second defence agreement was the 2012 General Security of Military 
Information Agreement (GSOMIA)782. Furthermore, the trilateral Security and Defence Cooperation 
Forum (SDCF) continued to expand its range of activities, joint exercises, and increased inter-
operability of the three militaries. 
 
On his visit to Beijing, Rudd also sought discussions with Hu Jintao over human rights in Tibet in the 
wake of the unrest that shook the country in 2008. Not only did Rudd’s government continue meeting 
within the framework of the TSD, it vowed to increase defence spending by $200 billion over two 
decades in the 2009 Defence White Paper, and explicitly named China as a cause of regional instability. 
The White Paper read “the pace, scope and structure of China’s military modernization have the 
potential to give its neighbours cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not 
reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans.”783 The White Paper was the first 
sign that a serious debate on China had erupted between Australian foreign policy elites within the 
defence community. According to a story in the Australian newspaper784, the Department of Defence 
was taking a more hardline on China’s potential to threaten American power in the region than was 
justified by Office of National Assessments (ONA) and Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO) 
assessments, which viewed China’s military build-up as primarily defensive in nature. Mike Pezzullo, 
the main driver behind the White Paper, thought that Australia must adopt a “hedging” strategy 
toward China. Interestingly, when ONA Chief Peter Varghese approached Prime Minister Rudd to 
intervene, Rudd allowed the White Paper to be released. It stated that such was the Chinese shock 
over the Paper that a Chinese diplomat told the Sydney Morning Herald, “For us this is confusing. Kevin 
Rudd was supposed to be the Chinese-speaking prime minister who would provide a bridge between 
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China and the US. But now it looks like he wants to act on behalf of America against China. This is 
going to be hard to explain to the Chinese people.”785 
 
The sudden end of Rudd’s premiership in 2010 and replacement by Julia Gillard did not signify a 
change in this mixed approach, due perhaps to the fact that Rudd was kept on as her foreign minister. 
Gillard’s initial criticism of the “overblown” and “unrealistic” 2009 Defense White Paper and 
replacement with a more cautious 2013 version786 seemed to indicate a shift to a more China-aligned 
posture, but this was swiftly balanced In April 2011, with a trip by Prime Minister Gillard around the 
region highlighted a growing dilemma for Australia and other American allies: A Wall Street Journal 
article by Andrew Shearer, an advisor under the Howard Cabinet stated, “At the same time as their 
economic dependence on China is growing, so too are their fears about its military muscle-flexing and 
its increasingly assertive regional diplomacy.”787 Around this time, voices within the Australian DOD 
began pushing for undersea warfare exercises with Japan and the United States, and according to one 
Australian defence official788, tripled the number of senior defence visitors to Japan. Andrew Shearer 
noted how Canberra had committed its entire C-17 fleet to Operation Tomodachi, following the 2011 
Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami789. The 2011 US-Australia Ministerial consultations (ASUMIN) also 
raised cybersecurity and further deployments of US forces to Australia. Then, in November, Prime 
Minister Gillard welcomed President Obama to Australia, where he used the occasion to lay out more 
fully, outlines of the Pivot and American determination to remain in the region: “I have, therefore, 
made a deliberate and strategic decision – as a Pacific nation the United States will play a larger and 
long-term role in shaping this region [the Asia Pacific] and its future by upholding core principles and 
in close partnership with our allies and friends.”790 The speech was accompanied by a new joint 
agreement to rotate 2,500 US Marines through Darwin on a permanent basis, seen by many as a 
counter to Chinese military power791. Prime Minister Gillard followed this up with a trip to Tokyo, 
where she met with Japanese Prime Minister Noda, with both using the occasion to reiterate their 
support for closer bilateral defence cooperation and a continued presence of the US military in the 
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region: “As staunch US allies, Japan and Australia are as one in welcoming a continued forward 
presence of the United States in the Asia Pacific as an important contribution to regional stability.”792 
Revealing the security dilemma at work, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized the move, 
“It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the 
interests of countries within this region,”793 with the Chinese Ambassador to Australia missing the 
event. 
 
7.6. Dealing with a “newly- assertive” China 
The first term of the Obama struggled with a definition of its relationship with Beijing. Secretary 
Clinton wrote, “the rise of China was one of the most consequential developments of our time…the 
United States would have to deal with a rising China and its growing economic, diplomatic, and military 
power in a careful disciplined way. In the past the emergence of new powers has rarely come without 
friction…”794 There was a growing narrative among Washington foreign policy elites (FPEs) that 
Chinese “assertiveness”795, had grown regionally, and vis a vis the United States, in the 2007-8 
Financial Crisis and the 2008 Beijing Olympics., These narratives were echoed on the Chinese side by 
discussions of “American decline”796, as well as a perception that the US was seeking “to contain”797 
Chinese power. Obama’s first term also saw an increasing number of incidents in the East China Sea 
and South China Sea, which saw China increasingly willing – and able – to press its maritime claims 
using fishing militias, a range of maritime agency vessels, and its growing naval forces. This led to 
mounting concern in the region and in Washington, and prompted Secretary Clinton’s Hanoi speech 
and diplomatic shift on the South China Sea in July798. What was most disturbing to American FPEs 
about China’s actions in the maritime region, was its apparent unwillingness to utilize traditional 
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dispute settlement bodies linked to UNCLOS and its increasingly heavy-handed tactics in contested 
maritime zones. Its military build-up of an “anti-navy navy”799 seemed to be “designed to push US sea 
and air forces away from the Asian coastline”800 leading to what Andrew Krepinevich, President of the 
think tank, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, called the “Finlandization”801 of the 
Western Pacific. While new Chinese military systems were not thought to match American 
capabilities, they were still seen as threatening due to their targeting of vulnerabilities in American 
systems, using stand-off missile forces, targeting the “Achilles Heel”802 of American satellite 
dependence, and benefitting from what US Naval War College professor Andrew Ericson calls, 
“theater concentration”803.  To some senior American observers, like Michael Pillsbury, a prominent 
China hand, and Department of Defense advisor and former official, China seems intent on replacing 
the US as the global superpower804.  
 
As a result of these tensions, the White House sought closer diplomatic, economic and military ties 
with Beijing’s civilian and military leaders, as a means of preventing sudden escalation through 
misunderstanding. In terms of the first two areas, the Obama team quickly found success with 
President Hu and Secretary Clinton agreeing to combine and upgrade the Economic dialogue to a 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED)805. On the other hand, Secretary Clinton quickly recognized 
that although Chinese leaders also sought a “positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship”, 
the way to do that was not always obvious: “This isn’t a relationship that fits neatly into categories 
like friend or rival, and it may never.”806 President Obama’s November trip to Beijing was widely 
perceived as unsuccessful by Western media807, with much of his visit becoming tightly controlled by 
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Beijing808. In addition, his inability to get China to agree on a new climate change accord at 
Copenhagen in December 2009 was widely seen as sign of a global “power shift”, though much 
Western reporting cast the blame on Beijing809. Similarly, efforts to build a greater dialogue between 
the militaries of the US and China, were stymied by increasingly strong Chinese reactions to the 2009 
US arms sales to Taiwan. Pointing out the fact that these sales were “old news”810, American military 
leaders811 struggled to replace the on-off-again nature of the military relationship, with something 
which might weather political storms812. Around this time, US defence papers called for confidence-
building measures (CBMs), recalling past successes – like the 1972 US-USSR Preventions of Incidents 
at Sea Agreement (INCSEA)813 – as models for future Sino-American relations. The year 2011 did see a 
number of high-level visits, including an exchange of visits between Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 
and General Chen Bingde, chief of the General Staff of the PLA, but even these events were marred 
by miscommunication and point-scoring through the media. Rather than using the occasion of Admiral 
Mike Mullen’s visit to Beijing to emphasize positive relations, General Chen took the opportunity to 
chide him on US operations during a press conference, saying, “It’s not [the] proper time for the United 
States to conduct military drills in the region with the Philippines and Vietnam”,814 and the PLAAF’s 
decision to test its new J-20 Stealth aircraft hours before Secretary Gates met with President Hu was 
widely perceived by the Defense Secretary’s advisors as a calculated insult815.  
 
There was a growing perception in Washington that despite the administration’s efforts to engage 
China in meaningful dialogue, the competitive elements in the relationship were growing on both 
sides. In many ways, this period exemplifies the confusion that American foreign policy elites had 
about China. Hillary Clinton had sought to guide the Chinese approach to the relationship by using an 
old Chinse proverb in her meetings with Dai Binguo, the State Counselor, “When you are in a common 
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boat, cross the river peacefully together.”816 This idea sought to promote the understanding that while 
the relationship was marked by some competition, it was also marked by a need for cooperation. The 
administration experienced some limited successes of coordination with Beijing over Iran and North 
Korea in the first term. However, it was Sino-Japanese ties where tensions were to escalate again. This 
time in the East China Sea. The 2010 Senkaku fishing boat incident was a relatively minor incident, in 
which a Japanese Coast Guard vessel was rammed by a Chinese fishing boat near the Japanese-
administered, Chinese-claimed Senkaku Islands. However, this event, and others like it increasingly 
set the tone of the US-China relationship, emboldening hawks on both sides. Secretary Clinton 
resolved to show a firm stance to China, stating the inclusion of the islands in the US-Japan security 
pact.  
 
7.7. The Second Term of the Obama Administration (2012-2016)  
The second term of the Obama presidency saw a number of changes in the administration, including 
the departures of a number of key figures associated with the “Pivot” or “Rebalance”. Despite the 
shifts in personnel, and the playing down of the Pivot to Asia, US foreign policy in the Asia Pacific 
remained largely the same with regards to the first term. This was partly due to policy extension, with 
new staffers largely following the track laid down in the first term. Jim Schoff, a senior advisor in the 
Department of Defence during Obama’s first administration described this policy continuity thus:  
 
The challenge is that every four or eight years, you do get a change in the fundamental 
approach, so I’s hard to pursue policies in a straight line, but you try to lay down as many 
boards as possible while you’re there, so you end up with a pretty small porch, but you hope 
that someone will come after you and say, they they’re starting to build a porch, maybe we’ll 
keep building this.817  
 
As Schoff went on to explain, the three policy options laid out in the first term had begun to merge in 
objectives, blurring the lines between Mahanians and Continentalists. Now, he asserted, US policy 
was increasingly focused on rectifying the region’s “impotent security framework” and shaping China’s 
behaviour into positive directions. In this new variant of the Clinton vision, the trilateral federated 
network and strengthening of regional architecture were directly linked to shaping China’s behavior. 
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Hillary Clinton left as Secretary of State and was replaced by Senator John Kerry, a strong figure on 
foreign policy, but with a portfolio traditionally centered around Europe and the Middle East. Leon 
Panetta replaced Robert Gates in the Pentagon, with Abraham Denmark – a former DOD China desk 
officer and Vice President at the National Bureau of Asia Research (NBR) – replacing Michael Schiffer 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense on East Asia. Jeffrey Bader left his post at the NSC and was 
replaced by Evan Medeiros who became Obama’s chief advisor on China. At the Department of State, 
Kurt Campbell left, with his post ultimately going to a career diplomat and NSC Staffer, Daniel Russel. 
With a number of postings to Japan and Korea, and having supported the “Pivot”, Russel is widely 
perceived as a “Japan hand”818 and a sign of continuity for regional allies. The second term would see 
much criticism of the Pivot and Rebalance, from both within the Washington policy community819 and 
from without820. With the exception of China, which continued to see the policy821 as a form of 
containment822 – criticism centered less on the validity of the policy itself, but concerned itself with 
whether the administration was resourcing the policy appropriately in the light of sequestration823. 
While the US had formally extricated itself from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, events in the Middle 
East and Eastern Europe would challenge the notion that Asia should be Washington’s priority. Despite 
this ambivalence, American foreign policy elites became more vocal over their threat assessment of 
China during this period, partly in response to China’s behavior in its near seas, and partly in response 
to its inability to reign in North Korea’s growing nuclear capability. 
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The repositioning of US forces to the Asia Pacific region – laid down in previous administrations – 
continued to build up capabilities in-theatre. This saw the US military rotate through the region B-1B 
Lancer strategic bombers824, advanced stealth F-22 aircraft825, and littoral combat ships826.  On January 
5th, 2012, new Defense Strategic Guidance was laid out by President Obama, which laid out the next 
priorities for the US military in Asia. This was followed up by a detailed speech by Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, in which he laid out the reconfiguring of military 
forces to the region, including the deployment of six aircraft carriers827. These speeches were seen by 
the administration as a way of attempting to shape regional and diplomatic dynamics, by adding 
pressure on China to halt its moves to secure de facto control of the South China Sea. According to 
Ryo Sasashi, “the core security policy motivation for the United States is to maintain a rules based 
order, ensure access to sea lanes, and maintain its leadership position based on strategic primacy.”828 
 
The trilateral between Australia, Japan, and the United States became a part of this core objective, 
and consequently became increasingly institutionalized. In 2012, the three government parts of the 
trilateral, the Trilateral Strategiv Dialogue (TSD), the Strategic and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF), 
and the Trilateral Missile Defense Forum (TMDF) had met at the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic 
Studies (APCSS) in an attempt to resolve institutional and bureaucratic issues. While attendees 
remember that while the discussions helped, efforts to rationalize the groupings were unsuccessful829. 
As the second term proceeded, trilateral institutionalization developed in three broad areas: first, it 
continued to develop more and better military exercises; second, it began coordinating policy over 
maritime strategy – in capacity-building and HA/DR – in regional waters; and third, it began fostering 
“under-the-hood” cooperation, such as institutionalized intelligence-sharing and defence industrial 
cooperation. Notably, the latter led to the abortive attempt by trilateral supporters within Canberra 
and Tokyo to procure the latest Japanese submarine and marry that to US-spec electronics systems. 
As can be seen by all three of these shifts, the uniformed services were increasingly moving the overall 
shape of the trilateral the most, with the SDCF becoming the lead trilateral in “operationalizing the 
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security framework”, linking trilateral capacity-building and military-to-military cooperation with 
states like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. 
 
 In the wake of continued and increased levels of Chinese assertiveness on its maritime periphery – in 
the form of a large ADIZ in the East China Sea and island dredging and base-building in claimed waters 
in the South China Sea, the US-Japan Alliance has seen much closer cooperation over China. In 2012, 
the US-Japan Alliance was upgraded by new Defence Guidelines, which attempted to increase naval, 
coast guard, and air force “jointery” and inter-operability for operations other than war (OOTW) in 
the East China Sea. It also established a permanent body, the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM) 
to deal with planning and crises. Australian policy continued to see-saw between Mahanian and 
Continentalist approaches during this period as it moved from an outwardly pro-alliance government 
of Tony Abbott, to the slightly more Continentalist approach of Malcolm Turnbull, while American and 
Japanese FPEs – both in government and out – seemed to become openly critical of China.  
 
7.8. Mahanian Japan: The return of Shinzo Abe 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s electoral victory in 2012 saw a strengthening of the Japan-
Australia bilateral and the US-Japan-Australia trilateral. This can be explained in a number of ways. 
Certainly, environmental factors played a role, Japanese FPEs felt that the regional security 
environment was more challenging, with the 2014 Defence White Paper referring to the “increasingly 
severe security environment surrounding Japan.” However, Prime Minister Abe’s belief system and 
the context of his cabinet, within bureaucratic structure, also played a role in how bilateral ties began 
to draw closer. According to William Tow, Abe wanted to build a Japan-Australia maritime security 
collective830, underpinned by the United States831. For this reason, he maintained strong support for a 
robust US-Japan Alliance, encouraging the further enmeshment and institutionalization of the 
alliance, as laid out in the 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines832. In this regard, the trilateral 
fitted perfectly as a means of maintaining strong links to Washington, while “diversifying” Japan’s 
defence relationships among other great powers. While never explicitly stated, Abe emphasized 
relations with US allies and both he remained close to Bush-era Mahanians – like CSIS’s Mike Green – 
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who continued to exert influence on US alliance policy833 in Washington834. Japan’s first National 
Security Strategy, released in 2013, emphasized a commitment to “open and stable seas”835, raised 
China’s “rapid rise and intensified activities in various (maritime) areas”836, committed to enhancing 
Japan’s intelligence capabilities, and maritime capacity-building assistance – and HA/DR – in Southeast 
Asia. This was echoed in the 2013 National Defence Program Guidelines837. 
 
While support for the bilateral relationship with Australia and the trilateral under Abe has been high 
among Japan’s FPEs838, it has remained weak with the general public839. Abe has been able to move 
around the public’s aversion to a growing security relationship between Japan, the US and Australia, 
because his cabinet has enjoyed some of the most centralized policymaking of any recent Japanese 
government840. Inheriting a strong, centralized Cabinet Office from Hashimoto’s civil service 
reforms841, Abe also strengthened the Secretariat’s legislative-making powers, and appointed a 
powerful and efficient politicians, Yoshihide Suga, as Chief Cabinet Secretary. He also developed a 
National Security Council (NSC) in the Cabinet Office in 2013842, which helped amplify trilateral security 
cooperation. One American defense official remembers the situation before the NSC was established, 
“Japan recognized that it had terrific inhibitions, because it did not have a single coordinating national 
security entity. There was no NSC. There was no counterpart. There was no entity at the Prime 
Ministerial, decision-making level, responsible for coordinating all sources of intelligence and all 
sources mostly of national military capability decision-making.” The impact of the new NSC was almost 
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immediate, and most political observers agree that it has worked well so far in directing policy from 
the Prime Minister’s office to the bureaucracy843.  
 
Abe’s cabinet has also promoted intelligence reform844 in order to increase trilateral cooperation, in 
addition to encouraging defence industrial cooperation845, particularly with a submarine deal with 
Australia. This has allowed Abe and those close to him to influence defence industrial policy much 
more directly846. Second, he has managed to circumvent opposition from the Cabinet Legislative 
Bureau847 – normally the key interpreter of Article 9 in the Constitution – with the support of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), which has been the most radical in trying to broaden Japan’s 
security cooperation848. This has been primarily implemented by two prominent members of the 
National Security Council, Secretary General Shotaro Yachi, and Deputy Secretary General Nobukatsu 
Kanehara, former diplomats, who have each played a part in expanding Japan’s security posture. As 
Vice Foreign Minister – under the Koizumi period – Yachi had developed closer Japanese relations with 
NATO and the US, while Kanehara – as political minister in the Washington Embassy until 2005 –played 
a supportive role in the early days of the trilateral and wrote the values-oriented “arc of freedom” 
policy under the first Abe cabinet849.  
 
The third group to support closer ties with the US and Australia has been the MOD, where Nobushige 
Takamizawa, a prominent defence bureaucrat who also sits on the National Security Council, has been 
a driving force for trilateralism and closer defence ties with Canberra. Under his leadership, the 
Japanese Defence White Paper identified Australia as a “first-ranked security cooperation partner”. 
According to Yuichi Hosoya, a legal expert who has worked closely with the Cabinet Office on collective 
self-defence, all three groups share a strong threat assessment of China, but for different reasons850. 
Kanehara and others within the liberal internationalist wing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs see 
China’s behavior as inherently threatening to the liberal international order851; Abe, Yachi, and others 
view China’s threat through the prism of Japanese identity, while Takamizawa and his supporters 
within the MOD view China as threatening because of the lack of military transparency, and China’s 
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use of military power to exert pressure on Japan’s periphery. As Ambassador Ryozo Kato has noted, 
the present day trilateral relationship has become “a comprehensive relationship with a large human 
network on all three sides.852” In Tokyo, the policy preferences of this network have become 
mainstream. 
 
7.9. Australia’s Deep Hedge   
This period also initially saw a surge of enthusiasm in Canberra for strengthening Australia-Japan and 
US-Japan-Australia ties. This was primarily because Prime Minister Tony Abbott was Mahanian in 
outlook, favoring a close relationship with the US and Japan853. He and Prime Minister Abe also shared 
a strong rapport. Like Prime Minister Howard before him854, Abbott believed that close ties to the 
US855 gave Australia more standing in the region. He even shared advisors, with Andrew Shearer – a 
key diplomat in the upgrading of the trilateral to ministerial status in 2005 – returning to the Prime 
Minister’s Office as a senior advisor between 2013 and 2015. During this period, the Australia-Japan 
relationship came very close to an alliance856, with Abbott proposing a submarine deal to Abe, which 
was seen as strategically promising by both sides. Staff talks had become so regular, as to occur every 
year or year and a half.857 FPEs within Japan and Canberra even managed to organize some bilateral 
and trilateral capacity-building cooperation projects in Vietnam858 and the Philippines859. 
Furthermore, under the guiding influence of the military-oriented trilateral SDCF, US-Japan-Australia 
trilateral military exercises increased in scope, size, and regularity. Despite these signs of greater 
institutionalization within the trilateral, all three continue to suffer internal debates, nowhere more 
clearly than Australia, where Abbott’s fall from power heralded a return to a more cautious middling 
approach toward allies and the China debate.   
 
The Japan-Australia Submarine Deal 
One might argue that the rise and fall of the Japan-Australia submarine deal is a good example of how 
internal FPE debates, and the shift of those FPEs in government can lead to policy confusion. A 
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neorealist analysis might suggest that in pursuing the deal, Australia was intent on balancing Chinese 
power in the region, by allying its naval forces with those of Japan in self-professed “northern and 
southern anchors” of the US alliance system860. The $40 million deal was first raised by Australian 
defence officials on a visit to Tokyo in 2011861, and was widely discussed by both supportive and critical 
FPEs in both countries in geopolitical terms. It flourished under the strong political support of the 
Mahanian-oriented Tony Abbott, but lost its way once Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull took office. 
Whether or not its failure was down to geopolitical considerations as some in Tokyo believed862, it 
certainly gained traction in Canberra and Tokyo due to its strong political support863. The extreme 
speed with which both sides began work on the deal under Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe, whereby 
the Japanese joint submarine bid for 12 new submarines for Australia’s Navy forces, was remarkable, 
given the traditional reticence and caution with which most Japanese defence companies treated 
international sales864, previously restricted by the ‘three principles865’. This same dependence on 
political support, may have also been what undermined it, once leadership changes took place866.  
 
The ease with which this project rose and then fell, points to the importance of FPE debates on threat-
status of the external environment, and shows how simple structural factors provide insufficient 
explanatory power for real-life events. One Japanese commentator, Masashi Nishihara, President of 
the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), notes the importance of domestic debates about 
foreign policy, “There is some hesitancy in Japan about pushing forward with the relationship with 
Australia, but my impression is those voices are quite weak today, so we’ll probably go ahead and do 
it, but in the future, we don’t know. Australia may have a different government, a different attitude 
toward China.”867 In referring to the Australian concern about provoking China into a conflict, another 
Japanese defence official close to the submarine deal, said,  
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Of course, there was a China factor. Even though Australia changed their stance a little. Basically, the 
Defense Ministry of Australia still sees China with concern. But as a government, they cannot say that. 
It’s a little bit discouraging to Japan, but for internationalists inside Japan, it’s understandable. And 
what internationalists in Japan believe that we don’t need a containment policy. We need to engage 
with them [China]. That’s what we should be aware of, and so we can have the Australia policy at the 
same level”868  
 
7.10. The Growth of China’s Threat Status   
Throughout the second Obama administration, mainstream American FPE opinion of China grew 
increasingly critical about China and vocal in this criticism. Previously such open expressions toward 
China had been muted in prestigious journals, appearing only in centre-right think tank publications 
or defence-oriented publications. While China-critical books have appeared in Washington before 
this, they have been somewhat marginal869. However, books with a China-critical theme published in 
2015 were written by a mixture of political scientists, military analysts, and former policy advisors. 
The most prominent of these was were two books by what some might have called “China hands”. 
The first was The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global 
Superpower by Michael Pillsbury. His strong Chinese language skills, a long career in the defence and 
intelligence community, and extensive network among China’s military gave some credibility to 
Pillsbury’s shocking analysis. David Shambaugh’s China’s Future870 was the second book to criticize 
China. An academic with a long career of watching China’s internal politics, Shambaugh’s book was 
co-released with a controversial essay in the Wall Street Journal, in which he stated that the domestic 
move toward authoritarianism by Xi Jinping was likely to dramatically weaken the country. “The 
Coming Chinese Crackup”871 was as contested as it was controversial, with China’s foreign ministry 
demanding that the story be taken down from the Wall Street Journal website872.  
 
The third tract written, written by two former senior diplomats, Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis was 
a Council of Foreign Relations report, “Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China”. Though anticipating 
that their recommendations would be controversial, the two called openly for a new grand strategy, 
“one that at its core would replace the goal of concentrating on integrating Beijing into the 
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international system with that of consciously balancing its rise”.873 This was primarily because – the 
authors allege – China was already pursuing threatening policies against which many American 
administrations have promised to hedge. The fourth China-critical book was the novel, Ghost Fleet – 
surprisingly enough – and predicted a Tom Clancy-like war scenario with China. What was significant 
about this book was the authors gave a high level of attention to contemporary military technologies 
that might play a part in a real Sino-American conflict. As a result, the book was extremely popular 
with the US military and became a must-read for strategists and decision-makers in Washington DC 
and on the Hill. A Foreign Policy article874 on the book alleged prominent FPEs who cited the book, 
included Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work, Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris, and 
USMC Commandant General Robert Neller. In the wake of China’s island-building activities in the 
South China Sea, and the release of a strong Chinese Defence White Paper, Chinese and Western 
media875 began to raise the possibility of war. One British scholar, Christopher Coker, even argued that 
while war seemed improbable, this was comparable to war, just before 1914 in his book The 
Improbably War: China, the United States, and the Logic of Great Power Conflict (2015). 
 
Despite these increasingly critical voices of China and “the prevailing approach toward China”, the 
Contintentalist voice has not fallen completely silent. In 2013, a prominent report China 2030 was 
published by the World Bank and the Development Research Center of the State Council. The massive 
500-page study co-written by Former-Bush appointee Robert Zoellick (along with Premier Wen 
Jiabou), outlining a reform blueprint for a more liberal development model for Beijing, showing the 
staying power of the economic liberalization. There were also signs that the Obama administration 
still sought to avoid unnecessary tensions with China. For example, one Philippine diplomat876 
asserted that US diplomats had quietly opposed Philippine plans to take its maritime disputes with 
China to the International Tribune in the Hague.  
 
7.11. Conclusion  
The central feature of the Obama administration was the attempt to marry Mahanian and 
Continentalist approaches in the US policy toward China and toward regional allies. Partly because of 
the growth of Chinese assertive behavior, Beijing’s willingness to use its military power, and the impact 
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that this has had on the region and on US domestic FPE debates, this was relatively straight-forward 
and as a result, the trilateral has continued to grow ever-closer. Although the United States continues 
to hedge, one can see slight variations – the growth in hard power balancing, for example – taking 
place. As neorealism and neoclassical realism both predict, this has seen a growth in alignment in 
security cooperation. This is evident in the growth of US-Japan-Australia trilateral military exercises, 
the ever-expanding search for inter-operability in intelligence-sharing, in military communications, 
and in battlefield tactics. While the trilateral is still not an alliance, it has an incredible amount of 
alliance-like features. 
 
Sadly, the period is marked by failure. The first failure is that of American FPEs to convince China to 
become a “responsible stakeholder”, and a failure to shape China’s behavior in the system through 
inclusive approaches to institution-building. It has also been marked by a failure of regional 
approaches – like ASEAN – to halt the slide toward great power competition. Finally, it has been 
marked by a failure of China to “rise peacefully”, since its foreign and security policy has put it at odds 
with enough regional states to facilitate counter-balancing by the United States.  
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8. CONCLUSION  
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that a neoclassical realist approach toward US foreign policy 
provides more explanatory power than neorealism for the development of the quasi-alliance trilateral 
between Australia, Japan, and the United States. Changes in the post-Cold War power balance in the 
Asia Pacific like the growth of Chinese power and the relative decline of American power, combined 
with the two security dilemmas combined created the right conditions for the “federated network” of 
trilateral –quasi-alliances. Pivotal to this process was how domestic variables in the United States 
played a key role in perceiving structural features of the international system, and how – as a result –
they formed into two broad bureaucratic policy coalitions – described in this thesis and elsewhere as 
Mahanians and as Continentalists. Their threat-assessment battles over China provoked a back-and-
forth policy output, which shaped the quasi-nature of the trilaterals within US policymaking, which 
can be seen over the three presidencies since the end of the Cold War. There was a third group, those 
who broadly sought regional integration, but their story was far less significant – both to the 
development of the trilaterals and to the overall pitch of US policymaking in the region, writ large. 
 
This chapter will examine these findings in more depth and provide a critique on where they could be 
improved or where there are weaknesses in the argument. It will then look at future avenues of 
research on trilateralism and on domestic variables and hedging. 
 
8.1. Overview of Findings  
This thesis began by making a few assumptions, which are worth revisiting here. The first of these is 
that the trilaterals are not fully-fledged alliances, like NATO or like the US-Japan Alliance. A broad 
review of the international relations literature did show that while there has long been a fuzziness on 
what constitutes an alliance, a common thread running through many scholars’ work was the idea of 
expectation. When states align with each other, they are moving into each other’s orbit on key issues 
and perhaps beginning to socialise over common policy challenges in their immediate environment. 
They may even – at this stage – begin formal and institutionalized defence cooperation. However, this 
thesis holds that they cannot be said to have allied with each other if there is no mutual expectation 
to come to the other’s defence in time of war – even if that expectation is highly conditioned. This 
does not mean that a state will not suffer from disappointment from its partner in time of war, but 
that for the sake of internal messaging, a government believes its hands to be free. This thesis rests 
on the fine foundations of scholars like Thomas S. Wilkins, whose taxonomy of alignment – of which 
allying is a subset – provides a clarity to the field that may reinvigorate and update alignment 
literature. This strict definition of what constitutes an alliance may seem arbitrary, but it is in fact a 
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common facet of how foreign policy elites have described the US-Japan-Australia trilateral. There is 
only one record of an actual government official using the term “alliance” to describe the institute, 
and they prefaced the term with “quasi”. Furthermore, of the 90 odd interviews carried out for this 
study, not one person agreed that the trilateral was an alliance. Some scholars – particularly those 
from China – declared that it “alliance-in-formation”, something on the way to becoming like NATO. 
Certainly, there were grave reservations from some officials, who found that language problematic. 
 
A second assumption that is important for this thesis is on the functionality of the trilaterals. While 
they are not alliances, they have a number of properties that make them worthy of study and 
observation. This thesis has found that the following principles apply to the trilaterals. First, each 
country brings their own motives and objectives to them. While this thesis has been primarily about 
the US reasoning for the trilateral, it has been interesting to note that the other two states have 
differing objectives and reasons for being in the trilateral. Or to put it more accurately, they all 
prioritise different functions – balancing China, building capacity, multilateralizing defence – in 
different ways. As this thesis has sought to argue, these priorities also differ internally so that the Bush 
administration’s first term emphasis on balancing and alliance-strengthening is quite different from 
the “wheels to web-building”877 conceptualisation of the late Clinton and two-term Obama 
presidencies. This buffet-style approach towards security cooperation has ultimately meant that the 
trilaterals are loose-fitting security frameworks around which bureaucracies have built and negotiated 
political objectives. This is a fascinating insight into the sophistication of modern institution-building 
and might be said to characterise alignment behaviour more widely. A third principle of the trilaeral’s 
functionality is its evolving nature. For as the trilaterals have progressed forward, moving from the 
purely diplomatic-political sphere, the high-space of strategy, and into the uniformed services level, 
so they have changed dramatically. They have moved from the policy coordination878 of the original 
TSD to the day-to-day practicality of military cooperation, championed by the SDCF and the BMDF. All 
three parts continue to change, but it is the latter two institutions that have the most potential to 
change, as they continue building intra-trilateral security interoperability and intra-regional trilateral 
security interoperability. To put it plainly, the navies of the three are now building a common 
operating picture (COP) with each other, AND attempting to foster that with willing regional partners 
in Southeast Asia. 
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 A primary insight at the domestic strategy-building level has been to discover the hedging types of 
policy outputs, when domestic actors inside states are unable to agree upon systemic challenges in 
the threat assessment stage. In a sense, this is a completely different theory of hedging than is 
currently presented by international relations theorists, who see it as a conscious strategy by states 
faced with difficult choices. This thesis uses bureaucratic pluralism and the dynamic between domestic 
actors, their perceptions of the balance of power in the international system, and their differing threat 
assessments to understand why states sometimes act in contradictory ways. It explains why states 
create half-way or alliance-like trilaterals, which do not actually contain the primary function of 
alliances – collective defence guarantees.  The current literature is not able to answer why states have 
chosen “federated networks” of “overlapping defense arrangements” over other forms of institution-
building and alliance-formation. However, using bureaucratic politics, we can see that a range of 
different actors within the state disagree on the nature and severity of threats in the international 
system. Those disagreements are not enough to prevent the creation of alliance-like institutions like 
the trilateral, but they are enough to halt or slow down their evolution to full alliance status. In 
essence, trilateralism is the impulse towards alliance-formation, constrained by domestic variables. 
 
This work has sought to (1) explain the origins and nature of trilateralism using a foreign policy 
approach over the current realist and neorealist methods; (2) placed the half-way nature of trilaterals 
within the threat-assessment debates by domestic policy actors; (3) proposed that these debates are 
another driver for a much larger strategy we commonly call hedging. Hitherto, hedging has been 
viewed as a black-box state strategy toward other states, but this thesis finds that hedging arises from 
domestic debates between various actors inside a state who contest the nature of a threat in the 
system. In the case of the trilateral, the threat debate is about China. The rise of China, its growing 
military power, and its opaque policy-making – a consequence of its authoritarian nature – have all 
created within some policy elites – called Mahanians – the perception that China is or will be a threat. 
However, the economic relationship, China’s size, and the desire to avoid a “security dilemma”, have 
encouraged another group of policymakers – called Engagers – to continue to press for good relations 
with Beijing and avoid conflict.  
 
This domestic battle on the threat assessment of China is what has created the American foreign policy 
behavior of hedging. Up until now, this concept has been debated between English Schools theorists, 
like Evelyn Goh, and foreign policy analysts like Evan Medeiros. In all cases, hedging is seen as a 
deliberate strategy. I offer an alternative explanation. Hedging is the result of bureaucratic infighting. 
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My framework borrows from Steven Lobell’s neoclassical realist analysis of how different foreign 
policy elites contest threat assessments, and thus also uses neoclassical realism as its theoretical 
approach.  
 
With the concept of bureaucratic hedging established, I then tested it against the case study of US 
foreign policymaking as relating to the trilateral strategic dialogue between 1993 and 2016. Since this 
is at heart, a foreign policy piece, this thesis relies heavily on elite interviews for its data. The range of 
interviews gathered for this project ranged over three countries, numbering around 90 individuals in 
various government departments and agencies. The wealth of data provided by the interviews made 
the selection of one case study preferable to three since much of the data collected for this study has 
not been assembled in one place before.  
 
While it is true that structural analysis provides us with many of the drivers behind US behavior in the 
Asia Pacific, such as hierarchy within the alliance and regional system, the rise of China and economic 
inter-dependence between the US and China, it has not been able to explain some of the false steps 
taken by American and allied FPEs. This is because of the double security dilemma, which drives 
American FPEs in two opposing directions. Neoclassical realism adds explanatory power to these 
structural features by examining the role of domestic variables in translating structural imperatives 
into policy outputs. The influence of Continentalists can felt – pushing back at Mahanian initiatives – 
throughout this thesis. Their views on integrating China into the global and regional economy, their 
emphasis on the security dilemma with China, have often stymied alliance-formation. This was evident 
2005, when the Department of State nearly let the trilateral strategic dialogue lapse, under Robert 
Zoellick. Another was the Department of State stepping in to halt the NSC-led Quadrilateral initiative 
with India in 2008, after Chinese protests made it clear that a security dilemma would result. It was 
also evident in the two Obama administrations that sought to soften the divisions between Mahanians 
and Continentalists. 
 
As we saw, during the Obama administration, key positions in the US foreign policymaking apparatus 
were given to both Mahanians and Continentalists. Kurt Campbell, Jim Schoff, and Danny Russel were 
able to develop and strengthen alliance-building policies in the Department of State, while Jeffrey 
Bader, Evan Medeiros, and Abraham Denmark, were able to foster high-level engagement with Beijing 
at the economic and strategic levels. Furthermore, the Obama administration’s Mahanians were able 
to bring on board those policymakers who continued to focus on regional integration. The trilaterals 
– not merely content with building cooperation between the US and its two allies – now set itself the 
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task of also building tighter security cooperation between the US alliance system and regional partners 
like Vietnam and the Philippines. Because of the differences in capacity – some, like the Philippines 
had very little – much of this trilateral regional work was in capacity-building, a phrase which covered 
both defence aid and tactical support. Setting itself the large task of helping Southeast Asian states 
defend their own sovereignty, the trilateral gave aid in the area of maritime awareness, developing 
radar systems for littoral states, that they might be able to develop a common operating picture.  
 
Finally, we saw that as Chinese behaviour became increasingly of concern to US FPEs, the defence and 
security part of the trilateral became increasingly institutionalized at the expense of the diplomatic 
and strategic side. The SDCF and BMDF became more focused on exploring ever-new ways to build 
capacity, while the TSD became ever-more dependent on the back-and-forth of different political 
leaders in the three countries. Shifts in the outlook of Japan and Australia – for example with Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd – made trilateral diplomacy less predictable. 
As one serving US official stated, however, when Mahanian-minded FPEs took leadership positions in 
both countries, it could have an enlivening effect on the uniformed cooperation. The most obvious 
example of this was the attempt by Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to 
develop a submarine deal. While the deal was ultimately unsuccessful in the end, the project was 
extremely unusual for a Japan that still regarded arms exports as sensitive. It was only the full support 
by both men that allowed the project to get as much traction as it did and though it failed in the end, 
it did develop new relationships between the defence ministries and defence industries of both 
countries. 
 
Despite the importance this thesis puts on bureaucratic coalitions in the foreign policymaking process, 
it should not be forgotten that structure is also very important. This thesis allows for that. But it also 
finds that structural imperatives lack meaning unless they are given some sort of context. This context 
is human, it is social. It is certainly political. Furthermore, we find that there seems to be a cycle 
between structure and how that structure is perceived by domestic foreign polite elites (FPEs). 
Structure influences perception through the setting of goals, rules, and players. For example, the Asia 
Pacific – a regional sub-system of the international system – has within it a number of structural 
features, which shape the perceptions of American FPEs. The legacy of the San Francisco system is 
one of those features, China’s rise another, and the efforts by regional states at building regional 
architecture, still another. The combination of these three features, along with the two security 
dilemmas, came to deeply shape the goals and objectives of American FPEs from the 1990s to today, 
and contributed to the inconclusive threat-assessment debates that particularly characterized the 
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Bush administration. International relations theory also plays a role in promoting wildly different 
perceptions among American FPEs primarily through the lens of the two schools of IR, realism and 
liberalism. When all that you have is a hammer, every problem tends to look like a nail.  
 
8.2. Weaknesses in the Argument  
There are a number of potential counter-arguments to the position laid out in this paper. One is that 
the argument is not really neoclassical realist, because it does not strictly prioritize structural 
imperatives over domestic intervening variables. A second argument is that the labels Mahanian and 
Continentalist are gross oversimplifications of how FPEs align themselves over policy positions and do 
not accurately reflect the complexity and nuances of decision making in government. Is labeling really 
just another form of cat-calling? Finally, there is a strong counter-argument which looks at the policy 
input of “threat assessment debates” and the policy output of “hedging” and notes that they are very 
basic constructions, ill-suited to the complexity of what takes place in the field of government 
policymaking. These are all strong arguments and they will be briefly examined below.  
 
The first counter-argument that the case laid out in this thesis is that it does not prioritize structural 
imperatives. Instead, structure seems to persuade FPEs of the rules of the game, the players, and their 
objectives, while at the same time, FPEs use international relations theory, and their career 
backgrounds to make meaning of structural features. It seems far more cyclical than should be the 
case, and leads to the usual chicken and egg question, of which begat which? While this is a seemingly 
strong criticism, it represents a slight misreading of the case laid out in this thesis. First of all, structure 
is prioritized: this thesis merely points out that it is actually quite difficult to correctly assess actual 
power in the system. Often, it seems as though we may only learn the correct power balance after a 
state has misjudged it and lost a conflict with another. After all, history is littered with accounts of 
states that misread the balance of power in the system. But correct power assessment may only be 
possible after many years. One might think of Zhou Enlai’s warning about the significance French 
Revolution. Naturally, states can reveal the correct power balance by falling afoul of it, but as Jeffrey 
Taliaferro has pointed out, this is a much higher bar than first it appears. Particularly in dealing with a 
state of the United States’ size and capabilities, there is a lot of room for error before it is revealed 
that a state has misjudged power in the system. Also, it is difficult to tell which perceptions of the 
system are completely inaccurate immediately. Instead, this seems to remain a historical activity. It 
may take decades, even centuries before we are able to say with any sense of determination, that this 
and or that point, was the point in which American FPEs began to misjudge the structural balance of 
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power in the system. Therefore, this thesis tends toward the view that the relationship between 
structure and perception is more usefully seen as cyclical rather than top-down.  
 
A second possible weakness of this thesis is the division of American FPEs into the two rather arbitrary 
labels, Mahanians and Continentalists. First of all, are we not simply using politer terms for “hawks” 
and “panda-huggers”? Second, doesn’t this label oversimplify both how FPEs conceive of US national 
interests and the nature of decision-making. Isn’t decision-making situational? These labels presume 
that some FPEs decided early in the careers on a set of objectives and principles to guide them on US 
policy in Asia and these remained static from then on? Someone who wanted to engage China in the 
1990s might now wish to contain them. The short answer to this, is that nothing about these terms 
implies that once one falls into one camp they are branded for life. They are approximate positions in 
a very complex scale of positions. They are also a useful fiction. For if we were to use the actual 
complexities of human decision-making (whether one had visited China, whether one liked the color 
blue, or bagels, or whether one was going through a divorce when that decision was made), we would 
simply be engaged in description. The exercise would be next to meaningless. However, by conceiving 
of FPE policy baskets in these two areas, we can get some badly-needed clarity. Again, if we think of 
the Underground Map’s relationship to real-life London, we can account for the utility of 
representational images. These labels stand as a way that we can define the lowest common 
denominator that allows individuals to coalesce into a significant coalition. They may disagree on a 
great many things, but at the lowest end of the spectrum, what they hold in common is a tendency to 
prioritize certain policy objectives. This, at a minimum, sets them apart from another group. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, is the attempt by this thesis to simplify complex grand strategy 
into two sequential features: “threat-assessment debates” and “hedging”. Prioritizing these terms, 
seems to oversimplify the broad range of policymaking choices that make up grand strategy and while 
providing neatness, hinders effective explanatory power. There are two possible responses to this 
point. First, as with the above question, this is really a question that lies at the heart of neoclassical 
realism as an approach – what is the right line between parsimony and clarity on one hand, and 
complex detail on the other? Where do we find that we have too much detail to make sense of things, 
and where do we find that we have extremely accurate predicative ability, but that these have so 
many exceptions, as to be essentially meaningless. We cannot have both perfectly. Instead, it is up to 
each scholar to attempt to find this line on the gauge between the two extremes. This thesis attempts 
to find that line in those concepts and finds that they are helpful in explaining real-life events, without 
pushing us into the realm of pure description. Second, this thesis does not claim that all grand strategy 
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falls into these categories, but that these categories adequately define how states align when 
confronted by potential aggressors.  
 
8.3. Where next?  
There are a number of interesting possibilities for future research, both in terms of the NCR approach, 
and in terms of the trilaterals and alliance research. In the first instance, we might look at what 
neoclassical realism has done for neorealism and see if it might apply to neoliberalism. That’s to say, 
the key benefit provided by the framework is to give internal and external variables some sort of equal 
or semi-equal explanatory power. The idea that all structural variables must be perceived from a 
realist perspective, however, does not necessarily follow. Neoliberalism provides its own types of 
internal-external interplay, and it might be interesting to pursue those. After all, doesn’t neoliberalism 
provide a type of structure within the international system overlaying anarchy? How should we 
account for the human constructs of the United Nations system, the global economy, and 
international society? Anarchy as a condition seems well-suited to the England of Hobbes, or the Italy 
of Machiavelli, or the Greece of Thucydides, but does not seem to accurately depict the rich 
institutional and normative nature 21st century of human politics. Yes, certainly, one might argue that 
at the end of the day, power is what sustains the international system, but already there are clear 
counter-examples that power is predicated on legitimacy. One cannot – it appears – have one without 
the other. Furthermore, we have already seen that pure neorealism does not seem to exist, given its 
heavy dependence on social meaning – in threat perception – in its explanation for state alignment. 
 
A second area of possible future research is the nexus between “federated networks” of alliances and 
“security communities”. Clearly, foreign policy elites in the United States and in Japan have shown 
that they believe that the San Francisco system might one day provide the building blocks for a 
regional security community. First, where does this idea come from? Why is it so popular among FPEs? 
Second, does the concept have any merit? In order to determine this, one would have to look at how 
institutions evolve and the nature of evolution in international relations. Furthermore, one would 
have to decide whether this topic should be approached through neorealist theory or through 
institutional neoliberal theory, or some combination featuring aspects of both. The suggestion that 
international relations theory has reached a dead end in alliance theory literature is not evidence that 
we have “finished” that field of research, but perhaps evidence that we need to reexamine some of 
the assumptions we have about alignment in general. It might be appropriate to see if this new 
investigation fits those scholars now looking at strategic partnerships, coalitions, and other non-
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traditional forms of security alignment. Either way, a number of interesting and exciting possibilities 
remain open for the scholar interested in understanding how states in a semi-secure world.  
 
8.4. The Future of Policymaking in the Asia Pacific 
In all of this, we have seen that domestic elites are unable to proceed quickly when it comes to making 
policy over complex areas. A reflection of the society they inhabit, they are pushed and pulled between 
different domestic interests. Doubtless, some of the Continentalists interviewed for this project were 
mindful of the important role that China’s economy and trade play in the health of the US economy. 
Certainly, this became a bitter point of contention in the Trump-Clinton campaign, with Donald Trump 
choosing to attack the Clintonian vision of win-win trade relations. Some of Mahanians may have also 
been mindful of the interests of the Department of Defense and the defence industry in playing up 
threats in order to continue justifying large defence budgets. These types of claims – in the absence of 
mind-reading – are very difficult to verify, and one can only attempt to get a snap shot of how given 
individuals think and communicate their thought processes during the foreign policymaking process.  
 
As we continue to proceed into the first term of the Trump Administration, it is already obvious that 
Trump as a leader differs widely from his predecessors. For one thing, he has focused his Asian policy 
on challenges, primarily on China as a potential challenger and trade cheater, and on North Korea, 
which has ballooned into a crisis in four very short months. Despite his lack of alliance-minded policies, 
it is clear that trilateralism – particularly at the uniform level – is continuing to evolve and grow, ever-
more complex in nature, and ever-more alliance-like. Now that the three militaries have developed 
annual exercises and specific objectives, they continue to push closer and closer to what many would 
describe as an alliance, without committing themselves to a formal treaty. The possibility of a 
quadrilateral with the US, Japan, India, and Australia has also been revived, and when the first three 
held the Malabar Naval exercises in early July, 2017, Australian leaders expressed an interest in taking 
part. Perhaps mindful of Australia’s unilateral withdrawal in 2008, or even concerned about Chinese 
sensibilities, Delhi decided to decline the request879. It has certainly become an age of muted 
competition and alignment; one that trilateral cooperation will become ever-more visible and of 
interest to states.   
 
 
  
                                                          
879 Andrew Greene, “India blocks Australian bid to join Malabar naval war games,” ABC News.au, 1 June, 2017, ABC Website: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-31/india-rejects-australian-request-to-join-naval-war-games/8577664 (accessed 
August 14,2017) 
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WATANABE, Tsuneo, Senior Fellow, Tokyo Foundation, 16 January 2015 
 
OYAMADA, Kazuhito, Coordinator, Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), 17 February 2015 
 
Journalists 
MIE, Ayako, Journalist, Japan Times, 5 February 2015 
 
PERRY, Richard Lloyd, Journalist, The London Times, 19 February 2015 
 
KASAHARA, Toshihiko, Journalist, Mainichi Shimbun, 14 February, 2015 
 
HASHIMOTO, Junya, Journalist, Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 February 2015 
 
 
Stage 2: Canberra – 8 March – 13 March 2015 
 
Department of Defence 
DEWAR, Scott, First Assistant Secretary, International Policy Division, Australian Department of 
Defense, 12 March, 2015 
 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
HOLLOWAY, Trevor, Japan Desk Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 10 March, 2015 
 
MCLEAN, Murray, Ambassador to Japan 2004-2011, (ret.) Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
12 March 2015 
 
Office of National Assessment 
KEAN, Douglas, Head, Strategic Analysis, Office of Net Assessment, 12 March 2015 
 
GENN, Harry, Assistant Director-General, Office of Net Assessment, 12 March 2015 
 
MAHONEY, Thomas, Researcher, Office of Net Assessment, 12 March 2015 
 
US Embassy 
PETERSON, Calvin “Pete”, Deputy Political Counselor, US Embassy, Canberra, 12 March 2015 
 
CHILDS, Gary, Political Officer, US Embassy, Canberra, 12 March 2015 
 
 
229 
 
Academia 
ARMSTRONG, Shiro, Co-Director, Australia Japan Relations Centre, Australian National University, 10 
March, 2015 
 
ENVALL, David, Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National 
University, 10 March, 2015 
 
KING, Amy, Lecturer in Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 10 March, 
2015 
 
MULGAN, Aurelia George, Professor, Humanities, University of New South Wales, 9 March, 2015 
 
SCIONE, Ben, Doctoral Candidate, Australian National University, 10 March, 2015 
 
TOW, William, Professor of International Relations, Australian National University, 10 March, 2015 
 
Think Tanks 
FEAKIN, Tobias, Director National Security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 March 2015 
 
SCHREER, Ben, Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy, Australian Strategic Policy Institute 11 March 2015 
 
CHANNER, Haley, Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute 11 March 2015 
 
 
Stage 3: Washington DC – 10 April – 10 July 2015 
 
Department of Defense 
BLAIR, Dennis, Admiral, Former Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, 1999-2002 (ret.), Sasakawa 
Foundation of the USA, 6 May 2015 
 
KLIMAN, Daniel, Senior Advisor for Asia Integration, OSD, Department of Defense, 11 May, 2015 
 
LAWLESS, Richard, Former Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs, Department of 
Defense, 2002-2009, 4 June 2015 
 
LORD, Arthur, Strategy and Force Development Office, OSD, Department of Defense, 12 May, 2015 
 
MCDEVITT Mike, Rear Admiral (ret.) Senior Fellow, Center for Naval Analyses, former Director Strategy 
War Plans, J-5, PACOM 1993-95, 27 March, 2015 
 
PRZYSTUP, James, Senior Research Fellow, INSS, National Defense University, 6 May, 2015 
 
SAKODA, Robin “Sak”, Former Country Director for Japan, OSD, Department of Defense 1994-1999, 28 
April, 2015 
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SCHIFFER, Michael, Senior Advisor to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for East Asia, 2009-2012, 19 May, 2015 
 
SCHOFF, Jim, Former Senior Policy Advisor, OSD, Department of Defense, 22 May 2015 
 
TAIT, Scott, Captain, J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Asia Pol-Mil Affairs, Joint Staff, 21 April, 
2015 
 
Department of State 
ARMITAGE, Richard, Former Deputy Secretary of State, 2001-2005. 26 May, 2015 
 
HANSEN, Scott, Political-Military Affairs, Office of Japanese Affairs, Department of State, 2013-2015, 
5 June 2015 
 
DUVALL, Linnea, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, 2013-2015. 2 June, 2015 
 
SCHRIVER, Randy, Chief of Staff to Deputy Secretary, 2001-2003, Deputy Assisant Secretary of State 
for East Asia, 2003-2005. 17 June, 2015 
 
National Security Council 
CHA, Victor, Former Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council, 2004-2007. 13 May, 2015 
 
GREEN, Michael J. Former Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council, 2001-2005. 15 April, 
2015 
 
LIEBERTHAL, Kenneth, Former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and 
Senior Director for Asia, National Security Council, 1998-2000. 8 June, 2015 
 
Japanese 
KATO, Ryozo, Former Ambassador to the United States, 2001-2008, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 1, 
2014 
 
WAGURI, Hiroshi, Defense Policy Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Defense, 2011-2014, Former Capacity 
Building, Multilateral Affairs, Director, 20 April 2015 
 
Australian 
SHEARER, Andrew, Former Senior Advisor, Prime Minister’s Office, Australia, 2006-2007, DFAT Japan 
Desk, 2005-2006, 21 May, 2015 
 
Stage 4: London   10 October – 14 December 2016  
 
DOWNER, Alexander, Former Foreign Minister, Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1996-2007, 9 September 2015 
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REVERE, Evans, Former Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and pacific Affairs, 
2005, State Department Director for Japanese Affairs, 2003-2005, 30 January, 2016 
 
GLOSSERMAN, Brad, Executive Director, Pacific Forum, CSIS, 10 October, 2016 
 
JILANI, Erum, Asia Pacific Advisor, OSD, Department of Defense 2012-2016, 4 November 2016 
 
PATTERSON, Torkel, Former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director Asia, National 
Security Council, 2001-2002, Special Advisor to the Ambassador to Japan, 2002-2004. 12 April 2015 
 
PATEL, Nirav, Former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, 2009-2012. 2 June, 2016 
 
URENA, Michael, Former Policy and Plans Officer, Pol-Mil Bureau, Department of State, 2009-2010, 27 
October 2016 
 
ZOELLICK, Robert, Former Deputy Secretary of State (2005-2007), Trade Representative (2001-2005), 
23 December, 2016 
 
 
